# DoD TRADEOFF DA

## NOTES

This disadvantage argues that security cooperation with NATO draws resources and attention away from a much more pressing and immediate threat: defending Taiwan against a Chinese invasion. The strengths of the DA are:

1-The evidence that argues that the two regions are zero-sum, and the US does not have the capacity to credibly assure allies/deter adversaries in both regions.

2-The evidence that argues preventing a China conflict is more important (faster, more probable, etc.) than preventing a conflict in Europe.

3-It is a net-benefit to the DoS CP that is also out in the starter packet. They work well together. Given some of the inherent weaknesses of the DA, it has a much larger likelihood of victory when paired with that counterplan instead of the status quo.

The weaknesses are:

1-Ukraine aid now and “security cooperation now.” I fear this will be a problem for most DAs. This DA has angles, but they certainly need more work in a second wave.

2-Plan-specific links. I wrote this file before I was able to see all solvency advocates and plan mechanisms. Wave 2 of the file could definitely bulk up aff-specific research arguing: the plan *specifically* is a drain on resources and Taiwan (or Asia, generally) needs the *specific resources* that the plan draws from (AI coop, cyber coop, etc).

When prepping the file, I would start by doing the following:

---Read it. Don’t highlight it the first time, see what’s there. If you don’t know what’s there, or what you need to refute, you won’t know what to highlight anyway.

---Read every plan and solvency advocate. Surely some affs will try to not use the military, knowing whether that is a given, or will need to be won, is necessary.

---When reading solvency advocates, think about why the plan drains resources. Is it a material provision of capabilities? If so, then it’s pretty simple. But, if it’s simply a negotiating stance or a MoU, then it will be much more difficult to win a link.

---Then, start to highlight the file.

If anyone has questions, feel free to email me at brickerb@umich.edu

## 1NC

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#### US-Taiwan security cooperation is expanding now, but success depends on sustained US support

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Bilateral military initiatives are reportedly expanding, in accordance with the growing threat posed by China. Washington is reportedly considering using special operators to help Taipei to conduct irregular warfare, including establishing resistance networks and countering an amphibious landing. This could support Taiwan’s grassroots efforts to mount a whole-of-society defense of the island, integrating civilian militias with active-duty and reserve military personnel. Earlier this year, the United States and Taiwan signed a coast guard cooperation agreement. Taiwan is fielding coast guard vessels capable of carrying anti-ship missiles and envisions its coast guard as a second navy during wartime. Taiwan is also revamping its military reserve system. These are complex undertakings that would benefit from substantial U.S. advice and assistance — especially if they are to be realized this decade. Congress is also pushing for more tangible U.S. support to Taiwan’s defensive preparedness, beyond routine U.S. arms sales. The recently introduced Taiwan Deterrence Act and Arm Taiwan Act would authorize $2 billion and $3 billion a year respectively in foreign military financing for Taiwan. This could help Taipei to purchase relevant defense articles like survivable communications systems, coastal defense cruise missiles (including in shipping containers), small missile boats, sea mines, loitering munition swarms, and mobile air defenses. The Taiwan Partnership Act would establish a partnership between the U.S. National Guard and Taiwan’s military. Taiwan’s plan to spend an extra $9 billion on domestically manufactured missiles and other capabilities may also generate demand for increased U.S. military assistance.

#### \*\*\*Insert Link\*\*\*

#### Aid to Ukraine is the brink. It’s temporary reinforcement. But, doubling-down on permanent security cooperation requires a tradeoff with Asia. Turns the case.

Wertheim 22, senior fellow in the American Statecraft Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He is the author of “Tomorrow, the World: The Birth of U.S. Global Supremacy.” “Europe is showing that it could lead its own defense,” *Washington Post*, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2022/03/03/europe-defense-nato-ukraine-war/>)//BB

Providing temporary reinforcements is the right decision today in the face of Russia’s bald aggression. But the United States should resist the inclination to revive its role as the military protector of Europe, especially since Europe is awakening to its responsibilities. Britain is sending troops to the Baltic states and Poland. France is pushing “strategic autonomy” for the European Union. And days after halting the Nord Stream 2 pipeline supplying natural gas from Russia, Germany reversed a long-standing ban on providing military assistance and sent weapons to Ukraine. Germany also vowed to spend more than 2 percent of its economy on defense, finally committing to meet NATO’s target. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz declared his country, and Europe, to have reached a “historic turning point.” Both Americans and Europeans would benefit if Scholz’s words prove true. In the coming years, European states should move to take the lead in their collective defense, and the United States should do everything possible to encourage them. To stake the defense of Europe on the United States, over the next decade and beyond, would be to answer Putin’s rash gamble with a slow-moving gamble of our own. It might seem as though the United States will remain able and willing to protect all of NATO’s 28 European countries far into the future. After all, America has orchestrated Europe’s defense for the past eight decades. Yet it did so under two markedly different conditions. During World War II and the Cold War, the United States sought to stop totalitarian powers from conquering the region. An Axis or Soviet takeover of Europe would have closed off the entire continent to liberal, American-style interaction and influence, and put the Western Hemisphere on the defensive. After the Cold War, however, as the Soviet threat collapsed, the United States recommitted to Europe not because the stakes were high but arguably because they were low. Threats were so negligible that it seemed U.S. leadership could keep things that way through modest exertion — and spread democracy to boot. Expanding NATO eastward, American officials convinced themselves that what had been a military alliance was more comparable to a political club, one that need not become an adversary of Russia. Russia’s assault on Ukraine ends that chapter and begins a new one. The prospect of further Russian aggression in Eastern Europe cannot be dismissed as negligible, as it was in the 1990s or 2000s. At the same time, Russia poses far less a threat to overrun Europe and threaten American security or prosperity than the Soviet Union did. After all, the Russian economy is roughly one-fifth the size of that of the European Union, and that was before the severe sanctions of the past week. Although Russia has built a formidable military, one that enables it to launch wars like that in Ukraine, NATO’s European members collectively outspend Russia on defense. During the Cold War, by contrast, the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact boasted land forces superior in number to those of NATO (including the U.S. share), and the gap between its economic output and that of Western Europe was several times smaller than Russia’s shortfall today. In the security environment now emerging, with Russia menacing Eastern Europe, the United States is set to face major costs and the ultimate risk: great-power war between nuclear peers. Yet the threat Russia poses remains one that Europeans could handle themselves, with America acting as a supporter rather than the leader. The United States remains a superpower. Why shouldn’t it be the main counterweight in Europe to Moscow? There are two reasons both the United States and Europe would be better off if it declined this role. One lies in Beijing, and the other in Washington. The United States has already identified China as its primary rival, embarking on “strategic competition” with the world’s number-two power. Taking on China and Russia at once would be unwise and likely impossible. True, the Pentagon has previously planned to fight two wars at once, but those wars were envisioned as “regional” conflicts against small states like Iran, Iraq or North Korea. In practice, the United States had difficulty prosecuting wars in Iraq and Afghanistan simultaneously. China and Russia represent challenges of a far greater magnitude, which explains why the Pentagon abandoned its two-war standard in 2018, even as its budget has grown. If the United States doubles down on European security while leading the charge in Asia, it may either fall short in both places or default on its commitments in Europe just when they come due.

#### Perception is key. Re-commitment to NATO at the expense of Asia triggers Chinese aggression against Taiwan

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With Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, major war has returned to Europe and with it calls for the United States to prioritize countering the present threat posed by Russia over the threat China could one day pose. But Russia’s ineffectiveness on the battlefield, paired with the increasing investments European nations are making in their defense, gives the United States a better opportunity than ever to finally pivot to Asia and focus on the more formidable challenge China represents. A failure to do so could embolden China and give Beijing an opening to increase its influence, to the detriment of U.S. security and prosperity. Over a decade ago, President Obama announced the “pivot” or “rebalance” to Asia in a speech to the Australian Parliament, declaring “the United States is turning our attention to the vast potential of the Asia Pacific region.” The president’s speech followed an essay by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton entitled “America’s Pacific Century,” where she argued for a “strategic turn to the region.” All too often, however, the United States has failed to pair this ambitious rhetoric with policies that reflected the region’s importance. Now, Putin’s aggression against Ukraine has led to a growing consensus that the United States needs to view Russia as its primary geopolitical challenge and shift resources to Europe. But such a reorientation of U.S. strategy would again delay the pivot to Asia just when it is both more necessary and more viable than ever. The reasoning may be counterintuitive but holds all the same. The war in Ukraine has revealed Russia’s military is incapable of waging modern warfare and does not have the ability to fundamentally threaten NATO. Russia failed to establish air superiority over Ukraine, its logistics are in shambles, and morale among its soldiers is reportedly dangerously low. The defining image of this war thus far is of a stalled Russian convoy stretching forty miles on a road leading to Kyiv. Overcoming these issues will take years and require a fundamental overhaul of Russia’s military culture and doctrine. Russia will have to undertake these difficult reforms with its military in tatters. While it is difficult to know exactly how many casualties Russia has suffered in Ukraine, it is well into the thousands, and the Russian military will likely suffer far greater losses if it attempts to take Kyiv. Russia has lost some of its most advanced fighter jets, helicopters, tanks, and artillery, while depleting its munitions. It will take a long time for Russia to rebuild its material strength, a prospect that will be even more daunting given the sanctions that are in force. The crisis in Ukraine has also forced European countries to awaken from their slumber, and they are now willing to shoulder a greater burden for their defense. Most consequentially, Germany has announced it will increase its defense spending to 2 percent of GDP and purchase 35 F-35 fighter jets, which will increase interoperability with NATO forces. Sweden is also looking to increase its defense spending to 2 percent of GDP, while support for joining NATO has surged in the country. Denmark has pledged to meet the 2 percent target, while Latvia, Poland, and Romania have signaled they will boost defense spending to exceed that target. A depleted and exhausted Russian military and increased European investments in their defense mean the United States can meet its obligations to its NATO allies while shifting resources to Asia. As such, the Department of Defense should continue to identify China as the pacing challenge given its military might and its regional ambitions. Taiwan should remain the pacing scenario, as it is the most difficult one for the United States to address and therefore if the United States gets that right it will be well-positioned to respond to other regional contingencies. Capabilities most relevant for a Taiwan scenario should be prioritized, in particular long-range missiles and submarines, while the United States should continue to distribute its military presence throughout the region. With NATO’s conventional capabilities set to improve, once this crisis passes the United States should withdraw the seven thousand troops it sent to Europe following Russia’s invasion and review its force posture on the continent, where it currently has ninety thousand service members based. While Putin has upended European security, nothing has occurred since the war in Ukraine began that reduces the challenge that China poses for the United States. China’s military spending shows no sign of slowing down and is projected to increase by over 7 percent this year. It is continuing to invest in capabilities designed to prevent the United States from successfully intervening on behalf of its allies and is rapidly expanding its nuclear arsenal. China’s economy is set to grow by 5.5 percent this year and it is pulling additional economies into its orbit with the entry into force of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership and ongoing Belt and Road Initiative investments. While the United States certainly needs to deal with the urgent threat to European security, it cannot lose sight of the more serious and multidimensional challenge coming from Beijing. Indeed, if the perception takes root that the United States is pivoting away from Asia and toward Europe this could prompt China to conclude it has a window of opportunity for remaking the regional order.

#### China-Taiwan war goes nuclear. Deterrence is key. It’s fast and more probable than European war.

Pettyjohn and Wasser 5-20-2022, \*senior fellow and director of the defense program at the Center for a New American Security, \*\*fellow in the defense program and co-lead of The Gaming Lab at the Center for a New American Security (Stacie and Becca, “A Fight Over Taiwan Could Go Nuclear,” *Foreign Affairs*, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2022-05-20/fight-over-taiwan-could-go-nuclear/)//BB>

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has raised the specter of nuclear war, as Russian President Vladimir Putin has placed his nuclear forces at an elevated state of alert and has warned that any effort by outside parties to interfere in the war would result in “consequences you have never seen.” Such saber-rattling has understandably made headlines and drawn notice in Washington. But if China attempted to forcibly invade Taiwan and the United States came to Taipei’s aid, the threat of escalation could outstrip even the current nerve-wracking situation in Europe. A recent war game, conducted by the Center for a New American Security in conjunction with the NBC program “Meet the Press,” demonstrated just how quickly such a conflict could escalate. The game posited a fictional crisis set in 2027, with the aim of examining how the United States and China might act under a certain set of conditions. The game demonstrated that China’s military modernization and expansion of its nuclear arsenal—not to mention the importance Beijing places on unification with Taiwan—mean that, in the real world, a fight between China and the United States could very well go nuclear. Beijing views Taiwan as a breakaway republic. If the Chinese Communist Party decides to invade the island, its leaders may not be able to accept failure without seriously harming the regime’s legitimacy. Thus, the CCP might be willing to take significant risks to ensure that the conflict ends on terms that it finds acceptable. That would mean convincing the United States and its allies that the costs of defending Taiwan are so high that it is not worth contesting the invasion. While China has several ways to achieve that goal, from Beijing’s perspective, using nuclear weapons may be the most effective means to keep the United States out of the conflict. China is several decades into transforming its People’s Liberation Army (PLA) into what the Chinese President Xi Jinping has called a “world-class military” that could defeat any third party that comes to Taiwan’s defense. China’s warfighting strategy, known as “anti-access/area denial,” rests on being able to project conventional military power out several thousand miles in order to prevent the American military, in particular, from effectively countering a Chinese attack on Taiwan. Meanwhile, a growing nuclear arsenal provides Beijing with coercive leverage as well as potentially new warfighting capabilities, which could increase the risks of war and escalation. China has historically possessed only a few hundred ground-based nuclear weapons. But last year, nuclear scholars at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies and the Federation of American Scientists identified three missile silo fields under construction in the Xinjiang region. The Financial Times reported that China might have carried out tests of hypersonic gliders as a part of an orbital bombardment system that could evade missile defenses and deliver nuclear weapons to targets in the continental United States. The U.S. Department of Defense projects that by 2030, China will have around 1,000 deliverable warheads—more than triple the number it currently possesses. Based on these projections, Chinese leaders may believe that as early as five years from now the PLA will have made enough conventional and nuclear gains that it could fight and win a war to unify with Taiwan. Our recent war game—in which members of Congress, former government officials, and subject matter experts assumed the roles of senior national security decision makers in China and the United States—illustrated that a U.S.-Chinese war could escalate quickly. For one thing, it showed that both countries would face operational incentives to strike military forces on the other’s territory. In the game, such strikes were intended to be calibrated to avoid escalation; both sides tried to walk a fine line by attacking only military targets. But such attacks crossed red lines for both countries, and produced a tit-for-tat cycle of attacks that broadened the scope and intensity of the conflict. For instance, in the simulation, China launched a preemptive attack against key U.S. bases in the Indo-Pacific region. The attacks targeted Guam, in particular, because it is a forward operating base critical to U.S. military operations in Asia, and because since it is a territory, and not a U.S. state, the Chinese team viewed striking it as less escalatory than attacking other possible targets. In response, the United States targeted Chinese military ships in ports and surrounding facilities, but refrained from other attacks on the Chinese mainland. Nevertheless, both sides perceived these strikes as attacks on their home territory, crossing an important threshold. Instead of mirror-imaging their own concerns about attacks on their territory, each side justified the initial blows as military necessities that were limited in nature and would be seen by the other as such. Responses to the initial strikes only escalated things further as the U.S. team responded to China’s moves by hitting targets in mainland China, and the Chinese team responded to Washington’s strikes by attacking sites in Hawaii. A NEW ERA One particularly alarming finding from the war game is that China found it necessary to threaten to go nuclear from the start in order to ward off outside support for Taiwan. This threat was repeated throughout the game, particularly after mainland China had been attacked. At times, efforts to erode Washington’s will so that it would back down from the fight received greater attention by the China team than the invasion of Taiwan itself. But China had difficulty convincing the United States that its nuclear threats were credible. In real life, China’s significant and recent changes to its nuclear posture and readiness may impact other nations’ views, as its nuclear threats may not be viewed as credible given its stated doctrine of no first use, its smaller but burgeoning nuclear arsenal, and lack of experience making nuclear threats. This may push China to preemptively detonate a nuclear weapon to reinforce the credibility of its warning. China might also resort to a demonstration of its nuclear might because of constraints on its long-range conventional strike capabilities. Five years from now, the PLA still will have a very limited ability to launch conventional attacks beyond locations in the “second island chain” in the Pacific; namely, Guam and Palau. Unable to strike the U.S. homeland with conventional weapons, China would struggle to impose costs on the American people. Up until a certain point in the game, the U.S. team felt its larger nuclear arsenal was sufficient to deter escalation and did not fully appreciate the seriousness of China’s threats. As a result, China felt it needed to escalate significantly to send a message that the U.S. homeland could be at risk if Washington did not back down. Despite China’s stated “no-first use” nuclear policy, the war game resulted in Beijing detonating a nuclear weapon off the coast of Hawaii as a demonstration. The attack caused relatively little destruction, as the electromagnetic pulse only damaged the electronics of ships in the immediate vicinity but did not directly impact the U.S. state. The war game ended before the U.S. team could respond, but it is likely that the first use of a nuclear weapon since World War II would have provoked a response. The most likely paths to nuclear escalation in a fight between the United States and China are different from those that were most likely during the Cold War. The Soviet Union and the United States feared a massive, bolt-from-the-blue nuclear attack, which would precipitate a full-scale strategic exchange. In a confrontation over Taiwan, however, Beijing could employ nuclear weapons in a more limited way to signal resolve or to improve its chances of winning on the battlefield. It is unclear how a war would proceed after that kind of limited nuclear use and whether the United States could de-escalate the situation while still achieving its objectives. AN OUNCE OF PREVENTION The clear lesson from the war game is that the United States needs to strengthen its conventional capabilities in the Indo-Pacific to ensure that China never views an invasion of Taiwan as a prudent tactical move. To do so, the United States will need to commit to maintaining its conventional military superiority by expanding its stockpiles of long-range munitions and investing in undersea capabilities. Washington must also be able to conduct offensive operations inside the first and second island chains even while under attack. This will require access to new bases to distribute U.S. forces, enhance their survivability, and ensure that they can effectively defend Taiwan in the face of China’s attacks. Moreover, the United States needs to develop an integrated network of partners willing to contribute to Taiwan’s defense. Allies are an asymmetric advantage: the United States has them, and China does not. The United States should deepen strategic and operational planning with key partners to send a strong signal of resolve to China. As part of these planning efforts, the United States and its allies will need to develop war-winning military strategies that do not cross Chinese red-lines. The game highlighted just how difficult this task may be; what it did not highlight is the complexity of developing military strategies that integrate the strategic objectives and military capacities of multiple nations. Moving forward, military planners in the United States and in Washington’s allies and partners must grapple with the fact that, in a conflict over Taiwan, China would consider all conventional and nuclear options to be on the table. And the United States is running out of time to strengthen deterrence and keep China from believing an invasion of Taiwan could be successful. The biggest risk is that Washington and its friends choose not to seize the moment and act: a year or two from now, it might already be too late.

## UNIQUENESS

### U---Assistance High

#### US-Taiwan defense cooperation is high now

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The United States has a nasty habit of firing resources at a military problem first and asking questions about effective implementation later — as recently demonstrated in Iraq and Afghanistan — but that does not have to be the case with Taiwan. U.S. officials are starting to get more serious about supporting Taiwan’s ability to defend itself. They debate competing policy stances on defending Taiwan (ambiguity versus clarity) but largely agree that “bolstering Taiwan’s self-defenses is an urgent task and an essential feature of deterrence,” as recently stated by the Pentagon’s top official for Asia. Experienced U.S. officials are raising the alarm that China may attempt forceful unification with Taiwan later this decade if deterrence continues to erode. In the 1970s, the United States used triangular diplomacy to gain leverage over the Soviet Union by opening relations with China and eventually switching diplomatic recognition from Taipei, which Washington had previously recognized as the seat of the legitimate Chinese state and government, to Beijing. Prior to this switch in 1979, the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group-Taiwan was the central hub for planning, coordinating, and executing defense cooperation initiatives. It served as the eyes, ears, and voice of the U.S. military to the Taiwanese armed forces. It possessed the requisite staff and planning horsepower to facilitate the large-scale military arms transfers, training, and advising that contributed to decades of Taiwanese military superiority over China, which has since evaporated. U.S.-Taiwanese defense initiatives are ramping up — to levels unseen since 1979 — due to legitimate concerns about Chinese designs on the island. However, the thick military organizational connective tissue that existed prior to 1979 is no longer in place to facilitate this cooperation. Without a military organization focused on the island, the U.S. personnel, funding, and materiel poured into supporting Taiwan may be inefficiently applied and generate limited return on investment — defined in terms of deterrence and lethality in conflict. To help to deter Chinese aggression, the United States should establish a 21st century version of this often forgotten advisory group to provide the staff capacity, synchronization, and interagency integration required to facilitate increasingly robust U.S.-Taiwanese military collaboration, bolster Taiwan’s defenses, and strengthen its will to fight. Despite inevitable Chinese government counterpressure, reestablishing this organization would probably not trigger military conflict and would be consistent with the U.S. commitment to the One China policy, guided by the Taiwan Relations Act, the three Joint Communiques, and the Six Assurances.

#### Status quo security cooperation is key to develop Taiwan’s asymmetric capabilities

Wong and Schmitt 5-24-2022, analysts at NYT (Edward and Eric, “U.S. Speeds Up Reshaping of Taiwan’s Defenses to Deter China,” *New York Times*, <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/24/us/politics/china-taiwan-military.html)//BB>

The Biden administration has accelerated its efforts to reshape Taiwan’s defense systems as it projects a more robust American military presence in the region to try to deter a potential attack by the Chinese military, current and former U.S. officials say. Russia’s war in Ukraine has made American and Taiwanese officials acutely aware that an autocrat can order an invasion of a neighboring territory at any moment. But it has also shown how a small military can hold out against a seemingly powerful foe. U.S. officials are taking lessons learned from arming Ukraine to work with Taiwan in molding a stronger force that could repel a seaborne invasion by China, which has one of the world’s largest militaries. The aim is to turn Taiwan into what some officials call a “porcupine”— a territory bristling with armaments and other forms of U.S.-led support that appears too painful to attack. Taiwan has long had missiles that can hit China. But the American-made weapons that it has recently bought — mobile rocket platforms, F-16 fighter jets and antiship projectiles — are better suited for repelling an invading force. Some military analysts say Taiwan might buy sea mines and armed drones later. And as it has in Ukraine, the U.S. government could also supply intelligence to enhance the lethality of the weapons, even if it refrains from sending troops. American officials have been quietly pressing their Taiwanese counterparts to buy weapons suitable for asymmetric warfare, a conflict in which a smaller military uses mobile systems to conduct lethal strikes on a much bigger force, U.S. and Taiwanese officials say.

#### Recent policy changes prove

Nakamura 6-1-2022 (Ryo, “U.S. willing to expand military aid to Taiwan: defense secretary,” *Nikkei Times*, <https://asia.nikkei.com/Editor-s-Picks/Interview/U.S.-willing-to-expand-military-aid-to-Taiwan-defense-secretary)//BB>

U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin indicated Washington is willing to expand arms aid and military training for Taiwan in response to China's growing threat to the island. "The United States will make available to Taiwan defense articles and services necessary to enable it to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability commensurate with the Chinese threat," Austin told Nikkei in a written interview ahead of a trip to Asia, departing on June 7. During congressional testimony in early May, Gen. Mark Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, reiterated China aims to acquire the capability to invade Taiwan by 2027. This assessment has created a sense of urgency to increase military sales and training to Taiwan's forces. At a news conference in Tokyo on May 23, U.S. President Joe Biden was asked if he was willing to get involved militarily to defend Taiwan -- "Yes," he replied. "That's the commitment we made," he said twice, possibly signaling a departure from the long-standing U.S. policy of "strategic ambiguity" on Taiwan. Though Biden said U.S. policy on Taiwan has not changed, the president's comment reflected the growing anxiety within his administration regarding a potential invasion of Taiwan by China. Washington has decided not to send troops to Ukraine, and when asked by Nikkei if the U.S. would not rule out the possibility of deploying forces in the event of a Taiwan Strait contingency, Austin said: "They are indeed two highly different scenarios." Although the real intention of Austin's response is unclear, he seemed to indicate the possibility of dispatching troops. The defense secretary touched on the implications of Beijing's recent security deal with the Solomon Islands, which reportedly could allow for China to have naval vessels stop over in a country that sits only about 2,000 km from Australia. "The recent agreement could increase instability within the Solomon Islands, and it will set a concerning precedent for the wider Pacific island region," Austin said. "The United States will seek to further deepen our enduring ties with the Pacific islands and take tangible steps to advance a free, open and resilient Indo-Pacific." He denounced Russia's invasion of Ukraine as "an affront to the rules-based international order and a challenge to free people everywhere." But the secretary added that the conflict "won't distract us from facing the challenges to a free, stable and secure Indo-Pacific region." Austin underscored the importance of "integrated deterrence" to deepen cooperation with allies in all domains. He said that the U.S. "makes the cost and folly of aggression very clear," and expressed hope for Japan to play a bigger role in deterring China.

### U---China-Focus High

#### Pivot to Asia is high now. But it’s not permanent.

Wilkinson 22, covers foreign affairs from the Los Angeles Times’ Washington, D.C., bureau (Tracy, “Remember the ‘pivot’ to Asia? U.S. wants to reassure Pacific allies it’s still on,” *Los Angeles Times*, <https://www.latimes.com/politics/story/2022-02-09/us-pivot-asia-reassure-pacific-allies>)

Like many U.S. governments before it, the Biden administration intended a foreign policy “pivot” toward China and Asia. Instead, Washington quickly faced war in Gaza, a chaotic pullout from Afghanistan and a possible Russian invasion of Ukraine. On Wednesday, Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken arrived in Melbourne, Australia, for a regional tour that will see him try to reassert U.S. influence in the Indo-Pacific against a rising China and to reassure allies worried that their issues are being given less priority in Washington. Blinken is scheduled to meet with his Australian, Indian and Japanese counterparts, whose nations, together with the U.S., form the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or Quad, an on-again, off-again group established as a counterbalance to Beijing. Speaking to reporters traveling with him, Blinken insisted that the Biden administration has maintained a “sustained focus” on the region despite an all-consuming and urgent mission to prevent Russia from invading Ukraine. He said he was on the phone in consultations over Ukraine during the long flight from Washington to Australia — the latest of some 200 engagements in recent weeks — and acknowledged that video-conferences and calls between Washington and European capitals on the crisis would continue to hum in the background of the talks in Melbourne. “Having said that, the world is a big place, our interests are global and you all know very well the focus that we have put on the Asia-Pacific and the Indo-Pacific region,” Blinken said. Blinken and the Quad representatives will tackle an “increasingly broad and deep agenda,” he said. It will be dominated by what most other countries in the region see as Chinese aggression on land and sea, as well as other issues such as emerging technologies that can also be threatened by Beijing. Australian Foreign Minister Marise Payne welcomed Blinken’s arrival and that of the other Quad ministers, saying that by gathering here they were “voting with their feet in terms of the priority that they accord to [Indo-Pacific] issues.” Target fine lines and wrinkles while visibly firming skin with our anti-aging treatment for men. Kiehls first all-in-one anti-aging moisturizer for men is specifically formulated for men's thicker, coarser skin. This revitalizing anti-wrinkle... U.S. officials tacitly acknowledge a pep talk is in order. Blinken “will demonstrate the strength and the credibility of America’s commitment to the Indo-Pacific region,” Daniel Kritenbrink, the assistant secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific affairs, said ahead of the trip. “We intend to demonstrate that our partnerships deliver, and they deliver practical and real benefits to our own peoples and to the peoples of the region.” Some in Asia expected greater interaction with President Biden, who campaigned on a shift to “strategic competition” with China as a pillar of his foreign policy. During Biden’s eight years as vice president, the Obama administration had also promised a “pivot” to Asia as its diplomatic focus. Instead, as crises erupted around the world, full-on engagement was delayed. In the meantime, Chinese President Xi Jinping, who has converted himself into leader for life, continued to claim Beijing’s sovereignty over disputed islands in the South China Sea; pushed its massive “Belt and Road” program, which spends billions of dollars in development money to gain influence in Europe, Africa and Latin America; and ignored international criticism of its treatment of the Muslim Uyghur minority, which the U.S. has called a genocide. This week, China again took the global center stage by hosting the Winter Olympics. The U.S. and several Western countries refused to send government delegations, but Russian President Vladimir Putin attended, striking a masterfully symbolic pose with Xi as the leaders of a new post-democratic alignment. The two men issued statements lavishing support on one another. “A much more powerful and assertive Xi government increasingly sees U.S. geopolitical strategy and activities in Asia through a very similar lens as [the one through which] Putin has long viewed American activities in Europe,” Ian Bremmer, president of the Eurasia Group, said in an analysis of Blinken’s tour. “To China, the Quad feels a lot like NATO encroachment does to Putin.” One potential flashpoint is China’s claim on Taiwan, which Beijing considers a breakaway republic much as Putin views post-Soviet Ukraine. Despite its stated focus on the region, the Biden administration still seems to be seeking its footing in Asia policy, said Michael Green, an Asia expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a think tank in Washington. The Trump administration receives credit for designating China as a strategic competitor, Green said, although it did not follow through with policy. Biden “has picked up and amplified” that decision, “but has essentially no economic strategy for Asia.”

#### Biden is right-sizing the force posture now to prioritize finite resources on the China threat

Wasser and Joyce 9-22-2021, \*Fellow for the Defense Program and co-lead of The Gaming Lab at CNAS. Her research areas include defense strategy, force design, strategic and operational planning, force posture and employment, and wargaming. She is also an adjunct instructor at the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, where she teaches an undergraduate course on wargaming, \*\*Professor of Political Science @ Brandeis (Becca and Renanah, “All About Access: Solving America’s Force Posture Puzzle,” *CNAS*, <https://www.cnas.org/publications/commentary/all-about-access-solving-americas-force-posture-puzzle)//BB>

The Biden administration has promised to revise US global force posture and alter the vast constellation of overseas forces, bases, and capabilities that underpin America’s ability to deter adversaries, counter threats, and protect allies. It has signaled an intent to reduce US presence in the Middle East to make it more commensurate with the region’s relative strategic importance (i.e., “rightsize” forces) and bolster its posture in the Indo-Pacific, much like previous administrations attempted to do. To this end, the administration has a Global Force Posture Review underway and has already drawn down US combat forces in Afghanistan, effectively ending the almost 20-year US presence in the country. This impulse to remake the US global footprint reflects a desire to address a new era of strategic competition with China and to expend finite resources and taxpayer dollars more efficiently. It is not the first push to revise US force posture. The Trump administration also attempted to make changes, including controversial plans to draw down forces in South Korea and Germany, while simultaneously seeking to stand up a new base and enhance US troop numbers in Poland. Such moves were, in theory, intended to correct US global posture to be more in line with the Department of Defense’s refocus on preparing for a future conflict with China and Russia.

### U---Resolve High Now

#### Resolve high now, because Biden is prioritizing Asia above Europe

Erlanger 9-28-2021, chief diplomatic correspondent in Europe, based in Brussels (Steven, “The Sharp U.S. Pivot to Asia Is Throwing Europe Off Balance,” *New York Times*, <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/17/world/europe/biden-china-europe-submarine-deal.html>)

Until this week, the so-called “pivot to Asia” by the United States had been more of a threat than a reality for Europe. But that changed when the Biden administration announced a new defense alliance against China that has left Europe facing an implicit question: Which side are you on? It is a question that European leaders have studiously sought to avoid since former President Barack Obama first articulated that America should “pivot” resources and attention to Asia as part of its rivalry with China. European leaders hoped that the relationship between the two superpowers could remain stable and that Europe could balance its interests between the two. Then the Trump administration sharply raised the temperature with China with tariffs and other trade barriers. And now the Biden administration on Wednesday announced an alliance between the United States, Britain and Australia that would help Australia deploy nuclear-powered submarines in the Pacific — and, in doing so, also tore up a $66 billion deal for Australia to buy a French fleet of diesel-powered subs. “Europeans want to defer the moment of truth, to not make a choice between the two,” said Thomas Gomart, director of the French Institute of International Relations, or IFRI. “The Biden administration, like the Trump one, is provoking the moment of choice.” France was enraged. Yet if it was a humiliation — as well as the cancellation of a lucrative defense deal — it possibly did have a silver lining for France’s broader goals. President Emmanuel Macron of France has been Europe’s loudest proponent of “strategic autonomy,” the idea that Europe needs to retain a balanced approach to the United States and China. “We must survive on our own, as others do,” said Josep Borrell Fontelles, the European Union’s foreign policy chief, echoing the French line. The French embarrassment — the Americans also announced the submarine deal with little if any warning — came after the disastrous fall of Afghanistan. European allies were furious with the Biden administration, blaming the Americans for acting with little or no consultation and feeding Mr. Macron’s argument that the United States is no longer an entirely reliable security partner. “The submarines and Afghanistan, it reinforces the French narrative that you can’t trust the Americans,” said Ulrich Speck of the German Marshall Fund in Berlin. Emmanuel Macron’s Second Term as President of France With the reelection of Emmanuel Macron, French voters favored his promise of stability over the temptation of an extremist lurch. Cabinet: President Macron’s new government combines continuity with change, as newcomers at the foreign and education ministries join first-term veterans. New Prime Minister: Élisabeth Borne, the minister of labor who previously was in charge of the environment, will be the second woman to hold the post in France. Overcoming Tragedy: Ms. Borne’s father, a World War II resistance member and a Holocaust survivor, killed himself when she was 11, an experience she has rarely discussed in public. Rape Allegations: Two women have accused Damien Abad, the newly appointed minister for solidarity and for disabled people, of raping them. Mr. Abad has denied the allegations. But whether France will succeed in turning this bilateral defeat into a way to promote strategic autonomy is doubtful, analysts suggest. “Many Europeans will see this as a transparent way for the French to leverage their own interests,” said Robin Niblett, director of Chatham House, the London-based research institution. Even so, there seems little doubt that Europe’s balancing act is becoming trickier to maintain. “Europe needs to think hard about where it sits and what it does,” said Rosa Balfour, director of Carnegie Europe. A Europe that spends more on defense is to be desired, but it also needs allies — including Britain and the United States, she said. And a Europe that does more to build its own security capacity “is the best way to be listened to more by its partners,” she added. The new alliance, known as AUKUS, is an effort to integrate Australia and Britain into the broader American effort to create a security deterrent to China. For Australia, which has seen its once-strong relations with Beijing deteriorate, America and Britain provide a much stouter deterrent to China in the Indo-Pacific, analysts agree, than could the deal with France. “It’s sending a very big signal to Beijing, which is useful for the U.S., but especially useful to Australia,” said Ian Lesser, acting director of the German Marshall Fund and head of its Brussels office. “And the weight of that signal is important because of who the partners are.”

### U---AT Ukraine

#### China is top-priority now

Ferguson 6-5-2022, Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University and the founder of Greenmantle, an advisory firm (Niall, “Dust Off That Dirty Word Detente and Engage With China,” *Bloomberg*, <https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2022-06-05/niall-ferguson-on-china-biden-should-dust-off-the-word-detente>)

The most remarkable thing about the foreign policy of the Biden administration is that helping Ukraine defeat Russia is not even its top priority. “Even as President Putin’s war continues,” declared Secretary of State Antony Blinken in a speech at George Washington University on May 26, “we will remain focused on the most serious long-term challenge to the international order — and that’s posed by the People’s Republic of China.” Blinken’s speech repays close study. About one-tenth of it was conciliatory. “We are not looking for conflict or a new Cold War,” he declared. “We do not seek to transform China’s political system. … We will engage constructively with China wherever we can.” But the rest was as hawkish a speech on China as the one delivered by then Vice President Mike Pence in October 2018, which for me was the moment Cold War II got going in earnest. In Blinken’s words: Under President Xi, the ruling Chinese Communist Party has become more repressive at home and more aggressive abroad. We see that in how Beijing has perfected mass surveillance within China and exported that technology to more than 80 countries; how its advancing unlawful maritime claims in the South China Sea, undermining peace and security, freedom of navigation, and commerce; how it’s circumventing or breaking trade rules … and how it purports to champion sovereignty and territorial integrity while standing with governments that brazenly violate them. Blinken spelled out how the US intends to “shape the strategic environment around Beijing,” citing the new Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity, announced by Biden on his recent Asia tour, and the Quad of the US, Australia, India and Japan, with its new Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness, not forgetting AUKUS, the US deal on nuclear submarines with Australia and the UK. But the most startling lines in Blinken’s speech were the ones on “the genocide and crimes against humanity happening in the Xinjiang region”; on US support for “Tibet, where the authorities continue to wage a brutal campaign against Tibetans and their culture, language, and religious traditions”; on Hong Kong, “where the Chinese Communist Party has imposed harsh anti-democratic measures under the guise of national security”; on “Beijing’s aggressive and unlawful activities in the South and East China Seas”; and — the coup de grace from a Chinese vantage point — on “Beijing’s growing coercion” and “increasingly provocative rhetoric and activity” toward Taiwan. The response of the Chinese Foreign Ministry to this confrontational speech was, I thought, surprisingly restrained. Taiwan is, of course, the key issue. As if to confirm Xi Jinping’s darkest suspicions, Biden went off script again at a press conference in Tokyo with Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida on May 23. A reporter asked if the United States would defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese attack. “Yes,” the president answered. “That’s the commitment we made. We agree with a one-China policy. We've signed on to it and all the intended agreements made from there. But the idea that, that it (Taiwan) can be taken by force, just taken by force, is just not, is just not appropriate.”

#### Aid to Ukraine doesn’t trigger perception of abandonment in Asia, yet. But, further moves to solidify US presence in Europe would

Walker 22, nonresident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and a former staff member on the Senate Armed Services Committee (Dustin, “Biden Must Do Better Than Obama on Ukraine,” Foreign Policy, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/01/27/biden-obama-russia-ukraine-military-strategy-nato/>)

The Winter Olympics are just around the corner. Russian President Vladimir Putin has Ukraine on his mind. In Washington, the Pentagon is preparing a new defense strategy that looks beyond the Middle East to focus on the Pacific and China. The White House, meanwhile, is concerned about costs and wants to rein in military spending. Sound familiar? Well, this is exactly what the world looked like once before—in 2014. When the Obama administration’s defense strategy was released in March 2014, the document was obsolete the day it was published. It did not mention Ukraine, even though Putin’s little green men had already seized Crimea. It did not mention the Islamic State by name, though the group’s fighters had already captured Fallujah. With the defense budget under spending caps and the threat of sequestration, the Pentagon had to spend tens of billions of dollars in contingency funds to rebuild European deterrence following Russia’s invasion and occupation of Ukraine and to defeat the Islamic State in the Middle East. Meanwhile, the Obama administration’s attempt to pivot to Asia stalled, and the U.S. military edge over China continued to shrink. As history threatens to repeat itself, U.S. President Joe Biden—who served under Barack Obama as vice president—looks perilously close to following in his predecessor’s footsteps. Biden faces the same question as in 2014: How can the United States stay focused on China while dealing with the crisis in Ukraine? Just as it was then, prioritizing the Indo-Pacific and countering China will not be strategically effective or politically sustainable if it is premised on sacrificing the commitment to credible NATO deterrence and defense. But given finite resources, the United States cannot confront China, the most powerful adversary it has ever faced, without substantially changing how it achieves strategic ends in Europe—especially when it comes to military power. That’s not just an urgent strategic question to answer now, as Washington decides how to deal with Russia’s threatened invasion of Ukraine. It also needs to be at the core of the Pentagon’s strategy that is set to be published as early as March. The administration must resist calls for a return to a strategy designed to win on two fronts simultaneously or in sequence. Right now, the United States can do a lot to support Ukraine, impose costs on Russia, and assure NATO allies without compromising its strategy to counter China. At the top of the list are accelerated deliveries of defensive military equipment to Ukraine—especially anti-armor, anti-ship, and air defense capabilities—as well as intelligence support and humanitarian assistance. If Russia does invade, Biden should get much more serious about sanctions than Obama was in 2014. Washington should target the wealth of Putin’s cronies in Western financial hubs, terminate Russian access to the SWIFT global payment system, prohibit transactions in Russian sovereign debt, sanction the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, and cut off access to U.S. technology critical for industries favored by Putin, including defense. The Trump administration’s technology sanctions that have seriously hobbled the Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei are an excellent precedent for this. The United States should also join NATO efforts to reinforce its eastern flank, including contributing U.S. troops to support the temporary activation and deployment of NATO’s Response Force. For this eventuality, the Biden administration has placed up to 8,500 U.S. military personnel on alert. But even as Washington reacts to Moscow’s threats to overturn the European security order, China and the Indo-Pacific must remain the primary focus of the United States’ strategic calculus. To that end, the administration should ensure sanctions do not inflict collateral damage on Indo-Pacific allies and partners. In particular, ensnaring India in Russia-focused sanctions for New Delhi’s planned purchase of the Russian S-400 air and missile defense system would be a mistake. Sanctions won’t stop the S-400 deal, but they would play into the narrative pushed by Moscow and Beijing that Washington is not a trustworthy partner for New Delhi. To keep its focus squarely on the Indo-Pacific, the United States must exercise restraint in what forces it sends to reinforce NATO should Putin invade Ukraine, and from where. Forces should not be taken from the Pacific. They should be relocated within Europe, from the United States, or from lower-priority theaters. For example, air and ground forces stationed in the Middle East could be moved to southeastern Europe to bolster NATO while remaining close enough to respond to any contingency. Deployment of an additional U.S. Army brigade combat team—of limited utility vis-à-vis China—may be sensible. But the Pentagon should avoid new, long-term deployments of assets in low supply, such as missile defense systems and advanced platforms for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. The Biden administration should also remember that allies provide the bricks, while the United States provides the mortar. NATO allies should contribute the bulk of any new forces deployed to guard the alliance’s eastern flank while the United States provides key military enablers such as command and control, logistics, and combat medicine. The good news is that allies are in fact stepping up: Denmark, France, Spain, and the Netherlands have all recently announced or proposed reinforcements of ships, fighter aircraft, and ground forces. Even as it responds to the crisis in Europe, Washington can take parallel steps to bolster deterrence in the Pacific—so that the current attention on Europe is not interpreted as a sign of weakness and distraction, as it was in 2014. For example, the Biden administration could announce plans to station a fifth and eventual sixth attack submarine in Guam. It could also back legislation on Capitol Hill to increase security assistance to Taiwan. Taking these steps during a crisis in Europe would send a powerful signal to Beijing and allied capitals that the United States’ priority on the Pacific perseveres. The Biden administration’s new defense strategy needs to confront the question of overstretch head-on. Given limited resources and the strength of the United States’ adversaries—especially China—the U.S. ability to prevail in a great-power conflict cannot be taken for granted. That’s why the administration must resist calls for a return to a strategy designed to win on two fronts simultaneously or in sequence. Such a force sizing is simply not realistic and would dilute the U.S. military’s focus on the Indo-Pacific as its priority theater, China as its pacing threat, and Taiwan as its pressing scenario. Critically, staying on track in the Pacific requires matching any new military commitments in Europe—even temporary ones—with new resources. The United States must not ask its military to do more with less or pretend that China and Russia can be deterred and confronted on the cheap. Now is not the time to cut defense spending as the Biden administration has proposed. Not when the U.S. military edge relative to China has so dangerously eroded. Not when inflation, aging platforms, rising personnel costs, and the failure to pass a budget on time are sapping the Pentagon’s buying power. The Biden administration and the U.S. Congress must provide the military with the sufficient, timely, and predictable funding demanded in these perilous times, and which U.S. service members deserve.

#### Biden is shifting from Ukraine to focus resources on China now

Tharoor 5-13-2022, analyst @ WaPo (Isanan, “Biden pivots to Asia as Ukraine war rages on,” *Washington Post*, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/05/13/asean-southeast-asia-china-biden/>)

The past couple of months marked a rallying moment for the geopolitical West. The Russian invasion of Ukraine triggered a sweeping, united response from Europe and its allies across the Atlantic. It led to far-reaching, coordinated sanctions on Moscow. It provoked a new, steely approach from many Europeans to diplomatically and militarily confront Russia. And it spurred the imminent expansion of NATO, an alliance cast by critics not long ago as an obsolete relic of the Cold War. The United States and its E.U. partners are flooding Ukraine with weaponry and aid. By some accounts, the Biden administration alone has mustered more funding for Ukraine in recent weeks than it is committing in the next fiscal year for fighting the planetary peril of climate change. Yet in Washington, there remains a large elephant in the room: China. New battles with the Kremlin have energized the doyens of the city’s foreign policy establishment, many of whom cut their teeth during the Cold War. But the Biden administration is trying to show that it hasn’t lost sight of its key 21st century “strategic competitor.” And it recognizes that its contest with China requires closer partnerships well outside Europe. A new push started this week. On Thursday evening, the White House hosted a dinner with eight leaders of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as a part of a major U.S.-led summit with the regional bloc. On Friday, the Southeast Asian delegations are slated to continue discussions at the State Department before a plenary session with President Biden. Next week, Biden will embark on a five-day trip to South Korea and Japan, culminating in another meeting of the “Quad” grouping with Australia, Japan and India. U.S. officials recognize that a decade of talk about a strategic “pivot” to Asia has yet to yield concrete results. “Several administrations in succession in the United States have tried … to launch more fundamental efforts, policies, frameworks in Asia, East Asia, Indo-Pacific, and found themselves stymied or misdirected or directed toward other pursuits,” said Kurt Campbell, the White House’s lead official on Indo-Pacific policy, in a speech this week at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. “And that has been something that I think all of us are deeply aware of in the formulation and execution of policy.”

The Biden administration aims to show that its heavy involvement in the Ukraine war is not a distraction from its priorities to the East. But it is climbing an uphill road with ASEAN countries, where many officials lament a lack of American engagement, especially during the years of the Trump administration.

#### The US ruled out sending meaningful cooperation to Ukraine, because of finite resources

Chellaney 22, Professor of Strategic Studies at the New Delhi-based Center for Policy Research and Fellow at the Robert Bosch Academy in Berlin (Brahma, “America Is Focusing on the Wrong Enemy,” Project Syndicate, https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/the-threat-to-us-global-leadership-is-china-not-russia-by-brahma-chellaney-2022-02)//BB

So, while the US remains the world’s foremost military power, it has been stretched thin by the decisions and commitments it has made, in Europe and elsewhere, since 1991. This goes a long way toward explaining why the US has ruled out deploying its own troops to defend Ukraine today. What the US is offering Ukraine – weapons and ammunition – cannot protect the country from Russia, which has an overwhelming military advantage.

#### There are zero US military forces on the ground in Ukraine

Ben-Archour and Cancian 4-22-2022, retired Marine colonel and senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (Sabri and Mark, “What military aid is the U.S. sending Ukraine?,” Market Place, <https://www.marketplace.org/2022/04/22/what-military-aid-is-the-u-s-sending-ukraine/)//BB>

Ben-Achour: Does the fact that these weapons require more training mean we will see Americans on the ground doing that training in Ukraine? Cancian: Well, we’re not going to see Americans on the ground in Ukraine, we’re going to see Ukrainians on the ground in the United States. The plan is that we will train Ukrainians to operate and maintain this equipment, which will take several weeks, if not months. But we will do that either in the United States, which is most likely, or possibly in some bases in Europe. But the administration has been quite clear that we’re not going to send U.S. forces into Ukraine to conduct this training or to participate in military operations.

## LINK

### Link---General

#### Security cooperation with NATO trades off with commitments to Asian allies

Bowne 18, Major, Judge Advocate in the US Air Force (Andrew, “Defending The New Fulda Gap: Deterring Russian Aggression Against The Baltic States Through Fiscal Legislation,” *Military Law Review*, 226.3)//BB

Although it is difficult, if not impossible, to determine the precise amount of expenditures the United States commits directly to NATO, estimates by RAND Corporation and the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) place the total costs of keeping U.S. forces in key industrial nations at less than $10 billion a year, or less than two percent of the total defense budget.58 While the United States increased defense spending by over eighty percent since 2001, “virtually none of that increase was generated by NATO commitments.”59 When compared to the defense posture the United States fielded in Europe during the Cold War, the resources currently obligated to defending Europe are remarkably low. In 1990, approximately fifteen percent of the total worldwide active strength was stationed in Europe, whereas only three percent of a significantly smaller total active force remains in Europe in 2017.60 Thus, despite the political rhetoric and fact that the United States spends more on defense than all other NATO members combined, it is clear the actual contribution to NATO is a relatively small portion of the overall U.S. defense budget. It is critical to understand the parameters of the United States’ contribution to NATO because the United States has finite resources, and, since enactment of the Budget Control Act (BCA) of 2011, legally binding caps on funding.61 Every dollar spent towards the objectives of NATO is, in theory, a dollar less going to fight the Islamic State or towards the Pacific pivot. However, the misunderstanding of the true costs of the United States’ role in NATO could have dangerous consequences. If the U.S. budgets and plans for NATO operations based on the false premise that it already spends too much and its partners do not contribute enough, U.S. leadership will likely make decisions that adversely affect its own national security interests.

### Link---General---NATO

#### NATO effectiveness requires substantial military resources. Triggers tradeoffs.

Chollet 20, executive vice president and senior advisor for security and defense policy at The German Marshall Fund of the United States. He previously served as US assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs (Derek, et al, “Rethink and replace two percent,” Atlantic Council, <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/nato20-2020/rethink-and-replace-two-percent/>)

To be clear, NATO’s effectiveness requires capable militaries, and this will be expensive. Tough decisions will always be required. Real work needs to be done to expand defense investment in equipment, readiness, emerging technologies, digitalization, and research and development. Substantial and targeted spending to create effective deterrence, particularly by large European countries like Germany, must remain a priority. We need to do all this in a way that avoids the pitfalls of oversimplification and acrimony that have too often defined the two-percent debate over the last decade.

#### Let US commitments to NATO die---that frees up resources to successfully defend Asian allies

Shifrinson 21, Non-Resident Fellow at the Quincy Institute and Assistant Professor at Boston University's Pardee School of Global Studies. (Joshua, “The Dominance Dilemma: The American Approach to NATO and its Future,” *Quincy Report*, <https://quincyinst.org/report/the-dominance-dilemma-the-american-approach-to-nato-and-its-future/)//BB>

It is easy to get wrapped up in the rhetorical shifts and policy particulars of the moment, but the United States has consistently approached NATO through a combination of opportunism and geopolitics. Since the alliance’s creation in the late 1940s, the United States has attempted to strike a balance between its own contradictory impulses. Going forward, the question is whether this balance is sustainable in practice, if not in declared intent, given the emerging shape of international politics. It is not defeatist to be skeptical. Alliance commitments tend to change when new threats appear and strategic priorities shift. As America’s attention moves toward Asia, its longstanding attitudes toward European security should be reevaluated and accorded lower strategic priority. Western Europe, and much of Eastern Europe, are secure. No European hegemon is on the horizon. A balance of power exists and ought to be allowed to mature. This is good news. America’s postwar commitment to European security went on far longer and became far more expansive than policymakers envisioned in the 1940s and 1950s. Now the mission is accomplished. Western Europe, and much of Eastern Europe, are secure. No European hegemon is on the horizon. A balance of power exists and ought to be allowed to mature. Seventy-two years after NATO’s founding, America’s role in the alliance can change fundamentally with little risk to U.S. or European security — and much to gain for both.

### Link---General---US Leadership in Europe

#### US leadership in Europe undermines effective deterrence of China

Mearsheimer 3-1-2022, Professor of Political Science at U Chicago (John Mearsheimer, , and Isaac Chotiner, staff writer, March 1, 2022 (“Why John Mearsheimer Blames the U.S. for the Crisis in Ukraine,” *The New Yorker*, <https://www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/why-john-mearsheimer-blames-the-us-for-the-crisis-in-ukraine>)//BB

I’m talking about the raw-power potential of Russia—the amount of economic might it has. Military might is built on economic might. You need an economic foundation to build a really powerful military. To go out and conquer countries like Ukraine and the Baltic states and to re-create the former Soviet Union or re-create the former Soviet Empire in Eastern Europe would require a massive army, and that would require an economic foundation that contemporary Russia does not come close to having. There is no reason to fear that Russia is going to be a regional hegemony in Europe. Russia is not a serious threat to the United States. We do face a serious threat in the international system. We face a peer competitor. And that’s China. Our policy in Eastern Europe is undermining our ability to deal with the most dangerous threat that we face today. What do you think our policy should be in Ukraine right now, and what do you worry that we’re doing that’s going to undermine our China policy? We should be pivoting out of Europe to deal with China in a laser-like fashion, number one. And, number two, we should be working overtime to create friendly relations with the Russians. The Russians are part of our balancing coalition against China. If you live in a world where there are three great powers—China, Russia, and the United States—and one of those great powers, China, is a peer competitor, what you want to do if you’re the United States is have Russia on your side of the ledger. Instead, what we have done with our foolish policies in Eastern Europe is drive the Russians into the arms of the Chinese. This is a violation of Balance of Power Politics 101.

### Link---General---Arms Sales

#### Arms sales to Europe tradeoff with US commitments to Asian allies

Wormuth 20, analyst at RAND, (Christine, “The Role of Allies and Partners in US Military Strategy and Operations,” RAND, <https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/CTA800/CTA867-1/RAND_CTA867-1.pdf)//BB>

It has become almost a cliché to say that the United States is at a strategic inflection point, standing at a crossroads, or perhaps is even facing the end of the international world order as we know it. Whatever you call it, the period when the United States was the sole superpower is ending, and the country now faces significant challenges ahead—most prominently, competing successfully against a rising China while reducing the risks of war with Beijing. This is going to require the United States to change its national security approach—a challenging assignment under normal circumstances but one that will be even more difficult because national security institutions will almost inevitably face pressure to trim budgets and because many other important domestic problems will compete for policymakers’ time and attention. Allies and partners will remain critically important in this changing landscape, but the United States needs to adapt and strengthen its network of alliances and partnerships to better position itself for this era of great-power competition. The zero-based reviews of the regional combatant commands that Secretary of Defense Mark Esper commissioned a year ago and that are wrapping up at the end of this month will inform DoD’s effort to adjust its overseas footprint and activities. To meet future challenges successfully in an era of finite resources, the United States needs to shore up deterrence in both Europe and Asia while carefully reducing its military footprint in the Middle East without creating more insecurity in that region. The Indo-Pacific Reassurance Initiative concept, included in both the House and Senate versions of the yet-to-be-finalized Fiscal Year 2021 National Defense Authorization Act, would be a valuable tool for DoD to shore up deterrence in Asia. 3 The United States also needs its allies and partners to do more for themselves and their own security, as well as more with the United States, in some cases, if all are to meet future challenges successfully. For instance, NATO allies need to continue to spend more on defense and make good on their pledges to do so by 2024, without the United States becoming myopically focused on percentage of gross domestic product as the sole metric of the health of the Alliance. U.S. allies and partners also need to continue working with the United States to share the burdens of providing peace and security around the world—for example, in the Middle East, where France and Australia participate in the maritime coalition interdicting weapon shipments to the Houthis, and in the South China Sea, where Australia and Japan have joined the United States to conduct freedom of navigation operations and hold naval exercises this year. Developing a comprehensive plan to adapt and revitalize the U.S. network of alliances and rebalance the U.S. military footprint overseas is both an essential component of a broader strategy for great-power competition and a homework assignment that will take years to complete. Palau’s recent offer to host U.S. military bases and airfields and the Philippines’ decision to freeze its withdrawal from the Visiting Forces Agreements are positive developments but there is much more work to be done. This is also an area in which DoD needs help from Congress. To compete successfully against China, deter Russian aggression, and recalibrate the U.S. military footprint in an era of finite resources, DoD will need to make difficult decisions about the kinds of systems in which it invests, how it is postured in key regions around the world, and what kinds of capabilities it is willing to sell (or not sell) to its allies and friends. Congress is involved in all these decisions, and without support from Congress for the many tough calls that lie ahead, it will be much harder for DoD to make the strategic adjustments that are so clearly needed.

### Link---General---Bolt-of-Blue

#### Unforeseen changes trigger inefficient raids on military resources

Kelly 10, principal mathematician at the RAND Corporation (Terrence, et al, “Security Cooperation Organizations in the Country Team: Options for Success,” RAND, <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA517323.pdf)//BB>

Changes Are Needed to Improve Security Cooperation Effectiveness

The RAND research team found that organizations that currently manage U.S. security cooperation work relatively well in most countries where peacetime engagement is the norm. In particular, current practices and authorities suffice if security cooperation efforts can be planned in advance and there is no need for significant change during a given budget year. However, when unbudgeted requirements arise, whether they are for new programs or for significant changes to existing programs, the current system has trouble working within inflexible authorities and funding mechanisms and what is, at times, less-than-ideal interagency coordination. To help DoD and the State Department overcome these hurdles, the RAND team developed three options that could help improve SAO capabilities and capacity:

#### Unforeseen policy changes require internal budget shifts

Bergmann and Schmitt 21, \*senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, where he focuses on European security and U.S.-Russia policy. From 2011 to 2017, he served in the U.S. Department of State in a number of different positions, including as a member of the secretary of state’s policy planning staff, where he focused on political-military affairs and nonproliferation; special assistant to the undersecretary for arms control and international security; speechwriter to then-Secretary of State John Kerry; and senior adviser to the assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs. Prior to serving in the State Department, he worked at CAP as a military and nonproliferation policy analyst and at the National Security Network as the deputy policy director. Bergmann received his master’s degree from the London School of Economics in comparative politics and his bachelor’s degree from Bates College, \*\*senior policy analyst on the National Security and International Policy team at the Center. She previously worked on U.S. foreign policy advocacy at Human Rights Watch and received her Master in Public Policy from the Harvard Kennedy School (Max and Alexandra, “A Plan To Reform U.S. Security Assistance,” *Center for American Progress*, https://www.americanprogress.org/article/plan-reform-u-s-security-assistance/)

DOD officials can work around the State Department’s diplomats. In part due to restrictions from the Budget Control Act and with new programs at the DOD, Pentagon officials had more flexibility on security assistance programs than their State Department counterparts. The DOD had budgetary space to reallocate significant funds from the substantial Pentagon budget to respond to sudden emergencies or new crises, something that is virtually impossible for the State Department, making the DOD often the lead actor in a crisis.44 Regional combatant commands aggressively sought more resources from Congress to conduct their own security assistance programs, giving them added flexibility to work with partners in the field that their State Department counterparts lacked.45 A Government Accountability Office report found that 56 DOD security assistance programs do not require any involvement from the State Department.46

### Link---AI---1NC

#### US-NATO AI interoperability requires a significant increase in funding

Christie 22, senior research fellow @ Finnish Institute of International Affairs (Edward Hunter, “Defence cooperation in artificial intelligence: Bridging the transatlantic gap for a stronger Europe,” *European View*, 2.1)

Much has already been achieved in terms of new structures, new initiatives and new policy developments to support the collaborative adoption of AI among NATO Allies and EU member states. In addition to pre-existing structures and mechanisms at both the NATO and EU levels, which have ensured that nations are not starting from scratch, national defence institutions are already able to refer to common policy commitments and to options, whether through NATO or the EDA, for research or capability-development activities. At the same time, ensuring a competitive edge in AI is a truly whole-of-government effort which requires considerable cross-over between the military and civilian realms. Large gaps remain between the US and the EU on certain key indicators. At the same time, the gaps pertaining to research are far smaller. To ensure greater European performance and relevance in AI in general, and its defence applications in particular, it seems desirable to focus on two strategic priorities: investment volumes, both public and private, which need to be significantly increased; and the full use of collaborative mechanisms involving the US. To that end, it would be beneficial for nations on both sides of the Atlantic to ensure that a clear and common vision is set out in forthcoming strategic documents, most notably the EU’s Strategic Compass and NATO’s new Strategic Concept. This should include clear political commitments to increasing investment, both in general and in instruments for promoting collaborative innovation. There are opportunities for ‘more Europe’ through the EDA and the European Defence Fund. But while pursuing those avenues, European capitals should prioritise efforts that complement and enhance transatlantic approaches, in recognition of the reality that the US remains the indispensable ally for Europe’s security.

### Link---AI---2NC

#### AI interoperability requires serious investment from both sides of the Atlantic

Christie 22, senior research fellow @ Finnish Institute of International Affairs (Edward Hunter, “Defence cooperation in artificial intelligence: Bridging the transatlantic gap for a stronger Europe,” *European View*, 2.1)

Artificial intelligence (AI) is the ability of machines to perform tasks that typically require human intelligence—for example, recognising patterns, learning from experience, drawing conclusions, making predictions or taking action—whether digitally or as the smart software behind autonomous physical systems (Reding and Eaton 2020, 14). The range of potential military applications is at least as vast as the range of tasks that require human cognition, for example analysing and classifying visual data, organising logistics, operating support vehicles, or tracking and engaging hostile targets (Christie 2021b, 84). States are racing to achieve superiority in the AI domain (Lin-Greenberg 2020). Furthermore, like other digital technologies, AI diffuses rapidly and cheaply across areas of human activity and across borders. Nevertheless, as with other technological transformations, states with greater resources and levels of effort, and better policies, will reap the benefits of technology adoption more rapidly than others. In an alliance context, matters pertaining to cooperation and interoperability take centre stage. The good news is that Europeans are not starting from scratch. European states that are members of NATO can rely on decades of experience with the Alliance’s mechanisms of consultation and collaboration. In addition, European states that are members of the EU can pursue collaborative activities through the European Defence Agency (EDA). Furthermore, EU funding is available through the European Defence Fund for defence research and capability-development activities. At NATO the key processes address, most notably, the areas of defence research, military transformation, capability development, military–technical standardisation, and defence planning and capability targets. For these areas of work, formal consultative mechanisms—committees in which each Ally has a voice—include the Science and Technology Board, the Military Committee, the Conference of National Armaments Directors, the NATO Standardisation Board, and the Defence Policy and Planning Committee. Each of these committees relies on support staffs and structures. Of particular interest when considering AI are the Science and Technology Organisation, which has several facilities and is led by the Office of the Chief Scientist at NATO Headquarters; and, Allied Command Transformation. The latter, including its Innovation Hub, plays a particularly central role in driving innovation and force transformation for the Alliance. In addition, two staff units created in 2019 are of particular importance, namely the Innovation Unit and the Data Policy Unit, both of which are within the Emerging Security Challenges Division of the NATO International Staff. The Innovation Unit provides thought leadership and initiatives to accelerate technology adoption, while the Data Policy Unit provides policy thought leadership on how to treat data as a strategic resource. The Innovation Unit designs new initiatives for the promotion and financing of defencerelated innovation. A notable achievement in this area was the creation of the NATO Innovation Fund (NATO 2021). In the EU context, the EDA plays a central role in several areas of work. Among other activities, the EDA supports defence research cooperation, defence standardisation and pooled procurement programmes, while also contributing to the EU’s Capability Development Plan and Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (Fiott 2018, 287). Most of the EDA’s functions are broadly analogous to ones that exist at NATO. Of particular interest is the intention to create a new Defence Innovation Hub within the EDA, as announced in the EU’s November 2021 draft Strategic Compass (European External Action Service 2021, 23). Before proceeding, it is worth spelling out the extent to which European security is dependent on NATO and in particular on the US. Of the EU’s 27 member states, 21 are members of NATO. These countries account for about 93% of the population1 of the EU. Within NATO, those Allies that are also EU members only account for about 20% of total defence expenditure across the Alliance, while the US alone accounts for about 70% of the same total.2 Beyond these aggregate indicators, it is furthermore the case that the US is considerably ahead of the EU in terms of practical adoption of AI. For illustration, in 2020 US private-sector investment in AI was around $23.6 billion, but was only $2 billion in the EU, implying a ratio of 12 to 1 in favour of the US (Zhang et al. 2021, 96). Scientific output indicators offer a more nuanced picture. In 2019, the EU accounted for 16.4% of the world’s peer-reviewed AI publications, ahead of the US with 14.6%, while China occupied the top spot with 22.4% (Zhang et al. 2021, 20). On the other hand, if one measures research output in terms of publications on the Arxiv database, the US is ahead of the EU (Zhang et al. 2021, 33) by a ratio of almost two to one, which is nonetheless much less than the large gap in private investment mentioned above. That the EU performs similarly to the US in terms of scientific research, but far less well in terms of investment and commercialisation of new digital technologies, is an old problem which has proven very difficult to address, whether at national or EU level (Baroudy et al. 2020). In the following sections, I offer reflections on three challenge areas for European and Allied defence institutions: interoperability challenges, international security challenges and investment challenges. These three challenges are effectively interdependent. While interoperability is a permanent goal in an alliance context, be it NATO or the EU, it is particularly salient in cases of rapid technological change, such as with AI, as there is a need for a higher tempo across areas of activity. Heightened international security challenges likewise increase the need for urgency to ensure that Western nations do not fall behind potential adversaries. Investment, in turn, is the engine for rapid change, enabling the dynamic adoption of new technologies, relevant capability-development activities and other adaptations along the value chain of military activities. Overall, my central argument is that the confluence of rapid technological change and heightened international security challenges requires a higher pace of change and adaptation that can only succeed if serious investments are made on both sides of the Atlantic.

#### 1AC ev agrees---it’s a massive undertaking

Margarita 1AC Konaev & Husanjot Chahal 21, Research Fellow & Research Analyst, Center for Security and Emerging Technology, Georgetown University. "The Path of Least Resistance Multinational Collaboration on AI for Military Logistics and Sustainment" April. https://cset.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/CSET-Path-of-Least-Resistance.pdf //pipk //BB

Finally, on the technical front, there are numerous challenges to ensuring that hardware and digital systems are interoperable and secure. Creating and maintaining common or interoperable information systems and databases is a massive undertaking considering that in each country, the data resides in repositories lacking standardized formatting or maintained by contractors that keep such information proprietary, especially for data on sensors and weapon systems. Shared information systems and databases are also particularly vulnerable to disruption, manipulation, and data theft in part because of discrepancies in countries’ network security protocols and capabilities.26 These problems are hard to resolve in their own right. But the aforementioned political factors, especially the push toward greater data sovereignty by some of the European allies, only exacerbate these technical challenges for collaborations on AI.

### Link---AI---AT AI Link Turn

#### Aff says AI inevitable, so this isn’t offense.

#### Moore’s law? More like Moore’s flaw.

Economist 20 (“The cost of training machines is becoming a problem: Increased complexity and competition are part of it,” <https://www.economist.com/technology-quarterly/2020/06/11/the-cost-of-training-machines-is-becoming-a-problem)//BB>

The fundamental assumption of the computing industry is that number-crunching gets cheaper all the time. Moore’s law, the industry’s master metronome, predicts that the number of components that can be squeezed onto a microchip of a given size—and thus, loosely, the amount of computational power available at a given cost—doubles every two years. For many comparatively simple ai applications, that means that the cost of training a computer is falling, says Christopher Manning, an associate director of the Institute for Human-Centered AI at Stanford University. But that is not true everywhere. A combination of ballooning complexity and competition means costs at the cutting edge are rising sharply.

#### AI advancement dramatically heightens costs

Wiggers 21 (Kyle, “AI Weekly: AI model training costs on the rise, highlighting need for new solutions,” Venture Beat, <https://venturebeat.com/2021/10/15/ai-weekly-ai-model-training-costs-on-the-rise-highlighting-need-for-new-solutions/)//BB>

Like other large AI systems, MT-NLG raises questions about the accessibility of cutting-edge research approaches in machine learning. AI training costs dropped 100-fold between 2017 and 2019, but the totals still exceed the compute budgets of most startups, governments, nonprofits, and colleges. The inequity favors corporations and world superpowers with extraordinary access to resources at the expense of smaller players, cementing incumbent advantages. For example, in early October, researchers at Alibaba detailed M6-10T, a language model containing 10 trillion parameters (roughly 57 times the size of OpenAI’s GPT-3) trained across 512 Nvidia V100 GPUs for 10 days. The cheapest V100 plan available through Google Cloud Platform costs $2.28 per hour, which would equate to over $300,000 ($2.28 per hour multiplied by 24 hours over 10 days) — further than most research teams can stretch. Google subsidiary DeepMind is estimated to have spent $35 million training a system to learn the Chinese board game Go. And when the company’s researchers designed a model to play StarCraft II, they purposefully didn’t try multiple ways of architecting a key component because the training cost would have been too high. Similarly, OpenAI didn’t fix a mistake when it implemented GPT-3 because the cost of training made retraining the model infeasible. Paths forward It’s important to keep in mind that training costs can be inflated by factors other than an algorithm’s technical aspects. As Yoav Shoham, Stanford University professor emeritus and cofounder of AI startup AI21 Labs, recently told Synced, personal and organizational considerations often contribute to a model’s final price tag. “[A] researcher might be impatient to wait three weeks to do a thorough analysis and their organization may not be able or wish to pay for it,” he said. “So for the same task, one could spend $100,000 or $1 million.” Still, the increasing cost of training — and storing — algorithms like Huawei’s PanGu-Alpha, Naver’s HyperCLOVA, and the Beijing Academy of Artificial Intelligence’s Wu Dao 2.0 is giving rise to a cottage industry of startups aiming to “optimize” models without degrading accuracy. This week, former Intel exec Naveen Rao launched a new company, Mosaic ML, to offer tools, services, and training methods that improve AI system accuracy while lowering costs and saving time. Mosaic ML — which has raised $37 million in venture capital — competes with Codeplay Software, OctoML, Neural Magic, Deci, CoCoPie, and NeuReality in a market that’s expected to grow exponentially in the coming years. In a sliver of good news, the cost of basic machine learning operations has been falling over the past few years. A 2020 OpenAI survey found that since 2012, the amount of compute needed to train a model to the same performance on classifying images in a popular benchmark — ImageNet — has been decreasing by a factor of two every 16 months. Approaches like network pruning prior to training could lead to further gains. Research has shown that parameters pruned after training, a process that decreases the model size, could have been pruned before training without any effect on the network’s ability to learn. Called the “lottery ticket hypothesis,” the idea is that the initial values parameters in a model receive are crucial for determining whether they’re important. Parameters kept after pruning receive “lucky” initial values; the network can train successfully with only those parameters present. Network pruning is far from a solved science, however. New ways of pruning that work before or in early training will have to be developed, as most current methods apply only retroactively. And when parameters are pruned, the resulting structures aren’t always a fit for the training hardware (e.g., GPUs), meaning that pruning 90% of parameters won’t necessarily reduce the cost of training a model by 90%. Whether through pruning, novel AI accelerator hardware, or techniques like meta-learning and neural architecture search, the need for alternatives to unattainably large models is quickly becoming clear. A University of Massachusetts Amherst study showed that using 2019-era approaches, training an image recognition model with a 5% error rate would cost $100 billion and produce as much carbon emissions as New York City does in a month. As IEEE Spectrum’s editorial team wrote in a recent piece, “we must either adapt how we do deep learning or face a future of much slower progress.”

### Link---Cyber---1NC

#### NATO cyber-defense is enormously expensive

Sanger 16, White House and national security correspondent, and a senior writer @ NYT (David, “As Russian Hackers Probe, NATO Has No Clear Cyberwar Strategy,” *New York Times*, <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/17/world/europe/nato-russia-cyberwarfare.html)//BB>

At United States Cyber Command, which has expanded rapidly since the United States carried out cyberattacks against Iran in 2010, Russia’s networks are a regular target of surveillance. By next year, Cyber Command will have more than 130 teams fully in operation around the world, integrated into Army, Navy, Marine and Air Force units, in addition to teams that work alongside the National Security Agency at Fort Meade, Md. It has built up a vast early warning network, placing tens of thousands of “implants” — sensors that can also be used to insert malware — into networks around the world. But NATO is only beginning to explore what it delicately calls “active defense,” and says it is not focused on offensive cyberweapons. The Russians have no such compunctions. But it is unclear what Russian hackers hope to achieve here in the Baltics, other than to make the point, as they did in 2007 when they brought Estonia to an electronic halt, that they can get into any system, anytime. “Whatever the Russians have in mind — mostly intimidation — it usually fails,” said Estonia’s president, Toomas Hendrik Ilves, who grew up in New Jersey before coming here to turn this small NATO country into a pioneer in introducing new web-based technology for governing a nation. The 2007 attacks backfired, he noted, because they drove Estonians far more solidly into the European and NATO camps. In Sweden and Finland, neutral nations in the Cold War, the politics are more complex. As the NATO exercise began in Finland last week, the Finnish foreign minister was in Moscow, meeting his Russian counterpart, Sergey V. Lavrov. The more Sweden and Finland turn to NATO, the more their networks, their news sites and their government ministries come under cyberattack. As Adm. John Richardson, the chief of United States naval operations, said at an event at the Council on Foreign Relations in May, “The fact is it’s a pretty hot war in the cyber domain going on right now.” A hot war, but a kind that suits Russia well: It is part of what military strategists call “gray zone” combat. For Mr. Putin, cyberespionage and cyberattacks keep NATO and its partners off balance. They are enormously difficult and expensive to defend against, and, at least for now, they have operated below the line that is likely to prompt a military or economic response. “It stays below the radar,” Martin Libicki of the RAND Corporation told a conference sponsored this month by the NATO cyber center here, officially known as the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence. For the Russians, Mr. Libicki said, cyberespionage and weaponry are part of a larger strategy of information warfare and a blitz of propaganda that makes sorting out fact from fiction — say, the causes of the Malaysia Airlines crash in Ukraine — all the more difficult. But the attacks also remind the smaller nations here of their vulnerability, even if Russia’s troops stay on their side of the border. So far, NATO has found few effective means of deterring attacks.

### Link---Cyber---2NC

#### The plan is resource-intensive. It would require long and drawn-out negotiations

1AC Lonergan and Moller 22, \*Erica D. Lonergan is an assistant professor in the Army Cyber Institute and a research scholar at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University, \*\*Sara B. Moller is a former Eisenhower Fellow at the NATO Defense College and will be joining the Center for Security Studies at Georgetown University later this year.

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. government.

(Erica and Sara, “NATO’s Credibility Is on the Line with its Cyber Defense Pledge. That’s a Bad Idea.,” Politico, <https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2022/04/27/nato-credibility-cyber-defense-pledge-russia-ukraine-00027829>)

NATO has achieved some strategic ambiguity with its current cyber policy, which may help to deter high-stakes Russian assaults during the present crisis. However, rather than an all-out Russian cyberattack, a far more plausible scenario is a lower-level attack carried out by the Russian government or a proxy group against one or more allies. In this case, the alliance’s interests — not to mention transatlantic security — would be better served by adopting nationally-tailored responses rather than pulling the Article 5 lever. Additionally, to prevent further escalation and reinforce the implicit firebreak that currently exists between cyber and conventional military operations, NATO allies should also agree to restrict any retaliatory response against Moscow to the cyber realm or non-military instruments of power. With little chance of improved NATO-Russian relations any time soon, time is of the essence to get this right. The allies should begin the hard political legwork now to ensure members get on the same page before NATO’s June summit, if not sooner. Achieving consensus on significant cyber issues has previously taken time. NATO’s attribution of the Microsoft Exchange hack last summer to China was an important step for the alliance and sent a strong signal to our adversaries. But it took months to reach agreement on the statement; the hack was uncovered in March 2021 and the NATO statement was not made public until July. In the current crisis, the alliance will not have the luxury of waiting four (or more) months to agree on a response. To avoid incurring damaging costs to NATO’s credibility and its deterrent powers, the allies should refine their cyber policy, now.

### Link---Cyber---Procurement---2NC

#### Enhanced cybersecurity requires modified procurement standards. Makes all weapons more expensive

Schneier and Wheeler 21, \* fellow at the Belfer Center at the Harvard Kennedy School and a fellow at the Berkman Klein Center for Internet and Society at Harvard University, \*\*information security executive, social scientist in the area of international conflict, author, and poker player. She is CEO of information security consultancy Red Queen Dynamics, and a Cyber Project Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University‘s Kennedy School of Government. She is an International Security Fellow at New America leading a new international cybersecurity capacity building project with the Hewlett Foundation’s Cyber Initiative and a US/UK Fulbright Scholar in Cyber Security (Bruce and Tarah, “Hacked drones and busted logistics are the cyber future of warfare,” *Brookings*, <https://www.brookings.edu/techstream/hacked-drones-and-busted-logistics-are-the-cyber-future-of-warfare/)//BB>

An updated GAO report from earlier this year found some improvements, but the basic problem remained: “DOD is still learning how to contract for cybersecurity in weapon systems, and selected programs we reviewed have struggled to incorporate systems’ cybersecurity requirements into contracts.” While DOD now appears aware of the issue of lack of cybersecurity requirements, they’re still not sure yet how to fix it, and in three of the five cases GAO reviewed, DOD simply chose to not include the requirements at all. Militaries around the world are now exploiting these vulnerabilities in weapons systems to carry out operations. When Israel in 2007 bombed a Syrian nuclear reactor, the raid was preceded by what is believed to have been a cyber attack on Syrian air defenses that resulted in radar screens showing no threat as bombers zoomed overhead. In 2018, a 29-country NATO exercise, Trident Juncture, that included cyberweapons was disrupted by Russian GPS jamming. NATO does try to test cyberweapons outside such exercises, but has limited scope in doing so. In May, Jens Stoltenberg, the NATO secretary-general, said that “NATO computer systems are facing almost daily cyberattacks.” The war of the future will not only be about explosions, but will also be about disabling the systems that make armies run. It’s not (solely) that bases will get blown up; it’s that some bases will lose power, data, and communications. It’s not that self-driving trucks will suddenly go mad and begin rolling over friendly soldiers; it’s that they’ll casually roll off roads or into water where they sit, rusting, and in need of repair. It’s not that targeting systems on guns will be retargeted to 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue; it’s that many of them could simply turn off and not turn back on again. So, how do we prepare for this next war? First, militaries need to introduce a little anarchy into their planning. Let’s have wargames where essential systems malfunction or are subverted—not all of the time, but randomly. To help combat siloed military thinking, include some civilians as well. Allow their ideas into the room when predicting potential enemy action. And militaries need to have well-developed backup plans, for when systems are subverted. In Joe Haldeman’s 1975 science-fiction novel The Forever War, he postulated a “stasis field” that forced his space marines to rely on nothing more than Roman military technologies, like javelins. We should be thinking in the same direction. NATO isn’t yet allowing civilians not employed by NATO or associated military contractors access to their training cyber ranges where vulnerabilities could be discovered and remediated before battlefield deployment. Last year, one of us (Tarah) was listening to a NATO briefing after the end of the 2020 Cyber Coalition exercises, and asked how she and other information security researchers could volunteer to test cyber ranges used to train its cyber incident response force. She was told that including civilians would be a “welcome thought experiment in the tabletop exercises,” but including them in reality wasn’t considered. There is a rich opportunity for improvement here, providing transparency into where improvements could be made. Second, it’s time to take cybersecurity seriously in military procurement, from weapons systems to logistics and communications contracts. In the three year span from the original 2018 GAO report to this year’s report, cybersecurity audit compliance went from 0% to 40% (those 2 of 5 programs mentioned earlier). We need to get much better. DOD requires that its contractors and suppliers follow the Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification process; it should abide by the same standards. Making those standards both more rigorous and mandatory would be an obvious second step. Gone are the days when we can pretend that our technologies will work in the face of a military cyberattack. Securing our systems will make everything we buy more expensive—maybe a lot more expensive. But the alternative is no longer viable.

### Link---Cyber---Critical Infrastructure---2NC

#### Protection of critical infrastructure requires significant resources

Wolff 22, associate professor of cybersecurity policy at The Fletcher School at Tufts University (Josephine, “Why Russia Hasn't Launched Major Cyber Attacks Since the Invasion of Ukraine,” TIME Magazine, <https://time.com/6153902/russia-major-cyber-attacks-invasion-ukraine/)//BB>

It’s likely that the combined efforts of Microsoft, the U.S., and many other countries and companies to ramp up cyber defenses both in and outside of Ukraine has undoubtedly helped curb the damage caused by these efforts. But if Russia really had on hand a stockpile of previously undetected vulnerabilities and sophisticated malware designed to exploit them, these lines of defense simply would not be enough to prevent some significant damage and disruption. Updating critical infrastructure networks and systems is slow, expensive, complicated work and it’s impossible that every potential target has been hardened to the point where it is no longer vulnerable to Russian cyberattacks—unless those cyberattacks were never all that impressive to begin with.

### Link---Biotech [1AC Jankowski]

#### NATO-led EDT policy requires substantial funding

1AC Jankowski '21 – Political Adviser and Head of the Political Section at the Permanent Delegation of the Republic of Poland to NATO [Dominik, " NATO and the Emerging and Disruptive Technologies Challenge” in *NATO in the Era of Unpeace: Defending Against Known Unknowns,* pp 99-102]

While the suggestion that EDTs will enable a new class of weapons that will modify the strategic landscape remains to be realised, a number of unresolved security puzzles underlying the emergence of these new technology areas have implications for NATO. As one looks to the future, new adversaries and new science and technology will emerge. The extent to which these EDTs may exacerbate or mitigate the global security and governance challenges that Russia currently poses to NATO Allies will remain an integral question as policy-makers navigate the complex global environment.

NATO is a natural forum for deliberations about EDTs, especially in a transatlantic context. It also has vast experience, going back to the Cold War, in working towards standardisation and interoperability among Allies. However, the results achieved have been mixed, which underscores the challenges the Alliance now faces – there are not only 30 Allies with disparate levels of capability, but also a backdrop of rapid technological advances where some of its competitors and adversaries may hold significant advantages.

In this context, NATO should concentrate on four core issues with regard to EDTs. First, as Andrea Gilli emphasizes, the Alliance should start a process on “NATO-mation.”29 In fact, the Alliance should serve as a primary transatlantic coordinating institution for information-sharing and cooperation between Allies on the security dimension of EDTs. NATO has an important role to play in the development of a common strategy based on an Alliance-wide EDTs threat assessment and an analysis of opportunities. Therefore, EDTs can serve as a unifying element for NATO’s work on future policies.

Second, NATO will need partners on its path towards achieving a comprehensive implementation strategy on EDTs. This will require connection with the private sector early and often, clearly communicating NATO’s priorities and requirements while providing accessible opportunities for industry, including non-traditional ones. Much of the innovative work being undertaken in the commercial sector is being carried out by companies that have never worked in the defence realm or have no wish to do so. Therefore, building new partnerships at NATO with the private sector will enable the Alliance to increase awareness, share data, and creatively tap into experiences and knowledge. Moreover, NATO and the EU should initiate a strategic dialogue to address fundamental issues of tech governance and data sharing in order to overcome the transatlantic tech policy divide.

Third, Allies should manage expectations and not overestimate the role of EDTs. EDTs are not a panacea to all of NATO’s problems, including the existing gaps in the still-needed conventional capabilities. Indeed, EDTs will not be a silver bullet to address NATO’s shortfalls. Therefore, Allies should first and foremost concentrate on two elements: overcoming the interoperability gap30 and revitalizing NATO’s once robust standardization programme.31

Fourth, Allies should consider using NATO as a body to coordinate efforts to find innovative ways to finance EDTs, including through an establishment of a NATO venture capital fund. A potential deep-tech investment in technologies with security and defence applications through a dedicated NATO structure could help Allies maintain their technological edge.

### Link---AT Normal Means = Only O and M

#### The plan drains from all DoD coffers, not just O and M

Reynolds 19, et al, Commandant, Defense Institute of Security Cooperation Studies (Ronald, “The Management of Security Cooperation,” http://cebw.org/images/docs/Legislacao\_Webinar/Greenbook\_39\_0.pdf)//BB

The above 1973 historical quote highlights the evolution of SC and underscores the extraordinary changes to SC issued in by the FY 2017 NDAA. The increasing scope of SC activities to include all DoD international programs and those FAA/AECA authorized programs administered by DSCA is testament to increased DoD policy responsibilities and the imperative to develop the SC workforce. Execution of foreign policy in terms of SC reaches from the Secretary of Defense through DSCA to the CCMD, and finally to the in-country SDO/DATT, DAO and SCO. Increasingly, almost every community within DoD and its respective leadership is recognizing the role they play in SC and the pivotal role SC plays in achieving U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives.

### Link---AT Normal Means = Budget Increase

#### Normal means is not an overall budget increase

Moulton 20, Congressman from Mass. (“Transcript: Rising to the Challenge: Regaining US Military Superiority During a Time of Uncertainty,” *Hudson Institute*, <https://www.hudson.org/research/16499-transcript-rising-to-the-challenge-regaining-us-military-superiority-during-a-time-of-uncertainty>)

Rep. Seth Moulton: And part of the criteria is going to have to be cost. That’s just the budgetary environment that we’re facing. It’s very easy to sit in Congress and say, “I’m always going to spend more on national security, I’m always going to couch it in terms of supporting our troops or whatever. But the reality is, we, like every country in the world have finite resources. And what’s most important is that we make the tough decisions to spend those resources as wisely as we can to support our troops and to support our national security, that’s going to be tough.

### Link---AT SC is Cheap

#### Even if the plan seems cheap, it will outpace cost projections because of military squandering of resources

Munson 13, senior vice president for preventive services and global crisis management for a private sector corporation and a retired U.S. Marine Corps officer (Peter, “The Limits of Security Cooperation,” *War on the Rocks*, <https://warontherocks.com/2013/09/the-limits-of-security-cooperation/)//BB>

SC does work to build capacity in certain, relatively elite units that perceive a real need for improvement and hard training. Likewise, it works to build interoperability between already-capable partner forces and U.S. and coalition militaries. SC in the right doses can be a good way of showing solidarity with allies against other regional threats. But SC [Security Cooperation] is not a panacea and must be applied with significantly more discernment than the usual some-is-good-more-is-better logic of U.S. military spending. Planners should go to great lengths to ensure that SC is seen as a tool for a specific purpose, not a reward to condition behaviors. SC-as-a-conditioning-tool becomes bribery with diminishing returns. If policymakers want a quid pro quo, they need to admit as much and use much more precisely targeted incentives: paying a fee for access or head-of-the-line transit privileges for example. This becomes a much more predictable business transaction than trying to use SC funds, winks, and nudges to get one’s way. Finally, in the land of perverse incentives, SC is often seen as a means to drive defense business to U.S. contractors. This is true. By creating arms races and supplying prestige weapons, however useless, to unstable areas of the world, they are creating U.S. jobs. But wouldn’t taxpayer money and efforts be better spent if officials more precisely targeted domestic concerns with taxpayer funds rather than hoping that efforts trickle down predictably from collaboration with corpulent and unsavory foreign generals? In the land of perverse incentives, SC funding is one of the most egregious—and in the post-9/11 era, many officials see SC as a critical tool of strategic positioning. However, the premises of SC must be reconsidered before the U.S. military squanders more resources on white elephant projects.

#### Every SC initiative generates financial op-costs

Gold 21, researcher at CNA (Zack, “A Better Way to Measure Returns on U.S. Security Cooperation Investments,” *Defense One News*, <https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2021/06/better-way-measure-returns-us-security-cooperation-investments/174742/)//BB>

Second, even if the returns were quantifiable, the real costs of security cooperation for the U.S. military are often unmeasurable. For example, past analysis indicates that the structure of the Navy’s cost accounting system makes it impossible to know the full, exact cost of any security cooperation deployment or activity. Additionally, there is opportunity cost in every decision about security cooperation. In Washington, the focus in recent years has been on realigning resources for great power competition. However, each geographic combatant command has dozens of partners. How, for example, can one accurately calculate the real and opportunity costs of conducting a bilateral exercise with Brazil as opposed to Colombia; or even with the UAE navy versus the UAE armed forces?

#### Security Cooperation drains finite resources needed for other programs

Hamilton 21. PhD, Associate Professor of Eurasian Studies (Robert, “Taking Stock of US Military Assistance in Georgia,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, <https://www.fpri.org/article/2021/12/taking-stock-of-u-s-military-assistance-in-georgia/)//BB>

A corollary to the problem of contractor-led assistance is the problem of “supply-side assistance.” This occurs when organizations involved in institutional capacity-building (ICB) in the U.S. “market” their services to partner nations, rather than assistance being contingent upon a demand signal from the partner nation, validated by the Security Cooperation Organization (SCO) in the U.S. Embassy. Most partner nations, unwilling to appear ungrateful, will gladly accept whatever assistance is offered, even if it doesn’t address an important national interest and even if the partner nation lacks the ability to absorb and sustain it. While such “marketing” allows ICB-providers to claim relevance and secure funding, for the [Security Cooperation Organization ] SCO, it represents a drain on its finite resources without the payoff of achieving important U.S. or partner nation interests.

### Link---AT BCA Expired

#### Discretionary caps *did* expire. BUT, mandatory sequestration was extended which means Congress must “look under the cushions” to fund new initiatives.

Gray 21, Director of Fiscal Policy @ AAF (Gordon, “The Budget Control Act Lives!,” American Action Forum, <https://www.americanactionforum.org/daily-dish/the-budget-control-act-lives/>)

The Budget Control Act Lives!

In 2022, the most conspicuous element of the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA), statutory caps on discretionary spending, expires. These limits were imposed as part of a compromise between congressional Republicans and the Obama Administration to raise the debt limit in exchange for spending restraint. While the discretionary spending limits did reduce projected discretionary spending, the caps were amended five separate times to allow Congress to spend more than the caps would otherwise allow. Congress did not, it turns out, have much of an appetite for abiding by these limitations, and so it increased them for, as the Congressional Research Service aptly observes, “almost every fiscal year in which they were effect.” Congress will happily let these caps expire. But Congress has shown a remarkable affinity for one other aspect of the BCA – mandatory sequestration. Briefly, recall that the BCA created the Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction, also referred to as the “Super Committee,” charged with coming up with a plan to reduce the deficit by at least $1.2 trillion. They failed, which meant under the BCA, a fallback mechanism, variously referred to as the “Joint Committee Reductions,” “Automatic Spending Reductions,” or more colloquially just as the “sequester,” was imposed. This mechanism was designed to achieve the $1.2 trillion in deficit savings (including interest costs) that the Super Committee failed to deliver, by lowering the existing discretionary caps further and reducing funding for certain mandatory programs, largely Medicare. These mandatory savings amounted to about $17 billion when first imposed in 2013. According to the administration, these reductions will amount to about $24 billion in FY2022. And Congress barely batted an eye. Coming up with $20 billion in annual budget savings is a challenge, and when Congress finds such a mechanism, they tend to revisit it. And that’s exactly what Congress has done here. Where these annual savings were supposed to expire along with the rest of the BCA at the end of FY2021, they have been extended six separate times such that they will now be imposed through FY2030. Whenever Congress needs to come up with $20 billion or so to offset new spending, this is one of the first cushions they look under. To be sure, these extensions have nothing to do with reducing the deficit, but rather just offsetting (usually only partially) new spending. Indeed, the Senate-passed bipartisan infrastructure bill would extend this policy an additional year, through FY2031. So, as Congress embarks on what will be a busy fall that will require 1.) funding the government, 2.) debating a partisan $3.5 trillion tax and spending reconciliation bill, and 3.) increasing the debt limit, it is remarkable to reflect on the fact that the product of 10-year-old debt limit negotiations, the BCA, will still be around 10 years from now.

#### Washington has internalized a zero-sum relationship between Europe and Asia. They will trade-off resources, even if it’s not legally required.

Simon, Desmaele and Becker 21, \*head of international security at the Institute for European Studies (Vrije Universiteit Brussel) and director of the Brussels office of the Elcano Royal Institute, \*\*doctoral fellow at the Institute for European Studies at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel, \*\*\*currently the US liaison to the French Joint Staff. He was previously a senior transatlantic fellow at the Institute for European Studies (Luise, Linde and Jordan, “Europe as a Secondary Theater? Competition with China and the Future of America’s European Strategy,” *Strategic Studies Quarterly*, <https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-15_Issue-1/Simon.pdf)//BB>

First, to influence and maintain a favorable balance of power in Europe, Washington has traditionally relied on a strategy of forward military presence coupled with economic and diplomatic engagement. But US resources are limited, and increasing demand for them in Asia raises new questions about whether Washington can preserve a favorable European regional balance at a lower cost than in the past. In this context, Washington must consider how much influence it is willing to cede to European actors, including Germany, Russia, Britain, France and the European Union (EU). Second, as Europe becomes a secondary theater in US grand strategy, Washington is compelled to ensure that Europe’s key powers and institutions support US interests when it comes to competition with Beijing, or at least that they do not undermine US efforts in this regard. In reframing its relationship with Europe, the US is paying increasing attention to Europe’s positions toward China and Asia. Washington recently warned Europeans, for example, about China’s efforts to leverage investments and trade to gain technological and related strategic advantages relative to the United States.9 China-related considerations are also likely to gain relevance in the context of America’s calculations vis-à-vis Russia, a country that can play a direct—if limited—strategic role in China’s immediate periphery: Central Asia, Northeast Asia, and the Western Pacific. For now, the US continues to look at Russia (primarily) through a European lens and worries about Moscow’s potential to threaten US regional interests and upset the European balance. However, as competition with China becomes the focus of US grand strategy, Washington may increasingly consider how Russia can affect that competition—whether through its relationship with China, its ability to strain the European balance of power, or its propensity to create challenges elsewhere in the world. While it is certainly conceivable that the United States could retain such overwhelming advantages vis-à-vis all its peer competitors, or that China’s rise could organically slow or reverse, the US does not seem to be betting on either scenario.10 The centrality of China in US grand strategy appears to be structural, driven by the broader eastward shift in the distribution of global economic power. It is therefore unsurprising that as the United States becomes increasingly preoccupied with China’s rise, it adjusts strategy in other regions accordingly. The fact that Washington has labelled China as a “global” competitor makes it difficult to isolate SinoAmerican competition in Asia and the broader Indo-Pacific area from what happens in other theaters, particularly Europe.

## INTERNAL LINK---RESOURCES

### IL---Resources Finite---Europe vs China

#### The plan requires a forced choice to sacrifice resources and focus needed to defend Taiwan

Colby 22, co-founder and principal of The Marathon Initiative, a policy initiative focused on developing strategies to prepare the United States for an era of sustained great power competition. From 2018-2019, Colby was the Director of the Defense Program at the Center for a New American Security, where he led the Center’s work on defense issues. Before that, he served as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Force Development from 2017-2018. In that role, he served as the lead official in the development and rollout of the Department’s 2018 National Defense Strategy (Eldridge, “The U.S. Must Support Ukraine, But China Must Be Our Priority,” *TIME Magazine*, <https://time.com/6152096/us-support-ukraine-china-priority/>)

How should America respond to Russia’s abominable invasion of Ukraine? This is a question of immense importance. Right now, there is more heat than light in the discussion. Given the momentous stakes, Americans must respond to this crisis with clarity of mind and sobriety. Moscow’s invasion is likely to be a hinge point in history. If nothing else, it lays to rest the idea that history is over, that power politics and the threat of war are gone from the developed areas of the world. This is sad, but it is a reality. In developing our response to Russia’s brazen act, we must face and adapt to this reality. For too long, we have discounted the hard facts of international politics. But now America must look at the world situation much more soberly and strategically, proceeding from these hard facts rather than ignoring them or wishing them away. Above all, our response must be strategic—it must match our response to the threats we face in light of our resources and the risks we are willing to take on. The reality is that we face multiple serious threats in different parts of the world. The danger Russia poses, including to our NATO allies, is now very clear. But others have not gone away. We also must consider Iran, North Korea, transnational terrorists like al Qaeda, and, above all, the threat of a China that seeks first hegemony over Asia and then global preeminence. So far this is familiar. Less familiar but absolutely critical is the fact that we do not have a military large or capable enough to fight major wars against Russia and China in even roughly concurrent timelines. It is true that Europe is mainly a land theater and the Western Pacific is mainly a maritime one. But many of the things our forces would need to defeat Russia or China are needed in both theaters—like heavy penetrating bombers, attack submarines, advanced munitions, air defenses, and survivable intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems. Even certain assets once thought most appropriate or necessary for Europe may well play a critical role in a fight against China, such as Army long-range missiles and artillery. These and other capabilities like them would be just as vital for beating back a Russian assault as they would be for denying a Chinese fait accompli against Taiwan—and are already in short supply. Unfortunately, this is not a problem that we can solve easily, quickly, or cheaply. We should seek to redress it, but, even if we muster the will, it will take years and a significantly larger defense budget to build more of the things we need to fight a major war, like penetrating heavy bombers and nuclear-powered attack submarines. In the meantime, what we do have can only be used in one place at a time. A missile used in Europe can’t be used in Asia, and a bomber lost over Europe will take years to be replaced. We do also have an unparalleled network of allies. But a similar problem confronts us here. In theory our alliance network is far stronger than the threats we face. But in reality few of our allies have significant militaries, and it will take those that don’t significant time to develop their armed forces even if they gather the resolve. Over the long term, then, our strategy should be clear. We should reshape our military to field far more of the kinds of systems needed to fight a great power war and, with a few exceptions like sustaining our ongoing counterterrorism efforts, dispense with those elements that are ill-suited for it. Meantime, we should press and encourage our allies, especially Japan, Germany, and Taiwan, to build up their conventional defenses, and fully enable those, like Poland, Australia, and the United Kingdom, willing to do more for their and others’ defense. But this strategy will take time to bear fruit. This is the strategy the 2018 National Defense Strategy called for—yet four years later, due to factors ranging from inertia through political and bureaucratic resistance to allied footdragging, we still have a long way to go. In the coming years, then, we face what Henry Kissinger called “the necessity for choice.” We don’t have enough of the right military might to cover all the threats to our interests. So we must prioritize. This is far from unprecedented. The U.S. and Britain faced this dilemma in 1941, and elected a “Europe first” strategy, prioritizing defeating much stronger Nazi Germany before Imperial Japan. Similarly today, America must prioritize addressing the threat China poses in Asia. Asia is the world’s “decisive theater” and China by far the most powerful other state in the world. If China attains its goal of becoming dominant over Asia, it will control over half of the global economy. Americans’ fundamental liberties and prosperity will suffer grievously. This is the most dangerous outcome for Americans, and preventing it must be the priority of our foreign policy. In practical military terms, this means that we must ensure enough of the right military forces—bombers, submarines, munitions, ISR, and the like—are ready and available to defend Taiwan, and on relatively short notice. Taiwan is China’s best target for breaking apart the anti-hegemonic coalition that is the only way we can prevent Beijing from dominating Asia. If China seizes Taiwan, it will deal this coalition a huge—possibly mortal—blow. We cannot allow this. And, crucially, this is a problem right now. We don’t know Beijing’s assessment of the People’s Liberation Army’s ability to seize Taiwan. But we do know that America’s ability to defeat a Chinese invasion of Taiwan has eroded very substantially in recent years, that it is continuing to erode, and that Beijing’s perceptions of its ability to take the island would rise dramatically if it knew we had expended or tied down critical parts of our military in or for Europe. In other words, we are in or very close to the window where a successful Chinese attack on Taiwan is possible, and we must hedge against this risk.

#### The plan specifically trades off with resources needed to deter China

[the counterplan defuses threats to NATO without requiring military spending]

Blackwill and Fontaine 22, senior fellow at the Council of Foreign Relations, \*\*Chief Executive Officer of the Center for a New American Security (Robert and Richard, “Ukraine War Should Slow But Not Stop the U.S. Pivot to Asia,” *Bloomberg*, <https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2022-03-09/russia-s-ukraine-invasion-should-slow-not-stop-u-s-pivot-to-china)//BB>

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s brutal and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine has upended this approach. Now Washington must deal with revisionist great powers in two regions, while the Middle East also continues to demand attention. The U.S. should continue a long-term shift to Asia, but in a way that better balances resources and engagements across the three strategic theaters. Paradoxically, Putin’s aggression demonstrates how this should be done. First, policy makers should absorb the enduring strategic logic behind a pivot to Asia. China combines the greatest capability and will to upend the international order. The Indo-Pacific represents the primary, but not the only, regional theater in which U.S.-China competition takes place. But a sustainable pivot to Asia is possible only in the absence of serious national security crises in Europe and the Middle East. No U.S. president will ignore a Russian-induced emergency in Europe, a major terrorist threat, or a nuclear and/or hegemonic Iran. America remains a global and not a regional power. The central challenge is allocating national security resources across all three regions, without either weakening vital U.S. national interests in one or imagining that America can do everything, everywhere. That problem is most acute in the military sphere. An increase in defense spending will be required, but how that money is spent is equally important. In the Middle East, for example, regular troops should relieve the burden placed on elite special operations forces in security cooperation missions. Washington should move expensive military equipment — like F-35 and F-22 aircraft — to the two arenas of great-power competition, employing less-capable aircraft, including unmanned systems, for counterterrorism missions. A combination of regional diplomacy and continued deterrence could limit Iran's regional ambitions, freeing up some of the forces that have deployed to the Middle East in recent years to deter a potential Iran threat. In Europe, the U.S. should build on its allies’ newfound willingness to enhance their military capabilities and deter further Russian aggression. This should involve moving American troops currently stationed in Europe further east, to countries such as Poland, Romania and the Baltics. Washington should also capitalize on the recent increase in intelligence sharing – including to NATO non-members – by eliminating barriers to sharing defense technology with allies newly willing to invest. For the Indo-Pacific, Washington should reserve the lion's share of military resources that matter most, including smaller naval surface ships, long-range missiles and next-generation fighter aircraft. Building on efforts like the Aukus security arrangement with Australia and the U.K. would give regional allies more leverage to strengthen their own defense, helping them better deter China and serve as the frontline in daily competition with it. Diplomatic resources are less zero-sum than military power, and economic engagement less still. Intense diplomatic work in Europe and the Middle East could bolster the coalitions in each that are willing and able to deal with threats there, and potentially reduce some of the threats themselves. Washington should couple this with an affirmative economic agenda, beginning with re-entry to or renegotiation of the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement.

#### Resources for Europe directly tradeoff with resources dedicated to Asian power projection

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Because outcompeting China has become its most pressing strategic challenge, Washington is adjusting its policies and relationships elsewhere in the world to ensure that they support competition with Beijing. While the shift has been gradual, it is now apparent; it represents a significant change from the twentieth century when the US went to war twice in Europe and conflicts elsewhere were often driven by the logic of European security. Whereas during the Cold War the US enlisted European allies in a global struggle against a European power, today the US seeks to enlist European allies in a global competition with a non-European power. To be sure, neither competition with China nor the preservation of a favorable regional balance in the Indo-Pacific fully monopolizes US global strategy. Both the 2017 NSS and the declassified synopsis of the 2018 NDS emphasize America’s ongoing commitment to the preservation of “favorable balances of power in Europe and the Middle East.”31 The NSS even refers to Europe as the United States’ most “significant trading partner” and notes that America is “safer when Europe is prosperous and stable.”32 Yet there is growing concern in Washington about how China’s rise might affect European security. In this regard, the NSS warns about Beijing’s supposed efforts to “gain a strategic foothold in Europe by expanding its unfair trade practices and investing in key industries, sensitive technologies and infrastructure.”33 A 2019 task force report published by the bipartisan Asia Society similarly identifies “China’s pursuit of a mercantilist high-tech import-substitution industrial policy” and its “economic and diplomatic statecraft to gain a military foothold beyond Asia,” including in Europe, as key grand strategic challenges.34 In other words, because US strategic objectives in Asia and Europe are increasingly interdependent, China and Asia are also becoming increasingly relevant in Washington’s dealings with and in Europe. This interdependence complicates America’s European strategy in two ways: by underscoring the problem resource trade-offs and by pushing the US to reconcile competing interests across the two regions.

#### Inter-regional tradeoff is the reason US commitments to Europe are capped now

Colby 20, co-founder and principal of The Marathon Initiative, a policy initiative focused on developing strategies to prepare the United States for an era of sustained great power competition. From 2018-2019, Colby was the Director of the Defense Program at the Center for a New American Security, where he led the Center’s work on defense issues. Before that, he served as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Force Development from 2017-2018. In that role, he served as the lead official in the development and rollout of the Department’s 2018 National Defense Strategy. (Eldridge, “How NATO Manages the “Bear” and the “Dragon”,” Elbridge A. Colby and Ian Brzezinski in Conversation with Nikolas Gvosdev, Orbis)//BB

Elbridge Colby: The primary mission for European NATO should be to ensure the effective defense of the NATO area. From the U.S. perspective, Europe remains a vital interest, and NATO is a critical alliance. But the top U.S. priority is ensuring the effective defense of its allies and partners in the Asia-Pacific, including Taiwan, from Chinese attack—not only because of the strategic reasons mentioned above, but also due to the breathtakingly rapid and impressive growth of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Thus, dealing with the PLA will continue to be priority #1 for the U.S. military, as the 2018 National Defense Strategy and U.S. Secretary of Defense Mark Esper made clear. This means that the U.S. military contributions to Europe will necessarily have a ceiling, especially as budget pressures are likely in the 2020s.

### IL---Resources Finite---Generic

#### Military resources are finite. New expenditures require a draw-down from other regions

Wasser 20, fellow in the Defense Program and co-lead of the Gaming Lab at the Center for a New American Security (Becca, “Making Critical Choices for Better Posture Approaches,” *Center for New American Security*, <https://www.cnas.org/publications/commentary/making-critical-choices-for-better-posture-approaches)//BB>

The 2018 NDS was widely lauded for acknowledging that the United States has finite resources and therefore must prioritize its activities. A key element of the strategic guidance was the elevation of China and Russia as top threats to the United States. This move raised the importance of Asia and Europe to U.S. defense strategy.2 While creating a clear hierarchy of threats was commendable, the details of how the DoD would implement this guidance was and continues to be unclear and has resulted in haphazard attempts to adjust posture. U.S. posture in Asia—with the exception of a reported planned troop reduction in the Republic of Korea and increased freedom of navigation operations—has remained remarkably stagnant for the top geographic priority.3 Europe, on the other hand, has seen significant plans to alter the U.S. footprint and establish a new base in Poland, with the intent to better address the Russian threat.4 The Middle East, despite being an implied region of lesser importance, has received an influx of U.S. forces and capabilities since the strategy was published.5 High-demand, low-density assets that the United States had previously removed from there for use in Asia and Europe have since been returned, along with additional capabilities.6 Moreover, while the DoD has undertaken combatant command–level posture reviews, only minimal force reductions have been made in Africa and South America, areas where the U.S. footprint is already relatively small.7 Although the elevation of China and Russia in the NDS had obvious implications for U.S. posture, actualizing these changes has been difficult. This is in part because the prioritization within the last NDS still does not go far enough in forcing DoD policymakers to make difficult posture choices. Altering posture using finite resources, manpower, and capabilities involves a dynamic similar to that of a seesaw—to reinforce forces and capabilities in one region, forces and the same capabilities in another region will have to be restrained in order to balance things out. With the United States facing further resource constraints as a result of COVID-19, the next NDS[National Defense Strategy] must further prioritize adversaries and geographic regions to help determine a more aligned posture—one that better prepares the nation to prevail against other great powers while deterring lesser opponents.

#### Defense budgets are flat---tradeoffs are required for the plan

Burns 21 (Robert, “Pentagon rethinking how to array forces to focus on China,” *Associated Press*, <https://www.wdhn.com/uncategorized/pentagon-rethinking-how-to-array-forces-to-focus-on-china/)//BB>

The Biden administration faces a conundrum as it rethinks the positioning of military forces around the world: How to focus more on China and Russia without retreating from longstanding Mideast threats — and to make this shift with potentially leaner Pentagon budgets. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin ordered a monthslong “global posture” review just days after taking office. It will assess how the United States can best arrange and support its far-flung network of troops, weapons, bases and alliances to buttress President Joe Biden’s foreign policy. The review is part of the administration’s effort to chart a path for a military still caught in decades-old Mideast conflicts, facing flat or declining budgets and grappling with internal problems like racism and extremism. Its outcome could have a long-lasting impact on the military’s first priority: ensuring it is ready for war in an era of uncertain arms control. Also at stake are relations with allies and partners, weakened in some cases by the Trump administration’s “America first” approach to diplomacy. Austin’s review is closely related to a pending administration decision on whether to fulfill the prior administration’s promise to fully withdraw from Afghanistan this spring. And it is advancing separately from big-dollar questions about modernizing the strategic nuclear force. Like the Trump administration, Biden’s national security team views China, not militant extremists like al-Qaida or the Islamic State group, as the No. 1 long-term security challenge. Unlike his predecessor, Biden sees great value in U.S. commitments to European nations in the NATO alliance. That could lead to significant shifts in the U.S. military “footprint” in the Middle East, Europe and the Asia-Pacific, although such changes have been tried before with limited success. The Trump administration, for example, felt compelled to send thousands of extra air and naval forces to the Persian Gulf area in 2019 in an effort to deter what it called threats to regional stability. Biden has seen reminders of this problem in recent days with violence in Iraq and Afghanistan. It might also mean a Biden embrace of recent efforts by military commanders to seek innovative ways to deploy forces, untethered from permanent bases that carry political, financial and security costs. A recent example was a U.S. aircraft carrier visit to a Vietnamese port. Commanders see value in deploying forces in smaller groups on less predictable cycles to keep China off balance. Hints of change were surfacing before Biden took office. In December, Gen. Mark Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, spoke of his own view that technological and geopolitical change argue for rethinking old ways of organizing and positioning forces. The very survival of U.S. forces will depend on adapting to the rise of China, the spread of technologies like artificial intelligence and robotics, and the emergence of unconventional threats like pandemics and climate change, Milley said. “Smaller will be better in the future. A small force that is nearly invisible and undetectable, that’s in a constant state of movement, and is widely distributed — that would be a force that is survivable,” he told a Washington conference. “You’re not going to accomplish any objective if you’re dead.” Austin made a similar, narrower point last month about the positioning of U.S. forces in Asia and the Pacific. “There’s no question that we need a more resilient and distributed force posture in the Indo-Pacific in response to China’s counter-intervention capabilities and approaches, supported by new operational concepts,” Austin wrote in response to Senate questions posed in advance of his confirmation hearing. Austin also noted his concern about competing with Russia in the Arctic. “This is fast becoming a region of geopolitical competition, and I have serious concerns about the Russian military buildup and aggressive behavior in the Arctic — and around the world,” he wrote. “Likewise, I am deeply concerned about Chinese intentions in the region.” That doesn’t argue for abandoning the U.S. military’s large hubs overseas. But it suggests more emphasis on deployments of smaller groups of troops on shorter rotations to nontraditional destinations. This shift already is underway. The Army, for example, is developing what it calls an “Arctic-capable brigade” of soldiers as part of an increased focus on the High North. That area is seen as a potential flashpoint as big powers compete for natural resources that are more accessible as ice packs recede. Similarly, the Air Force is sending B-1 long-range bombers to Norway, a NATO ally and neighbor of Russia, for the first time. China considers itself an Arctic nation, but the main U.S. concern with Beijing is its growing assertiveness in Asia and the Pacific. In the U.S. view, China aims to build the military strength to deter or block any U.S. effort to intervene in Taiwan, the semi-autonomous democracy that Beijing views as a renegade province that must eventually return to the communist fold. A Council on Foreign Relations report this month called Taiwan the most likely spark for a U.S.-China war, a prospect with dire human consequences that it said “should preoccupy the Biden team.” “Millions of Americans could die in the first war in human history between two nuclear weapons states,” the report said. Washington also cites concern about China’s efforts to modernize and potentially expand its nuclear arsenal while it declines to participate in any international nuclear arms control negotiations. The sharpened focus on China began during the Obama administration. The Trump administration went further by formally declaring that China and Russia, not global terrorism, were the top threats to U.S. national security. Some now question whether this shift has gone too far. Christopher Miller, who served as acting secretary of defense for the final two months of Donald Trump’s presidency, said in an interview that he agrees China is the key national security threat. But he said U.S. commanders elsewhere in the world told him the China focus was costing them needed resources.

### IL---Resources Finite---Taiwan-Specific

#### Funding for Taiwan requires tradeoffs from other areas

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Finally, the hefty price tag of an unqualified commitment to protect Taiwan would need to be traded off against other potential investments. The United States must keep its eye firmly on the larger contest: the broad-based competition of systems and societies emerging with the PRC. Historical lessons on the character of such competitions,[53] the geo-economic character of a wider contest defined by the difficulty of military conquest, and China’s emphasis on gradual, non-military tools of influence suggest that global economic engagement, technological rivalries, investments in diplomatic capability, and information security and cyber capabilities will be more important to the outcome of the larger competition than the status of Taiwan. At a time, for example, when the central office charged with overseeing US cybersecurity has been described as “underfunded, outmatched and exhausted”,[54] it does not make sense to pour tens of billions into capabilities oriented for the defence of Taiwan.

## INTERNAL LINK---ASSISTANCE KEY

### IL---Assistance Key

#### Effective US assistance to Taiwan deters Chinese aggression

Gramm and Wicker 5-4-2022, \*former chairman of the Senate Banking Committee and a nonresident senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, \*\*a U.S. senator from Mississippi, is in line to become the chairman of the Armed Services Committee if Republicans control the Senate next year. (Phil and Roger, “Deter China by Turning Taiwan Into a Porcupine,” *Wall Street Journal*, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/deter-china-by-turning-taiwan-into-a-porcupine-prevention-missiles-stinger-ships-strait-11651678122>)

The paramount lesson from the Russian invasion of Ukraine is that repeated threats of economic sanctions didn’t deter Vladimir Putin from launching an all-out invasion. This offers a warning for Taiwan, the U.S. and their allies as threats from China loom. The long history of sanctions, embargoes and economic blockades strongly suggests they are difficult to enforce, entail significant costs to the nations imposing them, and trigger market forces that eventually override them. Benefits flow to countries that don’t enforce the sanctions. The enforcement challenges grow significantly if the economy of the targeted nation is large, and as the size of the target country increases, the deterrent effect of threatening sanctions loses credibility. Since the Chinese economy—one-sixth of the world’s economy—is 10 times as large as the Russian economy, effective sanctions would be virtually impossible to enforce. Relying on threatened sanctions to deter a Chinese attack on Taiwan could therefore entice aggression that could pull the U.S. into a war with China, an event that would alter the course of world history. Thankfully, there is a far more effective deterrent. Taiwan is an island roughly 100 miles off the coast of mainland China. Unlike Ukraine, a large land army can’t be massed along its border. But because it is an island, supplies also can’t be delivered to an adjacent neighbor and clandestinely driven across the border. Any supplies delivered after an attack would have to be flown in or delivered by ship, putting the supplier directly in harm’s way. Supplying Taiwan on anything like the scale we have supplied Ukraine during a Chinese attack would be a logistical nightmare. When China was an economic basket case, 100 miles of ocean was more than enough deterrent. But with China now an economic and military powerhouse, Taiwan’s lack of preparedness is increasingly dangerous. Taiwan’s economy is two-thirds larger than Israel’s, but Taiwan spends almost two-thirds less as a percentage of gross domestic product on defense. U.S. support can’t be allowed to abet Taiwan’s neglect of its own defense. As Machiavelli observed, “nothing is so weak and unsustainable as a reputation for power which is not based on one’s own strength.” The good news is that modern technology makes it relatively easy for Taiwan to afford weapons that would make the cost of invasion exceed any reasonable benefit. Ukraine’s valiant resistance has shown how highly motivated defenders with high-tech weapons can scramble the calculus of military power. Like David’s smooth stone that slew Goliath, two Ukrainian Neptune missiles sank the flagship of the Russian navy in the Black Sea. With 400 U.S. Harpoon missiles, costing only 0.3% of its GDP, Taiwan could imperil any Chinese warship in the Taiwan Strait. Modern sea mines are even less expensive, and Turkish Bayraktar drones, which have been so effective in Ukraine, cost less than $2 million each. Two hundred fifty million dollars would buy 5,000 Switchblade drones, which could devastate landing craft, armored vehicles, and small assault ships. Taiwan already has two Patriot missile battalions and for $3 billion could double its air and missile defense. Stinger missiles, used to great effect in Ukraine, cost only $400 million for 1,000 missiles. Taiwan will have more than 200 F-16 fighter jets by 2026, including almost 70 of the newest Block 70 aircraft. With additional F-16s and other aircraft being retired from the U.S. Air Force, more aircraft could be made available at their depreciated value. If the U.S. and its allies are willing to accelerate the sale of these and other force-multiplier weapons at cost, Taiwan could totally upgrade and harden its defenses by simply raising its defense budget from 2% to 3% of GDP. At that level, Taiwan could fund all these weapon purchases over a five-year period. Sustaining its defense outlays at 3% of GDP would allow Taiwan to continue modernizing its defenses while spending at a level roughly equal to Israel’s defense expenditures in real dollar terms. With these investments, Taiwan should focus heavily on training for new weapons systems. It should also consider transforming its army from the current conscript system into a smaller voluntary force that would better accommodate a defense system based on the power of modern technology. Citizens who would have otherwise been drafted could be trained in high-end weaponry and kept in reserve or home-guard forces that could be activated in emergencies. The primary objective of the U.S., its allies and Taiwan isn’t to repel a Chinese attack but to prevent it from ever occurring. Effective deterrence is the key to national security. Any wolf has the ability to kill a gentle porcupine. And yet such an attack virtually never occurs in nature. The defense of the porcupine’s quills, which can rip through the predator’s mouth and throat, is the deterrent that protects the small creature in the violent woods. Through the force-multiplying miracle of modern weapons, we can help make Taiwan a porcupine and deter aggression that could have profoundly negative consequences for Taiwan, China and the world.

#### Assistance to Taiwan is key to deters invasion

Porter and Mazarr 21, \*Professor of International Security and Strategy at the University of Birmingham. He is also Senior Associate Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute, London, \*\* senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation. Previously he worked at the US National War College, where he was Professor and Associate Dean of Academics; and has been President of the Henry L Stimson Center; Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies; Senior Defence Aide on Capitol Hill; and a Special Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Patrick and Michael, “COUNTERING CHINA’S ADVENTURISM OVER TAIWAN: A THIRD WAY,” *Lowy Institute*, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/countering-china-s-adventurism-over-taiwan-third-way)//BB

The first and most important component of such a US approach would be for the United States to serve as armourer rather than guarantor, to help Taiwan strengthen its own ability to defeat an invasion. Taiwan is, in fact, an eminently defensible nation. Both geography and weather are unfriendly to aggressors and tend to channel possible invasions into narrow apertures of space and time. Surprise is nearly impossible: China would need to build up massive forces in ways that would provide Taiwan with ample warning time.[60] If Taiwan acquires, over roughly the next five years, large numbers of additional anti-ship missiles, more extensive ground-based air defence capabilities, smart mines, better trained and more effective reserve forces, a significantly bolstered capacity for offensive cyber warfare, a large suite of unmanned intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and strike systems, and counterstrike capabilities able to hit coastal targets on the mainland, it will continually increase the price China will have to pay to win a war.[61] Taiwan is gradually embracing such an approach, but even given recent increases, it does not yet spend enough on defence to give such a strategy teeth.[62] This has been a problem for some time: Taiwan’s defence cuts prior to 2018, one analyst argued then, after earlier cuts between 1993 and 2002, suggested “either a state of denial about the threat, a gridlocked political system, misplaced faith in current systems and geographic advantages, or perhaps most disturbingly, a belief that the United States is certain to provide timely military assistance.”[63] This is now changing, but slowly. Taiwan’s military reserves, which ought to be a leading tool of an island nation’s self-defence strategy, are poorly trained and equipped.[64] Open sources suggested that as of 2018, Taiwan was only able to fill 153 000 of 188 000 active-duty billets; reports suggest that even frontline units are only manned at 60 to 80 per cent strength. Taiwanese military exercises are rigid, scripted, and of low value.[65] Logistics shortfalls have reportedly even led to suicides by despondent Taiwanese soldiers.[66] Taiwan needs a serious domestic debate over the steps required to more fully provide for its own defence. President Tsai Ing-wen posted this image to her Twitter account on 24 March 2020, accompanied by the text, "As the world grapples with the severity of the #COVID19 pandemic, China's military maneuvers around #Taiwan have continued unabated. Whether it's national defence or preventing the spread of disease, our armed forces remain as vigilant as ever." Image: Tsai Ing-wen/Twitter. Just as important as the amount Taiwan spends on defence is how it spends those funds. Military analysts almost universally agree that Taipei has over-invested in large, expensive, exquisite combat systems. Weapons like modern fighter aircraft, large surface combatants, and even large anti-aircraft missile systems like the Patriot will be vulnerable to the barrage of Chinese air and missile attack.[67] Happily, this is now changing: Taiwan’s 2017 Overall Defense Concept (ODC) pointed the country in the direction of what has been termed a “porcupine strategy” with a shift away from legacy systems to smaller, cheaper, more numerous and survivable, and more explicitly defensive capabilities.[68] This new approach has been manifest in some recent arms purchases[69] and will reportedly be confirmed in Taiwan’s 2021 Quadrennial Defense Review.[70] The United States could encourage Taiwan’s planned evolution to such asymmetric capabilities in more direct ways. It could offer advice and direct aid to help Taiwan with purely defensive steps, such as national infrastructure resilience, stockpiles of key materials to deal with a potential blockade, and cyber resilience. More ambitiously, it could encourage and directly support development of technologies geared less towards power projection and more towards repelling invasion, such as cheap anti-ship missiles and UAVs,[71] the potential for which was again recently demonstrated in the fighting over Nagorno-Karabakh.[72] China would object, but the United States could argue that this cooperation on lower-technology systems is fully in line with its long-term commitments to reduce arms transfers.

#### Security cooperation is key---it’s the most powerful demonstration of the US commitment

Kanapathy 22, senior associate with the Center for Strategic and International Studies. He served on the U.S. National Security Council staff from March 2018 to July 2021 (Ivan, “Taiwan Doesn’t Need a Formal U.S. Security Guarantee,” *Foreign Policy*, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/04/26/taiwan-us-security-guarantee-defense-china-ukraine-war/)//BB>

From an adversary’s perspective, the breadth and depth of U.S. security cooperation are perhaps the most powerful demonstration of American commitment—more so than any mere declaration of intent. As with Ukraine, the United States compelled Taiwan to give up its nuclear weapons program decades ago. Also, as with Ukraine, the United States restricts the weapons it offers to Taiwan. In hindsight, U.S. failure to provide lethal assistance to Ukraine following the 2014 Russian incursions and twice again in 2021—all intended as de-escalatory olive branches extended to Russia—had the opposite effect on Russian President Vladimir Putin. Given the imbalance of military power across the Taiwan Strait, historical U.S. resistance to offering Taiwan security assistance out of consideration for Beijing has been equally unjustified and counterproductive. Strategic clarity, however, would not solve this problem. Current U.S. law already provides ample guidance. The Taiwan Relations Act establishes U.S. policy “to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force … that would jeopardize the security” of Taiwan. On the question of security assistance, the statute requires the U.S. government to “make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services” as needed for its self-protection. Prioritizing the U.S.-Taiwan security cooperation relationship is simply a matter of U.S. political will and bureaucratic implementation. Similarly, the U.S. president’s statutory obligations to respond to an attack are arguably already commensurate with, and in some ways stronger than, the U.S. mutual defense treaties with the Philippines and Japan, both of which are targets of China’s maritime military coercion. The latter documents obligate the United States to consider an attack on the counterpart to be “dangerous to its own peace and safety” and to “act to meet the common danger.” (This same language was used in the 1954 defense treaty with Taiwan, which the United States abrogated in 1980.) The Taiwan Relations Act, by contrast, sets a lower bar to initiate action by directing the president to consult Congress on a response to “any threat [emphasis added] to the security or the social or economic system of” Taiwan. Compared with a defense pact, the president can invoke the act earlier in a crisis—possibly even today. Haass and Sacks argue that strategic clarity should be accompanied by increased counter-China defense resources and enhanced diplomacy to signal severe economic and political costs in response to aggression. But the U.S. Defense Department has been focused on China as its top long-term priority since early 2018, and the recent implementation of U.S. and allied sanctions on Russia has instructed Beijing more than diplomacy ever could. READ MORE A man holds a Chinese flag on a Chinese navy boat A man holds a Chinese flag on a Chinese navy boat China’s Taiwan Invasion Plans May Get Faster and Deadlier Russian mistakes offer some warnings for Beijing’s ambitions. ANALYSIS | BONNY LIN, JOHN CULVER To build on this credibility, the United States must demonstrate willingness to sanction and restrict entities in China whenever appropriate—even at a cost to shorter-term U.S. economic interests. For their part, Edelman and Miller go further, suggesting that the United States deploy forces to Taiwan to train the Taiwanese military. Given revelations that U.S. force rotations to Taiwan already exist, though, no new policy declaration is needed to publicize or expand these programs. Putin’s trampling of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum on Ukraine and Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s evisceration of the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration on Hong Kong indicate both leaders respect hard power, not words on paper. It is concrete actions—increased military resources to counter China, demonstrated willingness to enact sanctions, and deployments of U.S. forces in Taiwan—that have and will impact Beijing’s perceptions of U.S. capability and resolve. Such actions can be taken without a U.S. defense commitment to Taiwan. Conversely, a declaration of strategic clarity could instead be counterproductive. A U.S. security guarantee would necessarily come with two caveats or conditions. The first relates to geographic scope. The Taiwan Relations Act (like the mutual defense treaty that preceded it) covers the main island and the nearby Penghu islets, leaving out Taiwan’s outer islands, which include offshore islands along China’s coast and South China Sea features. With very little warning, the Chinese military could annex one or more of these isles in a matter of hours—presenting a fait accompli before the United States could respond. And with China’s unparalleled anti-access defenses, not even the U.S. Marines would attempt to reclaim islands within China’s coastal territories. Therefore, a U.S. security guarantee cannot credibly include these outlying islands. But even if they are not covered under a defense pact, by annexing them Beijing would diminish U.S. credibility and sow division in Taiwan, just as it has in the Philippines, a longtime U.S. treaty ally. Ten years ago, Beijing ran such a playbook in the South China Sea, leveraging its superior maritime power. China’s armed vessels escalated a jurisdictional fishing dispute at the Philippines-controlled Scarborough Shoal, which China also claims and which is technically not covered by the U.S.-Philippines defense treaty. Washington stepped in to mediate, but Beijing reportedly reneged on an agreement for both claimants to withdraw. Following the Philippines’ withdrawal, the United States did not challenge China’s remaining vessels, effectively ceding control of the shoal to China. In the decade following this incident, many in the Philippines, including its president, have expressed resignation to China’s regional dominance and questioned the credibility of the U.S.-Philippines defense pact. Furthermore, the Philippines government delayed key U.S. security cooperation programs that would have enhanced allied deterrence posture vis-à-vis China. Given how Beijing’s 2012 aggression undermined the U.S.-Philippines alliance in Manila, if Washington were to adopt strategic clarity for Taiwan, Beijing might be incentivized to attempt a similar gambit with Taipei by seizing one of its outlying islands. A second condition of strategic clarity would be a “no Taiwan independence” clause, wherein a U.S. pledge “to come to Taiwan’s aid [would not be] unconditional and would not necessarily cover a crisis initiated by Taipei,” as Haass and Sacks write. But the assignment of blame for initiating a conflict is in the eye of the beholder. Such a caveat would be welcomed by Beijing, which argues that all its coercive measures are in response to provocations by Taipei and Washington. In Beijing’s view, Washington threatens China’s sovereignty by encouraging Taiwan along its steady march toward independence. With Ukraine, Chinese officials and media adopted Russia’s narrative that the United States is to blame for having broken a purported promise to not expand NATO eastward. In this reading, Putin was forced to invade Ukraine to block NATO from reaching Russia’s doorstep. Beijing also claims that Washington is acting equally as dangerously in the Indo-Pacific—so presumably Xi will be compelled to prevent Taiwanese independence. Considering Taipei’s assertions that Taiwan is “an independent country already,” a conditional U.S. promise to intervene would only provide fodder for China’s global propaganda organs, casting the United States as again reneging on a commitment not to interfere in China’s internal affairs. In practice, the “no independence” condition removes clarity from strategic clarity and enhances China’s propaganda narratives. Like most Americans, many Taiwanese people naively assume that the U.S. military can save them from subjugation. In truth, however, Taiwan’s inherent capacity to resist an invasion until partners can come to its aid is likely a decisive factor in mounting a successful defense, and therefore in deterring an attack in the first place. According to the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC), “Taiwan faces significant challenges from decades of underinvestment in defense.” In 2020, Taiwan spent just under 2 percent of its GDP on its military, while many other so-called front-line democracies, including South Korea, India, the Baltic states, Poland, and Israel, all spent more than 2 percent. While Taiwan’s defense budget has inched upward in recent years, a U.S. security guarantee would be counterproductive to overall military deterrence, because it would reduce pressure on the Taiwanese government to further increase defense spending, marginalizing effective capability enhancements such as additional defensive munitions and drones. Lastly, the argument for strategic clarity is premised on the notion that China currently believes the United States will not intervene militarily to defend Taiwan. While Beijing’s propaganda denigrates Washington’s commitment to the region, there is scant evidence that China’s leaders actually believe it. The Chinese Communist Party’s internal doctrine frames the United States as China’s greatest threat, and China’s military likewise assumes U.S. intervention in its planning. In China, U.S. President Joe Biden’s invocations of a commitment to defend Taiwan are viewed as intentional signaling, not as unscripted commentary. As the USCC concluded, “The perceived lack of clarity … may be less relevant to deterrence failure than other factors … given that Chinese leaders already assume U.S. intervention.” The instinct to provide a security guarantee to Taiwan arises from deeply held American values. But U.S. adversaries hold different values and are swayed by alternative propositions. Beijing would likely exploit a declaration of strategic clarity and seek to create divisions between Washington and Taipei. From China’s point of view, a decision to invade Taiwan would not be tied to a U.S. security guarantee—Beijing already assumes that Washington will intervene. To enhance military deterrence, Washington must advance credible U.S., Taiwanese, and allied defense postures and capabilities. To increase economic and political deterrence, the United States must demonstrate willingness to hold China accountable and build coalitions to do the same. Given the high stakes, Washington must lead from the front without delay to effectively deter cross-strait aggression.

#### Effective security cooperation with Taiwan is the only route to peace in Asia

Walker and Sayers 22, nonresident Fellows at the American Enterprise Institute. Mr. Walker was the lead adviser to the Senate Armed Services Committee on Europe and the Indo-Pacific (2017-2020). Mr. Sayers was the lead adviser to the Senate Armed Services Committee on the Indo-Pacific (2014-16) and an adviser to the commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (2016-2018) (Dustin and Eric, “Send More Aid to Taiwan, Before It’s Too Late,” *Defense One*, <https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2022/03/send-more-aid-taiwan-its-too-late/362790/)//BB>

The simple fact is that the United States could and should have done more over the last eight years to aid Ukraine in its cause and in its need. We should have provided more security assistance. More of that assistance should have been lethal weaponry. And that lethal weaponry should have been provided sooner and in greater quantities to prevent an invasion, not respond to one. Ukrainians have fought well and fought bravely. But regrettably, they have done so—at least initially—with less help than they deserved. The United States must not make the same mistake when it comes to Taiwan. The most effective way to deter war and preserve peace in the Indo-Pacific is to ensure Taiwan can defend itself. That’s why for the last four decades the United States has been committed to enabling Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability. But in recent years, China’s rapid military modernization has radically altered the military balance across the Taiwan Strait and the Indo-Pacific.

#### Shifting resources to Taiwan effectively deters China

Sacks 22, research fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) and the author of a recent CFR paper, “Enhancing U.S.-Japan Coordination for a Taiwan Conflict.” (David, interviewed by Jongsoo Lee, “Taiwan Strait: What Is at Stake and How to Prevent a Conflict,” *The Diplomat*, https://thediplomat.com/2022/02/taiwan-strait-what-is-at-stake-and-how-to-prevent-a-conflict/)//BB

In your opinion, how can the current Taiwan Strait standoff be peacefully resolved? Is there a long-term solution to prevent a recurrence of crises?

It is hard for me to see a resolution of cross-strait differences because I cannot think of a proposal that would be acceptable to both China and Taiwan. Instead, our objective should be maintaining the status quo, which I understand is not the ideal state of affairs for the Taiwanese people, but I would argue is better than all of the other potential alternatives and has allowed Taiwan to flourish. For things to stay the same, however, a lot has to change. I am worried about eroding deterrence and the possibility that Xi Jinping will be tempted to use force against Taiwan. That is why the United States needs to focus on preparing for a conflict in the Taiwan Strait, shift military resources to the Indo-Pacific, enhance coordination with Japan, and update its declaratory policy by shifting to stratgic clarity. We often focus on the failures of U.S. foreign policy and the list is long, including the Iraq War, a chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan, and a failure to prevent North Korea from developing nuclear weapons. But I would argue that the U.S. policy toward Taiwan has been one of the great successes of post-war foreign policy. We’ve not only avoided a war in the Taiwan Strait, but also put in place policies that allowed Taiwan to become an economic juggernaut and one of Asia’s few democratic success stories. The challenge for U.S. foreign policy now is to make the necessary adjustments to account for a more powerful and assertive China and ultimately preserve peace in the Taiwan Strait for the coming decades. In this sense, Taiwan is not so much a problem to be solved but a situation to be managed

#### Assistance is key to effective deterrence. Solves Chinese aggression

Mark Montgomery and Bradley Bowman 22, Retired U.S. Navy Rear Adm. Mark Montgomery is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. He previously served as policy director of the Senate Armed Services Committee under Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz. His last Navy assignment was as director of operations for U.S. Pacific Command. Bradley Bowman is senior director of the Center on Military and Political Power at FDD. He served as a national security adviser to members of the Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations committees, as well as an active duty U.S. Army officer, Black Hawk pilot and assistant professor at the U.S. Military Academy. (“Apply the lessons from Ukraine in the Taiwan Strait,” Defense News, https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2022/03/08/nine-lessons-from-ukraine-to-apply-in-the-taiwan-strait/)//BB

5. Provide Taiwan with security assistance funding. Given the disparity in their economies, it should come as no surprise that Taiwan spends much less on defense than China. According to the Department of Defense, China’s official defense budget was roughly 15 times larger than that of Taiwan in 2019. Taiwan just increased its defense spending to about 2.4% of its gross domestic product, which is actually high relative to most other democracies. But considering the threats Taiwan faces, a defense budget of 3% of GDP is more appropriate. The United States should incentivize and enhance Taiwan’s defense spending by providing $2 billion to $3 billion a year in security assistance funding to Taiwan on a sliding scale, with the size of the grant increasing as Taiwan increases its defense budget. This funding would be used to purchase U.S. weapons that Washington and Taipei believe are most necessary to deter or defeat a Chinese attack. 6. Prioritize arms deliveries to Taiwan. The United States has granted Taiwan access to nearly $19 billion in arms sales over the past six years. This often puts Taiwan in a line of potential foreign purchasers for a U.S. system. The United States should prioritize Taiwan’s placement in the procurement lines, especially when it comes to systems that place Chinese invasion forces at risk, such as Harpoon anti-ship cruise missiles and air-launched standoff land-attack missiles. Congress should establish an annual statutory requirement for reports from the administration focused on additional steps to speed up the delivery of arms to Taiwan and other threatened democracies. Actual arms deliveries — not announcements about future deliveries — best deter aggression. 7. Begin a U.S.-Taiwan joint exercise program. American and Taiwanese military forces are not interoperable and thus ill-prepared to fight together — a weakness well understood in Beijing. If China launched an attack today, American and Taiwanese joint operations would not operate effectively together. A low-cost means to enhance the effectiveness of both militaries would be to execute a persistent joint exercise program that develops the ability of U.S. and Taiwanese forces to operate at a coordinated or even integrated level. Building interoperability among naval and air forces can be done with a limited or no U.S. footprint in Taiwan. This program should include joint U.S.-Taiwan contingency tabletop exercises and war games. This will allow planners to maximize the effectiveness of U.S. support to Taiwanese forces, understand single-point weaknesses in American and Taiwanese plans, and inform U.S. logistics challenges in operations fought close to the adversary’s home bases. 8. Build U.S.-Taiwan combined cyber capabilities. U.S. Cyber Command has acknowledged that it conducts “hunt forward” cyber operations with allies and partners in Europe to counter Russian malicious activity. Similar, Cyber Command’s hunt-forward operations should be conducted with Taiwan’s cyber operators to help the island identify critical infrastructure vulnerabilities and existing Chinese malware, and to improve the resilience of Taiwanese cyber defense capabilities. 9. Welcome allies and partners to the effort. A final investment effort should include integrating willing allies and partners into these efforts. The United States should press Japan and Australia to commit to allowing U.S. military forces access during a crisis and to providing their own forces to counter Chinese aggression. The United States should expand this effort where possible to include Singapore, the Philippines and other possible partners who understand that Chinese expansion will not stop with Taiwan. These nine investments will help deter Chinese aggression against Taiwan. If deterrence fails — as it did in Ukraine — U.S. and Taiwanese military forces would be better prepared to defeat an attack by China. The United States acted too slowly in arming and assisting Ukraine. We should not make the same mistake with Taiwan.

### IL---Assistance Key---Prevents Direct Involvement

#### Assistance deters AND lowers the likelihood the US becomes directly involved in a future conflict

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We argue that the United States should reject the emerging belief that it confronts a binary choice over Taiwan — go all-in on a defence of Taiwan in the event of attack, or see its position in the Indo-Pacific crumble. This Manichean view represents an incoherent mixture of alarmist pessimism about what is at stake with a striking overconfidence in the US ability to deter or win a conflict that would represent an existential challenge to the CCP. Between these two poles, of abandonment and an unqualified US security pledge, there is a prudent middle way. The United States should act as armourer, but not guarantor. It should help prepare Taiwan to defend itself, to raise costs against any aggression, and develop means of punishing China with a range of non-military tools, but not commit in advance to wade in militarily — and consciously equip itself with a menu of options for deterring and punishing Beijing’s aggression without fighting. There are intermediate options that would allow a US administration to reserve the right to directly defend Taiwan — but also to choose not to become directly involved in a war and yet still enhance deterrence before conflict, ensure that any attack was a disaster for Beijing, and make it even more difficult for China to dominate the Indo-Pacific afterwards. We do not advocate ruling out any future policy choice.[13] We cannot forecast what a US president might decide in the event of a crisis, and we do not suggest that the United States should publicly abandon Taiwan. The chance that the United States would join any war over Taiwan will always exist. Increasingly, however, the scope of choice in the event of an attack appears to be narrowing to two extremes — either fighting, or cutting and running.[14] We argue that the United States should widen the scope of options for US presidents over Taiwan to avoid that dilemma.

### IL---Assistance Key---AT Invasion Inev

#### Deterrence can counter fundamental ambitions to integrate Taiwan

Benner 22, co-founder and director of the Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi) in Berlin. His areas of interest include international organizations (focusing on the United Nations), peace and security, data and technology politics, and the interplay of the US, Europe and non-Western powers in the making of global (dis)order. Prior to co-founding GPPi in 2003, he worked with the German Council on Foreign Relations in Berlin, the UN Development Programme in New York, and the Global Public Policy Project in Washington, DC. (Thorsten, “Peace Through Deterrence: Why Germany and Europe Need to Invest More to Preserve the Status Quo in the Taiwan Strait,” Internationale Politik Quarterly, <https://gppi.net/2022/03/16/peace-through-deterrence)//BB>

Why It’s Time for Investments in Deterrence

The key to peace in the Taiwan Strait is deterring Beijing from violently changing the status quo. And for deterrence to work, it will be crucial to influence the cost-benefit calculations of the Chinese leadership. The aim must be to persuade Beijing that Taiwan cannot be conquered ​“at an acceptable cost.” The military component of this endeavor is the task of Taiwan, the US and their regional allies. Both Taiwan and the US still have a lot of work ahead of them to achieve success in this regard. For a long time, Taiwan has failed to invest in the right military capabilities, and the US has been losing ground militarily against China in the region in recent years. But even a military hardening of Taiwan and a strengthening of the military capabilities of the US and allies like Australia and Japan alone would likely not convince Beijing’s leadership that the costs of an attack on Taiwan are too high. Only if Beijing believes that the political and economic consequences of an attempt to conquer Taiwan pose a fundamental threat to the ​“Chinese dream” and the foundations of the Chinese Communist Party’s ​“great national rejuvenation” project will it refrain from attacking Taiwan. As China’s key trading partners, Germany and Europe have a central role to play in this non-military component of deterrence. The former German Ambassador to the United Nations Christoph Heusgen, who now heads the Munich Security Conference, summed up what is necessary: ​“Beijing should not delude itself about the consequences of an invasion [of Taiwan]. Our possible response should be coordinated within the European Union and clearly communicated. This is not about military intervention – there are other options for sanctions. Beijing should know that it will not be treated as leniently as it was after the Hong Kong takeover.”

### IL---Assistance Key---AT Post-Invasion Provision

#### Assistance now is key---post-hoc assistance won’t work in Taiwan

Flournoy 22, Co-Founder and Managing Partner of WestExec Advisors and Co-Founder and Chair of the Board of Directors of the Center for a New American Security. From 2009 to 2012, she served as U.S. Undersecretary of Defense for Policy (Michele, “How to Prepare for the Next Ukraine: Washington Must Ramp Up Support for Vulnerable Partners—Before It’s Too Late,” *Foreign Affairs*, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2022-05-23/how-prepare-next-ukraine)//BB

If the United States and its allies and partners want to meaningfully strengthen their capacity to deter and defeat future attacks by Russia, China, and other authoritarian states, there is much they can learn from the war in Ukraine. Above all, the early trajectory of this crisis makes clear that Washington cannot and should not wait until conflict looms to start strengthening its own ability to prevent aggression and the ability of at-risk partners to defend themselves. Security assistance should be accelerated and focused on providing asymmetric capabilities that are not provocative on their own but instead turn vulnerable partners into “porcupines” that are difficult and costly to attack. These lessons can most obviously be applied in the case of Taiwan, where Chinese leadership may contemplate future military action to conquer the island. Efforts to strengthen the U.S. deterrent posture in the Indo-Pacific should go hand in hand with helping Taipei strengthen a multilayered defense, from its maritime and air approaches to its cybersecurity and the security of its major cities. Washington should ramp up its provision of key defensive capabilities, including antiship missiles, sea mines, and air and missile defenses. It should also offer more training in insurgency and popular resistance, so that in the event of a Chinese attack, Taiwan could buy time for the international community to muster an effective response. In Ukraine, Western countries were quickly able to mobilize and fill gaps with military aid after the Russian invasion began; they should not count on such favorable conditions in other conflicts. As the rest of this war plays out, the United States and its partners should be thinking carefully about how to deter and, if necessary, prevail in the next one. They can be sure that their adversaries will be learning their own lessons as well.

### IL---AT NATO Solves China

#### The US can’t wield NATO to solve Chinese aggression

McTague 22, staff writer at The Atlantic based in London, (Tom, “The West’s World War II Moment,” *The Atlantic*, <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2022/04/western-response-to-china-russia-invasion/629465/)//BB>

To work, such an entity must be built on more than simple altruism of the big for the small, but on self interest. If the U.S. genuinely sees China as a threat to the democratic order, it is in its interests to build something that protects and empowers that very order. NATO doesn’t do that, AUKUS—the naval submarine pact between Australia, Britain, and the U.S.—doesn’t do that. Even the G7, which comes closest, doesn’t quite do that, excluding South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand for starters. Deepening the Western world’s economic cooperation does not mean stifling one country over another, either. After 1950, freed of the fear of each other’s industrial success and protected militarily by the U.S., Germany and France both saw economic booms.

#### The resources used by allies for the plan also drain from other priorities

Binnendijk 19, PhD in Political Science (Anika Binnendijk, and Miranda Priebe, director of the Center for Analysis of U.S. Grand Strategy and a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation (“An Attack Against Them All?,” RAND, <https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR2900/RR2964/RAND_RR2964.pdf>)//BB

Competing National Security Demands

NATO countries have limited resources for defense and so must consider how the Russian threat stacks up against other threats. Many of these states are involved in other operations, such as training security forces in Afghanistan, responding to the Syrian refugee crisis, and combating terrorism abroad. As allies consider how to prioritize the Russian threat, leaders will have to think both about their short-term resources and their ability to regenerate forces given fiscal constraints, as well as industrial base issues in the medium- and long-term.

## IMPACT---CHINA MECHANICS

### !---Comparative By Region

#### China poses a larger and more probable risk than Russia

Colby 20, co-founder and principal of The Marathon Initiative, a policy initiative focused on developing strategies to prepare the United States for an era of sustained great power competition. From 2018-2019, Colby was the Director of the Defense Program at the Center for a New American Security, where he led the Center’s work on defense issues. Before that, he served as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Force Development from 2017-2018. In that role, he served as the lead official in the development and rollout of the Department’s 2018 National Defense Strategy. (Eldridge, “How NATO Manages the “Bear” and the “Dragon”,” Elbridge A. Colby and Ian Brzezinski in Conversation with Nikolas Gvosdev, Orbis)//BB

Nikolas Gvosdev: Which is the bigger challenge, China or Russia? Or are they equivalent? Elbridge Colby is co-founder and principal of The Marathon Initiative, a policy initiative focused on developing strategies to prepare the United States for an era of sustained great power competition. From 2018-2019, Colby was the Director of the Defense Program at the Center for a New American Security, where he led the Center’s work on defense issues. Before that, he served as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Force Development from 2017-2018. In that role, he served as the lead official in the development and rollout of the Department’s 2018 National Defense Strategy. Elbridge Colby: China is by a very considerable margin the more significant challenge to U.S. interests. The fundamental U.S. interest abroad is in denying another state the ability to dominate a key region like Asia or Europe. This could allow such a state to prejudice or deny our trade, access to markets, and so forth. China is a much greater threat on both of these scores: it is a far larger economy and thus can mount a much more plausible challenge to establish hegemony over its region than Russia can over Europe, and Asia is the world’s largest economy. So, the top priority must be to deny China hegemony over Asia. That said, Russia remains a challenge in Europe, and, in particular, is a concrete military threat in Eastern NATO; ensuring Russia does not see a plausible “theory of victory” in this area needs to be the priority focus for the Atlantic Alliance.

#### Asia war outweighs, threatens extinction

Mead 10, senior fellow @ the Council on Foreign Relations (Walter, *American Interest*, “Obama in Asia,” <http://blogs.the-american-interest.com/wrm/2010/11/09/obama-in-asia/>)

The decision to go to Asia is one that all thinking Americans can and should support regardless of either party or ideological affiliation.  East and South Asia are the places where the 21st century, for better or for worse, will most likely be shaped; economic growth, environmental progress, the destiny of democracy and success against terror are all at stake here.  American objectives in this region are clear.  While convincing China that its best interests are not served by a rash, [Kaiser Wilhelm-like](http://blogs.the-american-interest.com/wrm/2010/09/26/in-the-footsteps-of-the-kaiser-china-boosts-us-power-in-asia/) dash for supremacy in the region, the US does not want either to isolate or contain China.  We want a strong, rich, open and free China in an Asia that is also strong, rich, open and free.  Our destiny is inextricably linked with Asia’s; Asian success will make America stronger, richer and more secure.  Asia’s failures will reverberate over here, threatening our prosperity, our security and perhaps even our survival. The world’s two most mutually hostile nuclear states, India and Pakistan, are in Asia.  The two states most likely to threaten others with nukes, North Korea and aspiring rogue nuclear power Iran, are there.  The two superpowers with a billion plus people are in Asia as well.  This is where the world’s fastest growing economies are.  It is where the worst environmental problems exist.  It is the home of the world’s largest democracy, the world’s most populous Islamic country (Indonesia — which is also among the most democratic and pluralistic of Islamic countries), and the world’s most rapidly rising non-democratic power as well.  Asia holds more oil resources than any other continent; the world’s most important and most threatened trade routes lie off its shores.  East Asia, South Asia, Central Asia (where American and NATO forces are fighting the Taliban) and West Asia (home among others to Saudi Arabia, Israel, Turkey and Iraq) are the theaters in the world today that most directly engage America’s vital interests and where our armed forces are most directly involved.  The world’s most explosive territorial disputes are in Asia as well, with islands (and the surrounding mineral and fishery resources) bitterly disputed between countries like Russia, the two Koreas, Japan, China (both from Beijing and Taipei), and Vietnam.  From the streets of Jerusalem to the beaches of Taiwan the world’s most intractable political problems are found on the Asian landmass and its surrounding seas. Whether you view the world in terms of geopolitical security, environmental sustainability, economic growth or the march of democracy, Asia is at the center of your concerns.  That is the overwhelming reality of world politics today, and that reality is what President Obama’s trip is intended to address.

### !---Overstretch Turns Case

#### Strategic overstretch causes the US military to fail in both Europe and Asia

Wertheim 22, senior fellow in the American Statecraft Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He is the author of “Tomorrow, the World: The Birth of U.S. Global Supremacy.” “Europe is showing that it could lead its own defense,” *Washington Post*, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2022/03/03/europe-defense-nato-ukraine-war/)//BB>

Providing temporary reinforcements is the right decision today in the face of Russia’s bald aggression. But the United States should resist the inclination to revive its role as the military protector of Europe, especially since Europe is awakening to its responsibilities. Britain is sending troops to the Baltic states and Poland. France is pushing “strategic autonomy” for the European Union. And days after halting the Nord Stream 2 pipeline supplying natural gas from Russia, Germany reversed a long-standing ban on providing military assistance and sent weapons to Ukraine. Germany also vowed to spend more than 2 percent of its economy on defense, finally committing to meet NATO’s target. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz declared his country, and Europe, to have reached a “historic turning point.” Both Americans and Europeans would benefit if Scholz’s words prove true. In the coming years, European states should move to take the lead in their collective defense, and the United States should do everything possible to encourage them. To stake the defense of Europe on the United States, over the next decade and beyond, would be to answer Putin’s rash gamble with a slow-moving gamble of our own. It might seem as though the United States will remain able and willing to protect all of NATO’s 28 European countries far into the future. After all, America has orchestrated Europe’s defense for the past eight decades. Yet it did so under two markedly different conditions. During World War II and the Cold War, the United States sought to stop totalitarian powers from conquering the region. An Axis or Soviet takeover of Europe would have closed off the entire continent to liberal, American-style interaction and influence, and put the Western Hemisphere on the defensive. After the Cold War, however, as the Soviet threat collapsed, the United States recommitted to Europe not because the stakes were high but arguably because they were low. Threats were so negligible that it seemed U.S. leadership could keep things that way through modest exertion — and spread democracy to boot. Expanding NATO eastward, American officials convinced themselves that what had been a military alliance was more comparable to a political club, one that need not become an adversary of Russia. Russia’s assault on Ukraine ends that chapter and begins a new one. The prospect of further Russian aggression in Eastern Europe cannot be dismissed as negligible, as it was in the 1990s or 2000s. At the same time, Russia poses far less a threat to overrun Europe and threaten American security or prosperity than the Soviet Union did. After all, the Russian economy is roughly one-fifth the size of that of the European Union, and that was before the severe sanctions of the past week. Although Russia has built a formidable military, one that enables it to launch wars like that in Ukraine, NATO’s European members collectively outspend Russia on defense. During the Cold War, by contrast, the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact boasted land forces superior in number to those of NATO (including the U.S. share), and the gap between its economic output and that of Western Europe was several times smaller than Russia’s shortfall today. In the security environment now emerging, with Russia menacing Eastern Europe, the United States is set to face major costs and the ultimate risk: great-power war between nuclear peers. Yet the threat Russia poses remains one that Europeans could handle themselves, with America acting as a supporter rather than the leader. The United States remains a superpower. Why shouldn’t it be the main counterweight in Europe to Moscow? There are two reasons both the United States and Europe would be better off if it declined this role. One lies in Beijing, and the other in Washington. The United States has already identified China as its primary rival, embarking on “strategic competition” with the world’s number-two power. Taking on China and Russia at once would be unwise and likely impossible. True, the Pentagon has previously planned to fight two wars at once, but those wars were envisioned as “regional” conflicts against small states like Iran, Iraq or North Korea. In practice, the United States had difficulty prosecuting wars in Iraq and Afghanistan simultaneously. China and Russia represent challenges of a far greater magnitude, which explains why the Pentagon abandoned its two-war standard in 2018, even as its budget has grown. If the United States doubles down on European security while leading the charge in Asia, it may either fall short in both places or default on its commitments in Europe just when they come due.

### !---Draws in US

#### China-Taiwan conflict draws in the US

Porter and Mazarr 21, \*Professor of International Security and Strategy at the University of Birmingham. He is also Senior Associate Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute, London, \*\* senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation. Previously he worked at the US National War College, where he was Professor and Associate Dean of Academics; and has been President of the Henry L Stimson Center; Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies; Senior Defence Aide on Capitol Hill; and a Special Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Patrick and Michael, “COUNTERING CHINA’S ADVENTURISM OVER TAIWAN: A THIRD WAY,” *Lowy Institute*, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/countering-china-s-adventurism-over-taiwan-third-way)//BB

Any conflict over Taiwan would probably draw in the US homeland. It would most probably escalate in cyber terms, with China going after a range of US critical infrastructure, especially anything directly supporting military deployments. Emerging technologies would also allow Beijing to strike kinetically at the United States — with long-range hypersonic weapons, ‘Trojan Horse’ missiles hidden in shipping containers prepositioned in US ports,[49] or very long-range drones. Discussions of a Taiwan scenario sometimes treat it as a sort of twenty-first century Gulf War, with US forces deployed far from home to win a conflict from which the American people are largely insulated. A war with China will be nothing like that. If mutual homeland attacks do begin, the conflict is bound to escalate.

#### US will defend Taiwan because of strategic interests---causes great power war

Benner 22, co-founder and director of the Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi) in Berlin. His areas of interest include international organizations (focusing on the United Nations), peace and security, data and technology politics, and the interplay of the US, Europe and non-Western powers in the making of global (dis)order. Prior to co-founding GPPi in 2003, he worked with the German Council on Foreign Relations in Berlin, the UN Development Programme in New York, and the Global Public Policy Project in Washington, DC. (Thorsten, “Peace Through Deterrence: Why Germany and Europe Need to Invest More to Preserve the Status Quo in the Taiwan Strait,” Internationale Politik Quarterly, <https://gppi.net/2022/03/16/peace-through-deterrence)//BB>

Why the US Will Defend Taiwan

Some critics claim that the US’ messy withdrawal from Afghanistan has only fueled Beijing’s desire to conquer Taiwan because of nagging doubts about Washington’s determination to defend allies. Brussels-based journalist Stuart Lau, for instance, wrote on Twitter: ​“Imagine Beijing watching the US military ​‘commitment’ in Afghanistan while contemplating its next move on Taiwan.” This is a misguided analogy. For one, Beijing understands that Washington chose to withdraw from Afghanistan to free up political and military resources to deal with China. Moreover, Taiwan is strategically much more important to the US than Afghanistan. The island is a like-minded democracy and an important economic partner (particularly in semiconductor technology sector, where Taiwan is world leader). But above all, Taiwan is crucial as a strategic location for the US in the region. At a hearing of the US Senate in December 2021, Ely Ratner – assistant secretary of defense for the Indo-Pacific in the Biden administration – clearly cited Taiwan’s location as a central motivation for his government’s commitment to supporting Taiwan: ​“Taiwan is located at a critical node within the first island chain, anchoring a network of US allies and partners — stretching from the Japanese archipelago down to the Philippines and into the South China Sea — that is critical to the region’s security and critical to the defense of vital US interests in the Indo-Pacific. Geographically, Taiwan is also situated alongside major trade lanes that provide sea lines of communication for much of the world’s commerce and energy shipping.” If Beijing brings Taiwan under its control, the entire military balance in the Western Pacific will change. So far, as Bruce Jones very clearly states in his book To Rule the Waves, China has been severely restricted by the fact that the first island chain off its coast is comprised of US allies: Japan, Taiwan and the Philippines. If China controlled Taiwan, it would break through the first island chain and gain much freer access to the Western Pacific at large. As Jones writes: ​“China would suddenly gain naval bases beyond the first island chain. The southern coast of Japan would be much more vulnerable to the Chinese PLAN and American defenses in the rest of the Western Pacific more exposed to Chinese power.” It is precisely because the strategic consequences are so dramatic that we should assume that the US (alongside allies such as Australia and Japan, which have both indicated possible military support) is prepared to defend Taiwan militarily – and that this would lead to a great power war. Unless someone who is an advocate of radical retrenchment assumes the US presidency, this scenario would likely hold true in the foreseeable future and under both Republican and Democrat administrations.

#### Taiwan is different than Afghanistan/Ukraine---US would become directly involved

Benner 22, co-founder and director of the Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi) in Berlin. His areas of interest include international organizations (focusing on the United Nations), peace and security, data and technology politics, and the interplay of the US, Europe and non-Western powers in the making of global (dis)order. Prior to co-founding GPPi in 2003, he worked with the German Council on Foreign Relations in Berlin, the UN Development Programme in New York, and the Global Public Policy Project in Washington, DC. (Thorsten, “Peace Through Deterrence: Why Germany and Europe Need to Invest More to Preserve the Status Quo in the Taiwan Strait,” Internationale Politik Quarterly, <https://gppi.net/2022/03/16/peace-through-deterrence)//BB>

All of these are dangerous miscalculations that we should quickly discard. A war over Taiwan would shake the international order and decimate global prosperity even more than Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. If Germany and Europe were to attempt to mediate between the US and China, this would only serve to increase Beijing’s appetite for using coercion and force against Taiwan. And while the US has officially committed to a policy of ​“strategic ambiguity” with regard to Taiwan, it would be dangerously short-sighted for Europeans to doubt or downplay Washington’s willingness to risk a war with China. Due to its location, Taiwan is much more important to the US geopolitical strategy than Afghanistan and Ukraine. Washington may have shied away from entering a direct military confrontation with a nuclear superpower over Ukraine, but this would likely be different in the case of Taiwan.

### !---Turns Heg/European Credibility

#### China-Taiwan war decimates US military leadership, wrecks credibility in other theatres

Porter and Mazarr 21, \*Professor of International Security and Strategy at the University of Birmingham. He is also Senior Associate Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute, London, \*\* senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation. Previously he worked at the US National War College, where he was Professor and Associate Dean of Academics; and has been President of the Henry L Stimson Center; Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies; Senior Defence Aide on Capitol Hill; and a Special Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Patrick and Michael, “COUNTERING CHINA’S ADVENTURISM OVER TAIWAN: A THIRD WAY,” *Lowy Institute*, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/countering-china-s-adventurism-over-taiwan-third-way)//BB

Finally, there is the issue of the military cost of a conflict. No one can be certain how badly the US military would be mauled in a war with China, but the effects would likely be severe: a significant proportion of the committed forces could be destroyed or disabled, losses that could cripple [limit] the US military for years. One recent study indicates that, due to constraints on the US defence industrial base, it could take between 5 and 50 years for the United States to replace current inventories of major weapons systems.[50] For years if not decades after a war, then, the US military would be a fraction of its present strength. So would China’s, but this would reduce the credibility of other US pledges around the world.[51]

#### War goes nuclear, and devastates US leadership across-the-board

Porter and Mazarr 21, \*Professor of International Security and Strategy at the University of Birmingham. He is also Senior Associate Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute, London, \*\* senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation. Previously he worked at the US National War College, where he was Professor and Associate Dean of Academics; and has been President of the Henry L Stimson Center; Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies; Senior Defence Aide on Capitol Hill; and a Special Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Patrick and Michael, “COUNTERING CHINA’S ADVENTURISM OVER TAIWAN: A THIRD WAY,” *Lowy Institute*, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/countering-china-s-adventurism-over-taiwan-third-way)//BB

The parallels between the dilemmas of Vietnam and Taiwan are instructive. A growing certainty in the United States that regional and global security hinges on a single contest. Claims that America’s rival has an unquenchable appetite in a region ripe for dominance. The conviction that there is no middle ground—that to deter and punish aggression, the United States must prepare to fight the war itself. The result in Vietnam was to compel the fighting of an unnecessary war, and the United States may be sliding towards a similar abyss over Taiwan — but this time the stakes are far higher. This time, the dilemma could trap the United States in precisely the outcome it seeks to avert — a major war with a nuclear-armed China. It could lead to the devastation of the US military, a collapse of public support for power projection in Asia, an America fatally weakened for the broader competition with China and in its position elsewhere, and —perhaps— a nuclear exchange. Washington ought to think along indirect lines, rather than planning to directly engage with every aggression it hopes to deter. Such an approach demands fresh thinking, before it is too late.

### !---Turns LIO

#### US policy towards China will determine the LIO

Chellaney 22, Professor of Strategic Studies at the New Delhi-based Center for Policy Research and Fellow at the Robert Bosch Academy in Berlin (Brahma, “America Is Focusing on the Wrong Enemy,” Project Syndicate, <https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/the-threat-to-us-global-leadership-is-china-not-russia-by-brahma-chellaney-2022-02)//BB>

The future of the US-led international order will be decided in Asia, and China is currently doing everything in its power to ensure that order’s demise. Already, China is powerful enough that it can host the Winter Olympics even as it carries out a genocide against Muslims in the Xinjiang region, with limited pushback. If the Biden administration does not recognize the true scale of the threat China poses, and adopt an appropriately targeted strategy soon, whatever window of opportunity for preserving US preeminence remains may well close.

### !---Turns Europe

#### Chinese invasion of Taiwan breaks Europe

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In Europe, all eyes are currently on Russia’s brutal invasion of Ukraine and the dangers that the conflict could spill over into a full-scale war between NATO and Russia. At the same time, Europeans should not lose sight of the risk for another major conflict that has been brewing in the Indo-Pacific: a military confrontation between China and the US over Taiwan. Such an escalation poses one of the greatest threats to both German and European prosperity and global stability. Taiwan is an island of 23 million citizens. The Economist, in an article published in 2021, has called it ​“the most dangerous place on earth.” And the reason is clear: Taiwan is one of the most likely locations of a war between great powers in the coming decade. An armed conflict between the world’s two main nuclear powers – China and the US – would have catastrophic consequences not only in the region, but also for the rest of the world. Such a war over Taiwan would not only claim countless lives and hold an incalculable potential for escalation – it would also cause fundamental economic shocks and disruption. The fallout would be particularly strong in Europe, whose economy is deeply enmeshed with that of the Indo-Pacific. And any assault on Taiwan would be a fundamental attack on the international legal order that EU members have committed to uphold.

### !---Turns Economy

#### China-Taiwan war wrecks the global economy

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### !---Turns Cyber

#### China-Taiwan war trigger widespread cyber conflict [assistance solves]

Kitchen and Drexel 22, \*senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, a former national security adviser to Sen. Ben Sasse (R-Neb.), and a 15-year veteran of the United States Intelligence Community. Read his weekly technology and national security newsletter at thekitchensync.tech., \*\*research associate at the American Enterprise Institute, and studied Chinese state surveillance as a Schwarzman Scholar in 2018-2019 (Klon and Bill, “Securing Taiwan Requires Immediate Unprecedented Cyber Action,” *Lawfare*, <https://www.lawfareblog.com/securing-taiwan-requires-immediate-unprecedented-cyber-action)//BB>

The prospect of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan echoes some of the most disastrous 20th century instances of great power expansion—reminiscent, perhaps, of Nazi Germany’s Anschluss or even its subsequent invasion of Poland. Given that the latter ignited World War II, America’s strategic community has been rightly fixated on the vast military and political contingencies of a Chinese invasion that would remake Asia. But Taiwan is not just the geopolitical fulcrum of the Indo-Pacific; it is also the nexus of a rapidly evolving Sino-American technological competition. And if 20th century great power competition is any guide, tech races are just as important to long-term competition as territorial military contests. The U.S. needs to act now to secure the technological dimensions of a looming Taiwan crisis, or risk losing far more than the island. In the domain of Sino-American tech rivalry, Taiwan is unique in two aspects: First, the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation (TSMC) remains the world’s tightest bottleneck in the global high-tech ecosystem, with exclusive capabilities to construct the most valuable, sophisticated computer chips in existence. Second, military conflagration in Taiwan would represent a hitherto-unknown level of cyber-intensive military conflict, the seeds of which likely have already been planted. Both of these realities demand unprecedented cooperation between the United States and Taiwan—cooperation that requires significant trust and openness in Taipei and significant counter-espionage and national security assistance from Washington.

### AT Doesn’t Draw in US

#### If the US doesn’t get involved, that triggers wildfire prolif and war

Sacks 22, research fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) and the author of a recent CFR paper, “Enhancing U.S.-Japan Coordination for a Taiwan Conflict.” (David, interviewed by Jongsoo Lee, “Taiwan Strait: What Is at Stake and How to Prevent a Conflict,” *The Diplomat*, https://thediplomat.com/2022/02/taiwan-strait-what-is-at-stake-and-how-to-prevent-a-conflict/)//BB

The immediate stakes in the Taiwan Strait are clear, but the biggest shift I’ve seen in recent years is a growing recognition that what happens in the Taiwan Strait will have enormous ramifications for the entire Indo-Pacific. In my view, a growing number of policymakers have correctly concluded that if the United States were to stand aside in the face of a Chinese attack on Taiwan, its allies and partners would come to question whether they could rely on the United States for their security. Those countries would then either accommodate China or hedge against it by growing their militaries and developing nuclear weapons. Either development would result in diminished U.S. influence and increasing instability. Ultimately, unanswered Chinese aggression against Taiwan could very well precipitate the establishment of a Chinese-led order in the region most critical to America’s continued security and prosperity.

### AT Other Scenarios for US-China War

#### Taiwan is the only scenario for US-China war

Sacks 22, research fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) and the author of a recent CFR paper, “Enhancing U.S.-Japan Coordination for a Taiwan Conflict.” (David, interviewed by Jongsoo Lee, “Taiwan Strait: What Is at Stake and How to Prevent a Conflict,” *The Diplomat*, <https://thediplomat.com/2022/02/taiwan-strait-what-is-at-stake-and-how-to-prevent-a-conflict/)//BB>

Taiwan is now a focal point on the U.S. foreign policy agenda. Preserving the status quo in the Taiwan Strait in the face of growing Chinese power and assertiveness is a challenge not just for the Unites States but also other nations including Japan. For a view on what is at stake and policy prescriptions, Jongsoo Lee interviewed David Sacks, a research fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) and the author of a recent CFR paper, “Enhancing U.S.-Japan Coordination for a Taiwan Conflict.” What is Taiwan’s importance to China and the United States? Can China be a great power without control over Taiwan? China considers Taiwan to be a “core interest” and a remnant of its unfinished civil war. To Chinese leaders, the country’s “rejuvenation” can only be achieved once its territorial integrity is “restored” and Taiwan is the missing piece. Thus, from their perspective, China cannot be a great power until it brings Taiwan under its control. When cross-strait tensions rise, Chinese leaders remind their American interlocutors that Taiwan is the most sensitive issue in the bilateral relationship. Put plainly, Taiwan is likely the only venue that could trigger a full-scale war between the United States and China.

### AT Taiwan Independence

#### Zero risk of Taiwan independence

Sacks 22, research fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) and the author of a recent CFR paper, “Enhancing U.S.-Japan Coordination for a Taiwan Conflict.” (David, interviewed by Jongsoo Lee, “Taiwan Strait: What Is at Stake and How to Prevent a Conflict,” *The Diplomat*, https://thediplomat.com/2022/02/taiwan-strait-what-is-at-stake-and-how-to-prevent-a-conflict/)//BB

Generally, there are two scenarios that observers have focused on as potential triggers for conflict: a Taiwanese declaration of independence or a PRC decision to attack because its leaders concluded “peaceful reunification” could not be achieved. To me, a formal Taiwanese declaration of independence is no longer an acute risk: The majority of Taiwanese voters support maintaining the status quo and understand that pursuing de jure independence would all but guarantee a Chinese attack. In addition, the United States has repeatedly stated that it does not support Taiwanese independence, and Taiwan knows that if it is seen as provoking the mainland, then U.S. support will erode and it could choose not to come to Taiwan’s defense. Therefore, I believe U.S. policy needs to focus on deterring a Chinese attack, which is the far greater risk.

## AFFIRMATIVE

### Ukraine Thumper + Not Zero-Sum

#### Ukraine thumps the Asia pivot AND it’s not zero-sum

Madhani and Megerian 3-17-2022 (Aamer and Chris, “Biden’s China ‘pivot’ complicated by Russia’s war in Ukraine,” AP News, <https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-putin-biden-business-china-d47d4b2215de708b55a12bc4b648818d)//BB>

President Joe Biden set out to finally complete the “pivot to Asia,” a long-sought adjustment of U.S. foreign policy to better reflect the rise of America’s most significant military and economic competitor: China. But Russia’s brutal invasion of Ukraine has made that vexing move even more complicated. China’s government has vacillated between full embrace and more measured responses as Russian President Vladimir Putin prosecutes his war, making the decisions for Biden far more layered. Biden and China’s Xi Jinping are scheduled to speak by phone on Friday, a conversation that the White House says will center on “managing the competition between our two countries as well as Russia’s war against Ukraine and other issues of mutual concern.” The Biden administration is left needing to focus east and west at the same time, balancing not simply economic imperatives but military ones as well. “It’s difficult. It’s expensive,” Kurt Campbell, the coordinator for Indo-Pacific Affairs on the White House National Security Council, said during a recent forum of maintaining a high-level U.S. focus in two regions. “But it’s also essential, and I believe we’re entering a period where that’s what will be required of the United States and of this generation of Americans.” Biden has been deeply invested in rallying NATO and Western allies to respond to Russia with crippling sanctions, supplying an overmatched Ukraine military with $2 billion in military assistance — including $800 million in new aid announced Wednesday — and addressing a growing humanitarian crisis. Eastern flank NATO allies, including Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania, have made clear to the Biden administration that they want the U.S. to increase its military presence in the region and do more to address the worst humanitarian crisis in Europe since World War II. More than 3 million Ukrainian refugees have fled their country in recent weeks. Though the war in Ukraine has dominated Biden’s focus of late, White House officials insist they haven’t lost sight of China — and are watching intently to see how Xi decides to play his hand.

#### Distraction now AND the military is unprepared in Asia

Mark Montgomery and Bradley Bowman 3-8-2022, Retired U.S. Navy Rear Adm. Mark Montgomery is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. He previously served as policy director of the Senate Armed Services Committee under Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz. His last Navy assignment was as director of operations for U.S. Pacific Command. Bradley Bowman is senior director of the Center on Military and Political Power at FDD. He served as a national security adviser to members of the Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations committees, as well as an active duty U.S. Army officer, Black Hawk pilot and assistant professor at the U.S. Military Academy. (“Apply the lessons from Ukraine in the Taiwan Strait,” Defense News, <https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2022/03/08/nine-lessons-from-ukraine-to-apply-in-the-taiwan-strait/)//BB>

With the world’s attention fixed on the national security and humanitarian catastrophe in Ukraine caused by Russian President Vladimir Putin’s unprovoked invasion, a similar disaster is brewing in the Pacific. Taking a page from Putin’s playbook, the Chinese Communist Party, or CCP, is methodically assembling combat power to coerce or conquer the free people of Taiwan. Preventing that from happening will require Washington to learn the right lessons from the disaster in Ukraine. Among them is the need for Washington to spend less time worrying about provoking authoritarian bullies and more time working to defend threatened democracies before the invasion starts. This is especially critical as U.S. forces are much more likely to be directly involved in a response to coercion against Taiwan. For 25 years, Beijing has pursued a determined strategy featuring military modernization, technological advancements, economic infiltration, cyberattacks and persistent disinformation campaigns. These efforts have focused on building a world-class military, erasing American military supremacy in the seas and skies around Taiwan, and preparing for a potential attack designed to establish CCP dominion over Taiwan. Meanwhile, the United States has been distracted elsewhere, unable to focus its strategic and fiscal efforts on the rising power in China. This has been compounded by consistent congressional failures to provide the Pentagon with the timely, sufficient and predictable funding necessary to modernize U.S. forces and maintain sufficient readiness and capacity. Indeed, the Department of Defense has received on-time funding only once in the last 13 fiscal years. Exacerbating these dynamics, Washington has been slow in addressing serious concerns and specific requests for resources identified by Indo-Pacific Command in successive reports to Congress. Just last year, the command again warned that the military balance of power in the region continues to become “more unfavorable” for America and its allies.

### ---xt: Ukraine Thumper

#### Security Cooperation with Ukraine is high now

DoS, US Department of State, 5-6-2022 (“U.S. Security Cooperation with Ukraine,” <https://www.state.gov/u-s-security-cooperation-with-ukraine/)//BB>

The United States, our allies, and our partners worldwide are united in support of Ukraine in response to Russia’s premeditated, unprovoked, and unjustified war against Ukraine. We have not forgotten Russia’s earlier aggression in eastern Ukraine and occupation following its unlawful seizure of Crimea in 2014. The United States reaffirms its unwavering support for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders, extending to its territorial waters. Ukraine is a key regional strategic partner that has undertaken significant efforts to modernize its military and increase its interoperability with NATO. It remains an urgent security assistance priority to provide Ukraine the equipment it needs to defend itself against Russia’s war against Ukraine. Since January 2021, the United States has invested more than $4.5 billion in security assistance to demonstrate our enduring and steadfast commitment to Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. This includes more than $3.8 billion since Russia’s launched its premeditated, unprovoked, and brutal war against Ukraine on February 24. Since 2014, the United States has provided more than $6.5 billion in security assistance for training and equipment to help Ukraine preserve its territorial integrity, secure its borders, and improve interoperability with NATO.

United States security assistance committed to Ukraine includes:

Over 1,400 Stinger anti-aircraft systems;

Over 5,500 Javelin anti-armor systems;

Over 14,000 other anti-armor systems;

Over 700 Switchblade Tactical Unmanned Aerial Systems;

90 155mm Howitzers and 184,000 155mm artillery rounds;

72 Tactical Vehicles to tow 155mm Howitzers;

16 Mi-17 helicopters;

Hundreds of Armored High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles;

200 M113 Armored Personnel Carriers;

Over 7,000 small arms;

Over 50,000,000 rounds of ammunition;

75,000 sets of body armor and helmets;

Laser-guided rocket systems;

Puma Unmanned Aerial Systems;

Phoenix Ghost Tactical Unmanned Aerial Systems;

Unmanned Coastal Defense Vessels;

17 counter-artillery radars;

Four counter-mortar radars;

Two air surveillance radars;

M18A1 Claymore anti-personnel munitions;

C-4 explosives and demolition equipment for obstacle clearing;

Tactical secure communications systems;

Night vision devices, thermal imagery systems, optics, and laser rangefinders;

Commercial satellite imagery services;

Explosive ordnance disposal protective gear;

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear protective equipment;

Medical supplies to include first aid kits;

Electronic jamming equipment;

Field equipment and spare parts.

Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA)

Pursuant to a delegation by the President, we have used the emergency Presidential Drawdown Authority on eight occasions since September 2021 to provide Ukraine $3.4 billion in military assistance directly from DoD stockpiles.

#### High for a decade

TSC 3-25-2022 (The Soufan Center, “IntelBrief: The Impact of Security Cooperation and Building Partner Capacity in Ukraine,” <https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2022-march-25/>)

The Ukrainian military has benefited significantly from security cooperation efforts of the U.S. and its allies, which have provided Kyiv with training and weapons that have proved crucial so far in bleeding Russian forces. In addition to training provided by the U.S., the U.K. and Canada have also provided training, while a plethora of Western and NATO countries have provided supplies, equipment, weaponry, and ammunition. Since 2014, the U.S. has supplied Ukraine with more than $2.5 billion in military assistance, including supplying the Ukrainian military with everything from counter-mortar radars to Javelin anti-tank missiles. According to a recent report from Yahoo News, secret support provided by CIA paramilitaries was indispensable to Ukrainian forces, including snipers and other elite units who benefited from this covert action training program. Many analysts covering Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have been shocked as much by the former’s pitiful military performance as they have by the latter’s success. The Ukrainian military of 2022 stands in stark contrast to the Ukrainian military of 2014. The difference, in addition to the remarkable grit and determination of those fighting against the Russians, is the transformation of Ukraine’s military during the eight years between Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea and its most recent invasion, which began in earnest on February 24. The United States engages in security cooperation efforts and programs to build the partner capacity of U.S. allies all over the world. Every one of these partnerships is beset by certain challenges and setbacks, with instances of success less common than failures. What is difficult, if not impossible to account for, and something available in droves in the case of Ukraine, is the will to fight. That cannot be bestowed by an external ally, but when marshaled effectively, in combination with the necessary contextual factors that enable hope for success, can be combined with robust security cooperation to make a lasting impact on the battlefield. The U.S. came under immense criticism and Congressional scrutiny following the rapid collapse of the Afghan government and military in August 2021. In that case, twenty years of funding, training, and the provision of equipment seemingly disappeared over the course of the Taliban’s multi-week offensive, which saw Afghan forces abandon their fighting positions, allowing the insurgents to ransack city after city before seizing the capital, Kabul. However, in this instance, the U.S. had already publicized a deadline for withdrawal, and security and intelligence analysts broadly foretold of a Taliban takeover, undercutting motivations for viable sustained combat by the Afghan military. With Ukraine, years of security cooperation have clearly yielded significant results, with Ukraine performing valiantly in battle against one of the largest militaries in the world. Ukraine’s military readiness, ability to adapt on the battlefield, and integration of light infantry with anti-tank weapons, drones, and artillery fire is tangible proof of the benefits of Western security cooperation efforts. Ukrainian combat experience in the Donbas has also hardened its forces and given them a level of familiarity with how the Russians operate. In addition to training provided by the U.S., the United Kingdom and Canada have also provided training, while a plethora of Western and NATO countries have provided supplies, equipment, weaponry, and ammunition. Since 2014, the U.S. has supplied Ukraine with more than $2.5 billion in military assistance. This assistance has included training and equipping the Ukrainian military, supplying everything from counter-mortar radars to Javelin anti-tank missiles. Ukraine was at the center of the first impeachment of former U.S. President Donald Trump, who attempted to extort Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy by threatening to withhold crucial military assistance unless Zelenskyy agreed to help Trump dig up dirt on his political rivals, something Zelenskyy flatly refused to do. Several officials in the Trump administration attempted to justify Trump’s actions, labeling the Ukrainian government as corrupt and its military as ramshackle and overmatched. Fast forward to the current day, and the U.S. and its allies have opened the floodgates, sending Ukraine advanced weaponry as well as Soviet-made air defense systems, including the SA-8, that were secretly acquired years ago as part of a long-running clandestine project. At a meeting yesterday in Brussels, Belgium, NATO leaders pledged to provide Ukraine with even more weaponry and training, offering reassurance that there was no easing up on taking the fight to Russia more than a month into the conflict.

### ---xt: Not Zero-Sum

#### The US can focus on both regions at once

Kroenig 22, deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and a professor in the Department of Government and the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University (Matthew, “Washington Must Prepare for War With Both Russia and China,” *Foreign Policy*, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/02/18/us-russia-china-war-nato-quadrilateral-security-dialogue/)//BB>

As Russia threatens the largest land invasion in Europe since World War II, the most consequential strategic question of the 21st century is becoming clear: How can the United States manage two revisionist, autocratic, nuclear-armed great powers (Russia and China) simultaneously? The answer, according to many politicians and defense experts, is that Washington must moderate its response to Russia in Europe to focus on the greater threat posed by China in the Indo-Pacific. This would be a mistake. The United States remains the world’s leading power with global interests, and it cannot afford to choose between Europe and the Indo-Pacific. Instead, Washington and its allies should develop a defense strategy capable of deterring and, if necessary, defeating Russia and China at the same time. In recent weeks, Biden has sent several thousand U.S. troops to reinforce NATO’s eastern flank—and for good reason. A major war in Ukraine could spill across international boundaries and threaten the seven NATO allies that border Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine. Moreover, if Russian President Vladimir Putin succeeds in Ukraine, why would he stop there? Putin has shown a clear interest in resurrecting the former Russian Empire, and other vulnerable Eastern European countries—Poland, Romania, or the Baltic states—might be next. A successful Russian incursion into a NATO ally’s territory could mean the end of the Western alliance and the credibility of U.S. security commitments globally. The threat posed by China is also serious. Adm. Philip Davidson, former commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, predicted China could invade Taiwan within the next six years. This is a war the United States might lose. If China succeeds in taking Taiwan, it would be well on its way to disrupting the U.S.-led order in Asia, with an eye to doing the same globally. Moreover, Russia and China are increasingly working together. As this month’s summit between Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping shows, Moscow and Beijing are forging a closer strategic partnership, including on military matters. These dictators could coordinate dual attacks on the U.S. alliance structure or opportunistically seize on the distraction provided by the other’s aggression. In other words, there is a serious risk of simultaneous major-power wars in both Europe and the Indo-Pacific. To address this problem, many have proposed answers that simply will not work. The Biden administration initially hoped to put relations with Russia on a “stable and predictable” footing to focus on China, but Putin had other ideas, as the world is now seeing in Ukraine. Unfortunately, Washington does not get to decide how its adversaries sequence their aggression. Others have expressed hope that Washington can peel these powers apart or even align with Russia against China, but these are not realistic solutions. The misguided view gaining the most recent acceptance, however, is that Washington should simply choose the Indo-Pacific over Europe. Politicians and experts argue that the United States lacks the resources to take on both Russia and China. They point to China’s power and Asia’s wealth and argue that Asia should be the priority. While Washington pivots to Asia, wealthy European countries, such as Germany, should step up to provide for NATO’s defense. Indeed, the Biden administration’s National Defense Strategy, which has been delayed due to the Ukraine crisis, is expected to focus on China without offering a clear solution to the two-front-war problem. A good strategy starts with clear goals—and Washington’s objectives are to maintain peace and stability in both Europe and Asia. A good strategy, however, starts with clear goals, and Washington’s objectives are to maintain peace and stability in both Europe and Asia. U.S. interests in Europe are too significant to let them be worked out solely between Putin and the United States’ European allies. Indeed, the European Union, not Asia, is the United States’ largest trade and investment partner, and this imbalance is much starker when China (which the United States seeks greater economic decoupling from), is removed from the equation. Furthermore, China has conducted military exercises in Europe and the Middle East. Competing with China militarily means competing globally, not just in Asia. In addition, Xi is gauging U.S. resolve, and a weak response in Ukraine might make a Chinese move on Taiwan more likely. Moreover, the United States is not France; it is not compelled to make gut-wrenching strategic choices about its national security due to constrained resources. In short, publishing a defense strategy that can only handle one of the United States’ great-power rivals (which is what is expected from the forthcoming national defense strategy) is planning to fail.

### No Link

#### Plan’s funding comes from O and M or new appropriation

Reynolds 19, et al, Commandant, Defense Institute of Security Cooperation Studies (Ronald, “The Management of Security Cooperation,” http://cebw.org/images/docs/Legislacao\_Webinar/Greenbook\_39\_0.pdf

Under the authority of Title 10, Chapter 16, and/or the current National Defense Authorization Act, DoD provides material assistance and related training to partner nations to develop specific capabilities and/or capacities. This is normally done using DoD Operations and Maintenance (O&M) funding, but in some instances Congress appropriates additional funding for DoD to conduct these programs. Although it is DoD funding, these programs, and all security cooperation, must be coordinated with DoS. Security Cooperation practitioners refer to these programs as Building Partner Capacity (BPC) programs and execute them using a pseudo Letter of Offer and Acceptance. All BPC programs require congressional notification. Below are just a few examples. Examples with four digits in quotes represent temporary authorities whose authorizations can be found in various National Defense Authorizations Acts.

#### It's cheap

Kelly 10, principal mathematician at the RAND Corporation (Terrence, et al, “Security Cooperation Organizations in the Country Team: Options for Success,” RAND, <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA517323.pdf)//BB>

The United States conducts a wide range of security cooperation missions and initiatives that can serve as key enablers of U.S. foreign policy efforts to assist and influence other countries. For a relatively small investment, security cooperation programs can play an important role by shaping the security environment and laying the groundwork for future stability operations with allies and partners. Security cooperation,1 in the form of noncombat military-to-military activities, includes “normal” peacetime activities, such as building the long-term institutional and operational capabilities and capacity of key partners and allies, establishing and deepening relationships between the United States and partner militaries, and securing access to critical areas overseas. Security cooperation also can include conducting quasi-operational efforts, such as helping U.S. partners and allies manage their own internal defense.

### Asia Pivot Bad

#### Pivot to Europe solves Russia war, pivot to Asia causes it

McKinley 2-24-2022, non-resident senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Over the course of his 37-year career in the U.S. Foreign Service, McKinley held senior leadership positions in missions in Latin America, Europe, Africa, and South Asia. He was a four-time ambassador serving in Peru, Colombia, Afghanistan and Brazil (Michael, “It’s Time to Pivot Back to Europe,” *Politico*, <https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2022/02/24/its-time-to-pivot-back-to-europe-00011324>)

President Vladimir Putin’s recognition of the separatist republics of Luhansk and Donetsk, which opened the door to the wider assault on Ukraine that is now underway, is a game-changer on a historic scale. It underscores, like nothing else, that the drift away from Europe by the United States over the past 20 years in pursuit of wars and priorities elsewhere has been short-sighted. Like 1949, the year in which the North Atlantic Treaty Organization came into being, America and its European allies are facing a moment requiring a profound redefinition of their security, political and economic ties. Going forward, a strategic, not tactical, pivot back to Europe should be the driving imperative of American foreign policy. In doing so, it is important to accept reality: Putin called the bluff of the not-very-collected West, which was equivocating by placing only selective sanctions on Russia for its virtual annexation of part of Ukraine. Putin is unlikely to be deterred by a staggered escalation of these measures meant to allow room for him to change course: He is dead set on achieving at least a partial reconstitution of the Russian empire as he sees it and forcing the creation of a new security architecture for Europe. Putin’s words need to be taken seriously instead of being dismissed as ramblings or misleading. For all the lingering suggestions that there is still time for diplomacy, Putin could not have been clearer this week that he was also setting the stage for more aggressive steps in the very near future. He even raised a non-existent nuclear threat to Russia from a NATO-dominated Ukraine and again dismissed Ukrainian national identity as a fiction. Arriving at this point, too many commentators and politicians spent months resorting to dismissive rhetoric about Putin even as he outmaneuvered Western leaders. They belittled Russia — as a declining power, a declining economy and as a nation fearful of democratization on its borders. They argued that the United States and NATO allies could force Putin to rethink his actions — even though there has been no sign of him reconsidering course. Some argued that Putin would not risk war given the likely costs. It is now possible to see the limits of their world view. The inviolability of a nation’s sovereignty and its right to decide its own security alliances have also been presented as self-evident truths. In the case of Ukraine, however, many of us side-stepped uncomfortable questions about why NATO did not invite the country to join, and about the precedents set for Finland and Austria after World War II to ensure their neutrality. A now prophetic article by Henry Kissinger in 2014 makes it clear that something like the neutrality option would have been a more desirable outcome for Ukraine and reflected the reality of Ukraine’s situation. The West will find it difficult to break the momentum that Russia is building, or to reverse the new realities Putin is creating. Russia may not be a colossus, but it remains one of the most powerful countries in the world, with a nuclear arsenal, a modernized military and a serious player in international oil and gas markets. It cannot, in other words, be dismissed only as a “regional power threatening its neighbors out of weakness,” and while it is becoming an outright dictatorship by smothering democracy at home, that is not a central concern in the current crisis. Russia can project its military globally — as its interventions in Syria and elsewhere have shown. It can wage cyberattacks on Europe and the United States with relative impunity. Putin has triumphed in political showdowns with leaders like Turkey’s President Erdogan and, even as Russia’s relationship with Europe in general turns adversarial, the likes of Serbia and NATO member Hungary appear more sympathetic to Putin. World leaders until last week came to Putin as he limited his own international travel — and gave little away. Russia’s diplomatic fortunes are hardly crumbling elsewhere, as evidenced by a rising entente between China and Russia — aligned in their security interests against perceived Western encroachment. There is another factor at work, and that is that Putin’s view of history, often seen as opportunistic, does appear to be a primary driver of his actions. And it is not his worldview alone. The incorporation of Russian-speaking populations inside neighboring borders after 1991 remains an issue for nationalists in Moscow; and the West has systematically downplayed how NATO expansion since 1997 has looked to a generation of Russian leaders, and not just President Putin. It is not dovish, as a recent New Yorker article suggested, or appeasement as a British defense minister stated, to take these perceptions into account in the current crisis. The deep undercurrents of historical myth drive almost every nation into destructive paths. It is in this context that the United States and its allies have chosen to draw a line in the sand over a further Russian military intervention in Ukraine which has now materialized on a major scale. The relative success of President Joe Biden in preserving a united front with European allies on a gradual escalation of sanctions masks the lingering challenges of fully cohering on strategy. There have been differences between the responses by the United States and Britain on the one hand; the French and the Germans on another; and disparate governments like Italy (opposed to energy sanctions as late as this past weekend) and Hungary (offering veiled sympathy to Russia’s demands). French President Emmanuel Macron until recently was openly discussing the need for a new security architecture for Europe. Chancellor Olaf Scholz of Germany told national reporters on his return from Moscow that “we just can’t have a possible military conflict over a question that is not on the agenda” regarding Ukraine’s future membership in NATO. As EU foreign ministers met in Brussels this week, there were continued differences between those arguing for “incrementalism” on sanctions like Germany and Italy, and those wanting a more forceful response. There may be greater unity now as the scale of the Russian invasion becomes clear, but the proof will only be evident in the coming days. The allies’ caution in recent days contrasted with President Zelensky’s increasing concern as options close around him. The gathering of senior NATO and EU ministers at the Munich Security Conference on Feb. 18-20, as well as the presence of a U.S. delegation led by Vice President Kamala Harris, did not convey the strongest confidence on an agreed approach to Russian aggression. President Zelensky’s speech at the gathering was a searing indictment of the lack of decisiveness of Western nations over the last many years, and Ukrainian ministers were publicly critical of the slow pace of the imposition of sanctions since the recognition of the separatist republics by Russia. Western governments are now at a real, not hypothetical crossroads. The invasion is underway, and Putin would appear to be achieving his long-stated objectives, some of which he began to make clear 15 years ago in a speech to the 2007 Munich Security Conference. He has torn up the 2015 Minsk agreement which was meant to be the foundation for talks between Ukraine and Russia regarding the future of the Donbas. Putin is calculating he can survive sanctions for an indefinite period as he builds a significant war chest of foreign reserves. He is also betting on a swifter and easier military victory in Ukraine than Western analysts are predicting. If either of these scenarios were to hold, NATO, EU and American threats or actions would end up ringing hollow to most of the rest of the world. Putin, in short, means to complete what he has started, and more. As Lithuanian Foreign Minister Gabrielius Landsbergis suggested, Ukraine may not be the end of the story, and Belarus’ renewed and total subservience to Moscow can, in retrospect, be seen as prelude to Putin’s attempt to do the same to Ukraine. In responding to Russia’s expanding aggression in Ukraine, Western nations will build towards ever more severe sanctions. There will be United Nations resolutions and condemnations. Russian oligarchs may lose their right to residence and investment in London and Paris. Nord Stream 2 is being suspended and may be canceled. NATO may be strengthened; European members may finally spend 2 percent of their GDP on defense. NATO may accelerate military assistance to Ukraine or arm an insurgency in Ukraine in the future. The broader international community may be galvanized into supporting harsher measures to punish Russia depending on the scale of the conflict. Longer-term, however, the latest developments suggest it is time to rethink the West’s approach to the next phase of dealing with Putin. That will entail recognizing that the security landscape of Europe is being changed as we watch, in real time, and is unlikely to be turned back to what it was any time soon. The response must stop Russia from destroying the post-World War II architecture that has largely preserved peace for 70 years. Doing so will require another historic decision and response. We need to revitalize NATO and the transatlantic economic and political relations which have been weakened for two decades as the United States prioritized Asia, abandoned trade agreements, diverted NATO to fight wars farther afield and allowed allies to take for granted the alliance’s centrality to their own collective defense. In the process, we may rediscover that the future of the United States is still most fundamentally impacted by what happens in Europe.

#### Asia pivot causes Russian aggression and solve focus on Asia can’t solve Chinese aggression

Reuel Marc Gerecht and Ray Takeyh, 3-22-2022, Mr. Gerecht, a former Middle Eastern targets officer in the Central Intelligence Agency, is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Mr. Takeyh is a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. (“The Folly of the ‘Pivot to Asia’: China is a rising challenge, but neglecting Europe and the Middle East won’t help America confront it.,” *Wall Street Journal*, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-folly-of-the-pivot-to-asia-pacific-china-russia-global-power-nato-11647981737)//BB>

Seldom has a diplomatic phrase been more reckless than the Obama administration’s “pivot to Asia.” The U.S. has never been able to disentangle itself from key regions of the world, as the war in Ukraine demonstrates. But the notion that a new “Pacific century” should become the nation’s defining priority surely has emboldened adversaries elsewhere and called into question other alliances, including the most indispensable, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The question that ought to haunt the White House today is whether its ignominious retreat from Afghanistan in the name of ending so-called forever wars, and its stream of press releases insisting that China is the only rival worthy of attention, prompted an impetuous Vladimir Putin to undertake the largest land invasion in Europe since World War II. In January 1950, Secretary of State Dean Acheson gave a speech placing Korea outside America’s defense perimeter, thus inviting aggression from North Korea. Often overlooked in that speech is Mr. Acheson’s insistence that “it is a mistake . . . to become obsessed with military invasions” when thinking strategically about Asia and the Pacific. Acheson seemed to assume that the dilemmas of newly independent Asian states came from internal subversion stemming from economic stagnation. To be fair, the Truman administration didn’t shrink from its responsibilities in Europe when war broke out in the Korean Peninsula. The U.S. has been a global power for a century and has always given some regions and countries priority over others. Early in the Cold War, Europe’s economic rehabilitation and its military defense preoccupied America’s politicians and strategists. In the 1960s, as the Cold War stabilized in Europe, the U.S. turned its gaze toward Asia, where a truculent China and an eastward-looking Soviet Union were both bent on exporting revolution. With 500,000 U.S. troops in Vietnam, the Far East became a priority. And in the aftermath of 9/11, the Middle East took on importance as Washington hunted down terrorists and sought, however haphazardly, to refashion a political culture that had generated so much hate. Before Barack Obama, no president had insisted that the exigencies of one region mandated ignoring others. The U.S. fought prolonged wars in East Asia, yet Washington didn’t claim that these conflicts meant that it had to pivot from Europe or Latin America. Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon were beset by Vietnam; they didn’t complain about “forever wars” and the need to leave the Far East. When George W. Bush found himself mired in Iraq, he didn’t proclaim that Europe and Asia no longer mattered. Burden sharing has been an objective of all U.S. presidents. The strategic neglect of Asia-firsters is new. Joe Biden must be considered the least authentic of China hawks. Much more than Mr. Obama, he has brandished the China threat as cover for isolationism. Even the hasty departure from Afghanistan was in part justified as a means of focusing on China. Leaving Afghanistan would somehow, Secretary of State Antony Blinken told us, make the U.S. stronger vis-à-vis Xi Jinping. At home Democrats partly justified exorbitant domestic spending as a means of rebuilding an America better able to resist China. Yet Mr. Biden hasn’t taken any serious military measures, or reinitiated a free-trading alliance, to confront Beijing. This disconnect between words and deeds might have been starkest when, soon after his inauguration, Mr. Biden held a summit meeting with Mr. Putin—whom Democrats had denounced throughout Donald Trump’s presidency as a threat to democracy—where he pressed for a “stable and predictable” relationship with Moscow. Much of the cheap talk about pivoting stems from U.S. frustrations in the Middle East. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan caused the political class to question its assumptions about American power. Yet the Middle East remains. Energy markets are still global. Fracking hasn’t made Persian Gulf oil less important to America’s national security. The perverse interplay between Arab authoritarian states and Islamic radicalism (the former feeds the latter) continues. Iran’s nuclear ambitions, unimpeded by arms-control diplomacy, will soon confront the international community. As Mr. Putin has shown, a revisionist leader, armed with nuclear weapons and nursing grievances, can easily rattle, if not upend, financial markets and cherished assumptions. For the foreseeable future, the Far East will have a prominent place in America’s strategic imagination. China’s conversion from a communist laggard to a rich and militarily powerful fascist state has Western leaders in a bind, given that they literally bet the bank on the hope that investment and trade would somehow pacify Beijing’s ambitions. But China’s rise doesn’t mean that Europe matters little or that the Middle East can be ignored. The U.S. isn’t Sweden. When America retreats, everyone suffers.

#### Asia pivot breaks NATO

Lauren Sukin 11-18-2021, MacArthur Nuclear Security Postdoctoral Fellow at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation (Lauren, “How Biden can improve European relations while pivoting to Asia,” The Bulletin, <https://thebulletin.org/2021/11/how-biden-can-patch-european-relations-while-pivoting-to-asia/)//BB>

The US focus on China is controversial, in part, because it comes at a moment when relations between NATO and Russia are severely strained. NATO’s Eastern European members don’t want China to “overshadow” concerns about Russia. Multiple Eastern European states have competed for additional US forces —though to little avail. Poland even offered, in 2018, to name a military base after President Donald Trump.

Now, NATO waits for the US Global Posture Review, which will provide guidance on how best to allocate US military resources going forward. The review will be heavily scrutinized. If it re-aligns US military resources towards East Asia, the cracks in NATO may continue to grow.

### US-Europe Relations Solve China War

#### US-Europe relations are a force-multiplier that solve Chinese aggression

Lauren Sukin 11-18-2021, MacArthur Nuclear Security Postdoctoral Fellow at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation (Lauren, “How Biden can improve European relations while pivoting to Asia,” The Bulletin, <https://thebulletin.org/2021/11/how-biden-can-patch-european-relations-while-pivoting-to-asia/)//BB>

France’s fretting should serve as a warning to the Biden administration. The US focus on East Asia continues to rock relations between Washington and its European allies. In transitioning its strategic priorities towards the Pacific, the United States cannot succeed alone. Incorporating allies and partners—including those in Europe—in the planning, negotiating, and implementation stages of its efforts to manage threats from China will be critical. The effort should also pay dividends. By restoring and reinvigorating damaged European alliances, the United States will be better positioned to manage threats in East Asia and elsewhere.

#### Europe is a key counterbalance against Chinese leadership

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The United States needs Europe to be peaceful because it needs NATO and the EU to be productive. The size of Europe’s economy makes it an important counterbalance to China’s growth. British, French, and Spanish ties with Africa are important in pushing back against China’s growing influence in the continent. European universities still produce stellar research which is crucial in the technological competition with China. Each of Europe’s strengths in a competition with China also makes it an important region in its own right. With three-quarters of a billion people, it is an important trade partner and plays a key role in the American economy. It is home to many U.S. military bases used for important missions, most recently during the evacuation from Afghanistan. Its scientific and technological achievements contribute to American prosperity—the Pfizer-BioNTech vaccine that the president of the United States and millions of others recieved would not have been made without German partnership. America can’t afford to take Europe for granted anymore. They need us and we need them. The hard part of alliance management is supposed to be responding to the needs, wants, and objectives, and insecurities of the other side. But lately, the United States has had more trouble figuring out what its own needs, wants, and objectives in Europe are—or if it has any at all.

### China Not a Threat

#### The US has the overwhelming military advantage

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The US military dominates the strategic, tactical, and operational levels of warfare across the spectrum. The Pentagon is implementing sophisticated network warfare programs such as the Advanced Battle Management System, Project Convergence, and Joint All Domain Command and Control. China is concerned about the lethal and distributed US military, equipped with a potent combination of quantity and quality of weapon systems. The USN surpasses the PLAN in rapid deployment, maneuverability, and expeditionary warfare capabilities. The overwhelming display of US military power since 1945 is a credible deterrent for Beijing. Since the First Gulf War, the United States has demonstrated its capability of destroying the adversary through preemptive strikes consisting of long-range weapon systems such as cruise missiles in the first few days of the war, giving no time for the adversary to retaliate.75 According to Taylor Fravel, China is not a military superpower.76 There is not much evidence about China’s plans for global military capabilities on par with the United States. China’s military power is miniscule as compared to United States’ former adversary the Soviet Union. China’s military will be thinly stretched defending the third-largest country in the world. The top echelons of the CCP and PLA acknowledge US military advantages. Chinese scholars like Xu Ruike and Sun Degang admit that China is an economic heavyweight but is a military featherweight and will remain so for the coming decades.77 US primacy in the post–Cold War world has prevented World War III. The two most likely contenders for expansion, North Korea and China, have restricted their militaries within their borders. The United States retains unrivaled military power, and China is not in a position to challenge it.

#### The US leads across all military spectrums

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Why China Cannot Challenge the United States

People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Major General Zhang Shaozhong ranked Chinese military power in 2020 in the fifth place behind the United States, Russia, Britain, and France, while PLAN surface power was ranked in the eighth place behind Japan and India. The Peoples Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) was ranked seventh in the world, due to its lack of fourth-generation fighter planes and high-end drones. In General Shaozhong’s view, China will become the second-largest military power in the world only in 2049, when it celebrates its centennial anniversary.27 The US Military as an Economic Deterrent The US military plays the central role of economic deterrence. The Communist Party of China (CCP) gains its legitimacy from economic development. It is possible that China could target Guam with its small fleet of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM). However, the use of ICBMs will lead to massive retaliatory strikes by the United States leading to total annihilation of China’s military and economic centers of gravity.28 The USN Maritime Strike Tomahawk Cruise Missile Block V will destroy coastal cities like Shanghai, obliterating China’s hi-tech industries in a matter of hours. The CCP leadership is inexperienced in nuclear matters as it lacks exposure to a nuclear warfare strategy as practiced by the United States and Russia. China’s nuclear policy is based on low-level deterrence, “minimum deterrence,” and its nuclear arsenal remains small and vulnerable.29 Threatening the United States with 200 nuclear weapons is not an option. Geographically, the United States and China are similar in size. However, China’s economy will be decimated by a few US nuclear weapons, as its critical infrastructure is concentrated on the coastlines and not dispersed like the US infrastructure. A war will lead to a loss of China’s exports to the United States worth USD 310 billion. The war will result in a decline in industrial production, unemployment, and inflation, causing an economic crash and a people’s revolution. As seen from World War II, the United States will experience reverse economic gains and benefit from the war, resulting in high employment and industrial growth. It is expensive to be a superpower. Sun Tzu wrote in The Art of War two and a half millennia ago, “first count the cost.”30 China’s defense budget cannot compete with the combined power of United States, India, Japan, and Australia. The United States alone spends more on national defense than China, India, Russia, Saudi Arabia, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Japan, South Korea, and Brazil combined.31 Can China afford it? An arms race will lead to an increase in China’s military spending, affecting its development goals. The Absence of War-fighting Experience The United States has an analytical learning process in place—China does not.32 Lessons learned have been well documented by the US military in the form of doctrines, tactics, techniques, and procedures. The US military has been documenting lessons learned since as early as the Boxer Revolution during the China campaign.33 The US military has been led by outstanding military generals like George Marshall, Dwight Eisenhower, George Patton, and David Petraeus, while China always lacked great generals. The world sends its military officers to US military institutions and not China’s military colleges. The PLA strategy is based on Mao’s theory of the weak contender fighting a stronger adversary through deceit and deception. China’s only option is an asymmetric strategy due to its incapability to fight symmetric wars. Chinese scholars have authored books like Science of Military Campaigns, Science of Military Strategy, and Unrestricted Warfare.34 However, China is unable to convert the strategies and tactics mentioned in these books into an executable doctrine. The Lack of Power Projection Power projection capabilities set a superpower apart. From its Charm Offensive to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China has been wielding its economic power to compel US allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region to align with China, which has not been greatly successful.35 China lacks global reach, as it does not have foreign defense treaties or logistical bases abroad equipped with military stockpiles.36 During a war with the United States, soliciting Pakistan’s military support looks difficult, as China’s all-weather friend has been hesitant to cut its military ties with the United States. China is constrained to operate beyond the unrefueled range of its aircraft, warships, and submarines. US nuclear-powered carriers can rule the seas for four years before being refueled. China’s nonnuclear-powered AC can barely operate beyond its green waters. The Type 903 replenishment ship can only support two to three ships for approximately two weeks.37 The USN’s 68 nuclear-powered submarines have been prowling the world’s oceans displaying naval power, while the PLAN’s nuclear-powered submarines are unable to do so. Fighter aircraft operating without a package of air-refueling tankers, Airborne Warning and Control System aircraft, or a network of expeditionary airfields cannot travel very far. The PLAAF’s capability to target US bases in the Pacific is hindered by a lack of air-refueling capacity. A flight group of eight J-11B Flankers will have to be simultaneously refueled twice by two air-refueling tankers for a seven-hour flight.38 The PLAAF will have to deploy 20 percent of its tanker fleet to refuel the Flankers. The PLAAF has 10 tankers for more than a thousand fighter aircraft, while the USAF has 625 tankers for 1,956 fighter aircraft.39 The tankers will be the prime targets for the USN potentially putting the Flankers at risk. China’s only existing bomber, the H-6K, is reverse engineered from the 1950s Soviet-designed Tu-16 bomber. The bomber is incapable of attacking Hawaii—even when equipped with CJ-10 cruise missiles. The H-6K has a range of 3,800 miles, while Hawaii is 5,157 miles from the closest H-6K base. The H-6K cannot attack nearby US bases, as the bomber will be detected on open seas by the US C4ISR systems. PLAAF fighters are unable to escort the bombers, as they cannot match its range.40 An Archaic Military Less than 30 percent of China’s surface forces, air force, and air defense forces and 55 percent of its submarine fleet were modern in 2011.41. Subsequently, nothing much has changed, as a substantial percentage of China’s military remains obsolete.42 China’s military faces institutional shortcomings arising from obsolete command structures, low quality of personnel, and corruption.43 The military has weaknesses centering on supporting capabilities such as logistics, inadequate airlift, and deficient air defense and antisubmarine warfare.44 The PLA’s loyalty to the CCP has hampered its competence.45 China’s military training and operational capabilities and competences do not match US standards.46 PLAAF pilots fall short on the requirement of executing sophisticated aerial maneuvers during unplanned operations.47 China’s military structure presents significant cultural challenges,48 as it emphasizes control above command.49 A culture of risk aversion and low levels of trust in subordinates impacts the PLA effectiveness.50 A highly centralized structure does not allow the PLAN to operate autonomously during a war. Therefore, a political commissar is positioned on PLAN warships and submarines.51 The USN values autonomy from the individual to the institution, which reflects its emphasis on commanding at sea.52 Nation states cannot project power globally through a rigid command-and-control system.53 PLAN submarines have the worst safety record in the world.54 The PLAN’s rudimentary nuclear missile submarine fleet carries a limited number of missiles.55 The PLAN cannot threaten the US mainland, as its submarines will have to sail through chokepoints such as the Kuriles and the Ryukyus islands, Luzon Strait, Taiwan Strait, and the Philippine archipelago—all of which are controlled by the USN.56 These chokepoints, forming a crescent-shaped chain, are also a defensive line for US containment policy; and the United States is involved in monitoring them. The PLAN submarine power is outdated, compared to the overwhelming USN undersea warfare capabilities. The US submarine arm brings strategic deterrence to the Indo-Pacific through a wide array of capabilities such as antisubmarine warfare antisurface warfare precision land strike; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; and special warfare capabilities. Soviet weapon systems were much sought after by the United States to learn their strengths and weaknesses. Numerous Soviet-made fighter aircraft defected during the Cold War. An Iraqi MiG 21 defected to Israel, while a Soviet MiG 25 landed in Japan. The aircraft were later handed over to the United States to decipher the technical details. However, US intelligence is not similarly orchestrating any defections of PLAAF fighter aircraft, as the United States is not interested in obsolete Chinese technology. Instead, China is stealing weapon data or reverse engineering US weapon systems.57 The CCP-controlled military press described the Shenyang J-15 Flying Shark fighter aircraft as a “flopping fish” and criticized it for lacking the stealth capabilities of the F-35 Lightning.58 The US F-117 Nighthawk stealth fighter entered service in 1983 and saw combat during the First Gulf War, while the fifth-generation F-22 Raptor and F-35 Lightning fighter aircraft have been deployed in conflict zones. However, the PLAAF has not operationally inducted the J-31 fighter aircraft while the J-20 fighter aircraft has not yet proven its capabilities in any bilateral or multilateral military exercise. The much-hyped Chengdu J-20 is a heavy fighter aircraft comparable to the MiG 31, which is essentially an interceptor and not a multirole or an air superiority aircraft. China’s Vulnerable A2/AD Zones A study of modern wars suggests that the United States will decimate China’s military without entering the A2/AD zone. This is how the United States devastated Iraqi defenses in 1990. US strategic depth in Asia will allow military planners to concentrate the military at different locations. The United States has a devastating array of lethal weapon systems, such as submarines, for countering China’s A2/AD strategies. During the First Gulf War, the United States launched 297 Tomahawks, which destroyed the Iraqi military.59 Ohio-class submarines can operate unhindered in the adversary’s A2/AD zone closer to the shore; thus, striking targets far inland. Collectively, four Ohio-class submarines installed with 616 BGM-109 Tomahawk cruise missiles would obliterate China’s military. The inexperienced PLAN AC group will be destroyed by long-range antiship missiles (LRASM), Tomahawks, and Mark 48-Mod 7 torpedoes launched from USS Key West, USS Oklahoma City, USS Topeka, and USS Asheville submarines based in Guam. The USN and USAF have signed a USD 414 million contract for autonomously guided with onboard sensors, jam-resistant, and difficult to detect antiship LRASM.60 The stealthy Zumwalt-class warship—equipped with emerging technologies—can sail undetected in littoral waters and contested territories to launch LRASM and Tomahawk cruise missiles. China is constructing military bases on islands in the South China Sea; however, this military infrastructure is vulnerable to US weapon systems, as the islands lack natural defenses and camouflage.61 During a war, the bases will be annihilated by the USN as the PLA cannot hide behind hills and forests. Once destroyed, these facilities cannot be supported from the mainland, as the logistical supplies will be demolished by the USN. China’s military modernization may enhance A2/AD zones, but it does not contribute to a blue-water, sea-control capability.62 China’s Hyped DF-21 Missile The antiship DF-21 missile, carried by colossal transporter erector launchers, has a range of 1,400 miles. The missile regiments are based in the barren Gobi Desert, which makes it an easy target for the US military. The DF-21 has been tested on a stationary ship, but it has not yet been successfully tested against a moving target.63 A system of systems is required to track the AC,64 acquire the precise location, keep the missile locked on the target, penetrate the carrier’s multilayered defenses, and provide mid-course updates as within one hour the ship will have moved 30 miles. China does not know about the DF-21 performance against the US CSG countermeasures.65 The United States and Russia have not yet developed a missile equivalent to the DF-21. However, China lacks the C4ISR systems to strike targets at that range. China does not release the missile testing data, leading to many questions, including whether it can hit moving targets. Does it have precision targeting technologies?66 Until proven otherwise, the functionality of the missile is based on nothing but circumstantial inference and speculation.

### No China War

#### **No US-China war**

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Many observers are pessimistic about deteriorating US-China relations and believe the two countries are heading towards a cold war. Even worse, some argue that the situation might be more dangerous than the US-Soviet Union Cold War, and that a hot war might break out between the two. This argument is unconvincing. First of all, deterrents to a flare-up are much stronger in US-China relations than in US-Soviet relations. Although economic and people-to-people ties between China and the US are declining, they are still close compared to US-Soviet ties. It is hard to decouple two closely intertwined economies and societies. Take two examples. China is expected to become the world's largest consumer market, a temptation hard to resist for exporters, including those from the US. And in education, more than 300,000 Chinese students study in the US, bringing in huge revenues for the US education industry. Many universities go to great lengths to woo international students. Recently Harvard and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology even sued the government over its new visa restrictions, now aborted, on international students. Second, even if there is decoupling, the pain would not be too great and can be kept out of the national security sphere if properly handled. In fact, for national security reasons, a modest degree of isolation will make both sides more secure and comfortable. For instance, if China’s information technology equipment cannot capture Western markets, the US will be more relaxed. If China cannot get advanced technologies from the US and its technological progress slows down, the US will be less anxious. In the same vein, China feels assured knowing that if the Trump administration does impose a travel ban on Communist Party members, it would be abandoning one of the tools available to the US to promote “peaceful evolution” in China. Economic decoupling is undeniably more painful for China than for the US. But unlike Japan during WWII, which was hit hard by the US oil embargo because of its lack of natural resources, China has no such problems. Given its large domestic market, losing the US as a major customer is not a disaster for China, and can be compensated through more dynamic economic activities at home. China can also make up for being freezed out of technological exchanges by turning to indigenous innovation. As for the US, it can import goods from other developing countries, albeit less cheaply. The relative loss is acceptable when weighed against the heightened perception of economic independence and security. Third, the ideological confrontation between China and the US is less intense than that during the Cold War. Unlike the obsession with ideology in those days, the line between capitalism and socialism is blurred today. The market economy has become universally recognised as the best way to promote economic growth and, politically, many countries have embraced democracy. Even North Korea calls itself the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Although ideological hawks in the US still long for the day when the beacon of freedom will light up the world, after many years of fighting bloody wars overseas, most American people are not interested in promoting democracy abroad. Meanwhile, China just wants to preserve its political system and has no interest in exporting it to other countries, as the Soviet Union did. Thus, ideological antagonism in China-US relations can easily be eased by calculations of realistic interests, which create conditions for compromise and cooperation. Fourth, both China and the US have many options other than war to achieve their policy goals. While they have no allies to serve as a buffer, given the nature of the potential conflict in the South China Sea or Taiwan Strait, both countries are adept at operating in grey zones and fighting psychological, public opinion or diplomatic warfare below the threshold of war. The forced closure of the Chinese consulate in Houston by the US government is just the latest act of brinkmanship. In addition, given China’s huge economic and financial interests in the US, the latter can wield the stick of sanctions when use of force is highly risky or not worth it. When both sides have many tools and options, why would they rush to war to achieve their goals? Last but not least, the imbalance of power will act as a deterrent. Some say the US and Soviet Union did not fight a hot war because they were evenly matched. It was not the case, actually. At the beginning of the Cold War, the Soviet Union was at a relative military disadvantage. Moreover, a country needs the will to fight before going to war, even if it is stronger militarily than its adversary. Having fought years of meaningless wars, the US is weary of war. China, too, abhors war. Having a clear understanding of US strength, especially when its own economy is slowing down and it is facing various domestic challenges, China would not wish to recklessly start a war with the US. In summary, the possibility of a hot war between China and the US is very small. The greatest danger for China is not a cold or hot confrontation with the US, but policymakers’ interpretation of the momentary hostility towards Beijing of a portion of the American population and the larger world. An erroneous interpretation could end China’s march to further opening up, and see it turn instead towards self-isolation.

### China Not Revisionist

#### China isn’t revisionist

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In the abstract, such claims are alarming—in context, and in balance, rather humdrum. In fact, the evidence of any Chinese intention to destroy, or even merely undermine and exploit, the current order is slight. China is certainly using its growing military power to defend its claims in the SCS and even—on occasion— to coerce its neighbors. It uses protectionist economic policies to boost the prospects of Chinese companies and reduce competition. It employs economic statecraft to serve its interests abroad. And it certainly is opposed to America’s policy of global democracy promotion. However, none of these positions fundamentally challenge the existing order, none of them radically depart from America’s own actions when it was a rising power in the nineteenth century, and none of them obviously surpass America’s own contemporary record of order subversion.

When the United States was a rising power, it took half of Mexico and considered taking the rest, it colonized the Philippines and Hawaii, and it unilaterally seized the maritime choke points of the Caribbean (Puerto Rico and Cuba).21 The United States used tariffs—which by 1857 averaged 20 percent22 and by the end of the nineteenth century were “the highest import duties in the industrial world”23—to protect its industries. It stole intellectual property,24 and it ideologically challenged the governments of the “Old World.” Today, despite no longer being a rising power, the United States has launched two disastrous invasions, tortured prisoners, and dispatches drone strikes at a whim with little international legal authority.25 The point is not that two wrongs make a right; it is that international order is much more resilient than critics seem to realize,26 and it is utopian to expect any rising Great Power to act in a way that uniformly satisfies one’s moral scruples, evolving, in Friedberg’s words, “into a mellow, satisfied, ‘responsible’ status quo power.”27

Friedberg or Harris might object that America’s rise took place in the context of a different order. This is perfectly true, but the more important point is that the long nineteenth century (1815–1914)—the era of America’s rise—was the first iteration of the New Peace.28 The implication is that relative peace can and has coexisted with limited wars, property and territorial thefts, acts of coercion, and aggressive assertions of status. This does not mean any of these are desirable— they are not—but it shows that they need not be fatal to the system. Insofar as there is a lesson from that first period of relative peace, it is that Great Power confrontation is the one thing that is fatal. Accepting this does not mean capitulating in every instance, as implied by some,29 but it does mean rediscovering the rules of Great Power competition30 alongside the art of strategy.31

Focusing only on areas that China’s rise violates the scruples of the established powers, moreover, downplays the extent to which China, has, in fact, conformed to the existing order. As a RAND Corporation report published in 2018 concludes, China has been a supporter—albeit a conditional one—of the international order: “Since China undertook a policy of international engagement in the 1980s … the level and quality of its participation in the order rivals that of most other states.”32 The way in which Xi Jinping, following his 2017 Davos speech in defense of globalization, has been heralded as the most prominent champion of international order and defender of globalization underscores the fact that there are different elements of this order, and that China supports many, if not most, of them. Even in places where China is supposedly “altering” the current order, Beijing tends to simultaneously affirm that order. China’s Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, for instance, actually mirrors existing structures, and China has intentionally copied elements and “best practices” of the World Bank and Asian Development Bank. China is playing the same game, even if it is seeking a bigger role within it.33

### War Turns DA

#### War turns the DA---a new conflict is a significant drain on all military resources

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Opportunity cost #4: Managing a war saps U.S. focus and diplomatic energy. While the United States is a global power, it does not have endless capacity. Inevitably, the attention of high-level policymakers is focused on the highest-priority concerns— and as long as the war in Afghanistan continues, it will rightly garner significant attention and resources from all sectors of the U.S. government. When it comes foreign policy priorities, urgency outweighs importance, so regular decisions about the war require the highest-level attention at the White House, the State Department, and the DOD. For the senior-most national security officials, time is precious, and dedicating enough time to issues such as climate change or China can be crowded out by the need for regular, high-level engagement on life-or-death decisions in Afghanistan.

#### Specifically, a new war undermines Asian deterrence

Magsamen 19, vice president for National Security and International Policy at the Center for American Progress and Michael Fuchs, senior fellow, (Kelly, “The Case for a New U.S. Relationship with Afghanistan,” *Center for American Progress*, <https://americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/New-Relationship-w-Afghanistan-final.pdf)//BB>

• Opportunity cost #5: Two decades of military conflict have eroded U.S. military readiness. While the U.S. military has global responsibilities, it has finite resources, and nothing drains U.S. military readiness like an active war, as made clear by the 2017 report of a Task Force on Defense Personnel co-chaired by former U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta and former National Security Adviser James Jones.39 For the Pentagon, prosecuting the war in Afghanistan is a top-level priority that requires significant time from its top officials as well as tremendous resources—from regular rotations of thousands of personnel to equipment to budget expenditures. With pressing needs to bolster U.S. force posture in Asia and Europe to deter threats from Russia and China and adapt the military to emerging threats such as cybersecurity, the U.S. military will have a difficult time dedicating the necessary attention and resources to these threats while fighting an indefinite war with roughly 14,000 troops in Afghanistan.